Labour, knowledge and communication: rethinking the practical content of critical social theory by Masquelier, Charles
   
 
A University of Sussex DPhil thesis 
Available online via Sussex Research Online: 
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/   
This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author.   
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author   
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author   
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details   
  
Labour, Knowledge and Communication : Rethinking 
the Practical Content of Critical Social Theory 
 
 
Charles Masquelier 
 
 
 
 
 
 
July 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Social and Political Thought 
 
 
University of Sussex 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2 
 
 
Declaration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be 
submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award 
of any degree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Signature:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3 
 
University of Sussex 
 
Charles Masquelier                           Doctor of Philosophy  
 
 
 
Labour, Knowledge and Communication: Rethinking the Practical Content 
of Critical Social Theory 
 
 
Summary 
 
In response to the reification of social reality caused, according to the first generation of 
the Frankfurt School, by the instrumental mastery of nature, Adorno, Horkheimer and 
Marcuse have elaborated a critique of instrumental reason aimed at providing the 
theoretical tools for a treatment of the social realm as a field of human practice. 
Concerned with the risks of reproducing the relationship between humanity and nature 
hindering human emancipation, they have nevertheless sought to limit the task of 
critical theory to a theoretical form of resistance, thereby divorcing social theory from 
the practical orientations found in Marx‟s critique of political economy. It was not until 
the works of second-generation critical theorist Jürgen Habermas, that one could find a 
renewed attempt to link theory with the objective conditions of existence thought to be 
required for human emancipation. With these theoretical developments, however, social 
theory was effectively stripped of its critique of technology, and became primarily 
concerned with the problem of human emancipation as a matter strictly regarding 
intersubjective relations. The present work proposes that the formulation of a social 
critique oriented towards the institutionalisation of emancipatory practice cannot 
presuppose or apologise for the instrumental mastery of external nature. It shall be 
argued that in order to achieve such a task, the critique of instrumental reason 
elaborated by the first generation of Frankfurt School theorists must be complemented 
and completed with the broad outline of an institutional framework capable of 
indicating the conditions of existence required for the actualisation of human 
emancipation as the labour-mediated reconciliation of humanity with both internal and 
external nature, and for which the works of G.D.H. Cole provide a potential basis for 
rethinking critical theory and updating libertarian socialism.  
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Introduction  
 
 
„Philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change 
it‟1 
 
 
„[T]he great transformation to which this century is moving [is] the reconciliation of 
mankind with nature and with itself‟2 
 
 
 
 Under the modern age, humanity has witnessed an unprecedented level and 
speed of accumulation of wealth and technological development, both made possible by 
the rise of industry which marked a shift of attention “from nature as the source of 
marvels and new powers to the human instruments whereby these natural forces were 
discovered, integrated, and made serviceable for man‟s purposes.”‟3 Modernity‟s 
material achievements are, in this sense, the products of a new relationship between 
humanity and external nature, namely the instrumental mastery of the latter by the 
former. However, can equally significant achievements be observed at the social level? 
More specifically, has the modern age fulfilled its own promises of autonomy, equality 
and justice for all?   
Marx was among the first modern thinkers to assess the achievements of 
modernity. Although aware of the progressive character of this new phase of social 
development, he discovered significant social failures which he came to associate with 
the dominant form of economic organisation marking the new relationship between 
humanity and external nature, namely the capitalist mode of production. Whilst 
capitalism had led to an unprecedented pace of growth and technological development, 
it had failed to bring about the economic and political institutions whereby the direct 
producers, i.e. the majority of the population, could exert control over their conditions 
of existence and reap the due rewards of their work. The illusory heaven of the political 
community was all but a mirror of the exploitative and alienating character of the sphere 
of material reproduction. As a diagnosis exposing the social failures – and their 
(economic) causes – of modernity, therefore, his theoretical framework came to assume 
the form of a social critique. Its primary aim consisted in replacing the economic and 
                                                 
1
 Marx, K. “Theses on Feuerbach” in McLellan, D. (2000) Karl Marx: Selected Writings, p 171 
2
 Engels, F. Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, 1844 
3
 Leiss, W. (1972) The Domination of Nature, New York: George Braziller, p 76 
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political institutions that have prevented this new phase of social development from 
actualising autonomy, equality and justice for all. With Marx, then, one witnesses the 
emergence of a social theory primarily oriented towards a form of political action 
leading to the radical re-organisation of economic life, i.e. the collective control of 
production.
4
 However, according to his later works, social change was not a merely 
desirable goal. It was also the inevitable consequence of the self-destructive dynamism 
of a form of capital accumulation relying upon the continuous expansion of productive 
forces. The relationship between humanity and external nature underpinning the 
capitalist mode of production would eventually liberate humanity from the fetters of 
wage-slavery. Marx‟s unity of theory and practice, therefore, appears to be tied to the 
instrumental mastery of external nature.  
 A few decades later, a school of thought heavily inspired by new intellectual and 
socio-historical developments came to question the viability of Marx‟s own social 
critique. The emergence of totalitarian regimes in Western and Eastern Europe 
combined with the development of capitalism into its “advanced” form, led the early 
generation of Frankfurt School theorists
5
 to re-assess the achievements of modernity 
and the role of critique in an age whereby the prospects for social change appear as 
remote as they have ever been since modernity‟s inception. Drawing their inspiration 
from the social theories of Weber and Freud, they sought to expose the repressive 
mechanisms that had led to the emergence of such a state of affairs. Although clearly 
aware of the problematic character of capitalist production, they discovered that the 
development of the principle of self-preservation into a cultural and epistemological 
form effectively prompted the elaboration of a critique capable of recognising the role 
of knowledge in repression. With Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse, then, one 
witnesses a clear attempt to approach autonomy from the standpoint of the relationship 
between humanity and internal nature, and explain repression as the domination of the 
                                                 
4 It should nevertheless be noted here that, as Finlayson noted, the early Marx rejected the view according 
to which we ought to “confront the world as doctrinaires with a new principle” and stressed the important 
of “develop[ing] new principles for the world out of principles of the world.” In this sense Marx‟s social 
critique could be said to remain within the confines of immanence. However, the task of developing “new 
principles” leading to the overthrow of the existing reality remains. Social critique, therefore, continues to 
be oriented towards a subversive form of practice. Finlayson, J.G. “Political, Moral and Critical Theory. 
On the Practical Philosophy of the Frankfurt School” in Rosen, M. and  Leiter, B. (eds) (2008) The 
Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p 640 
5
 Whilst Adorno, Horheimer and Marcuse are said to belong to this generation, also known as the “first 
generation” of critical theory, Habermas is said to be a member of the “second generation” of critical 
theory. See Finlayson, J.G. “Political, Moral and Critical Theory. On the Practical Philosophy of the 
Frankfurt School” in Rosen, M. and  Leiter, B. (eds) (2008) The Oxford Handbook of Continental 
Philosophy 
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latter by the former, mediated by forms of property, state and consciousness, stemming 
from the relationship between humanity and external nature. Autonomy would therefore 
consist in the emancipation of the repressed, namely internal nature, from the 
instrumental form of rationality unfolding under the principle of self-preservation and 
causing humanity to raise itself out of nature whilst seeking to master its forces. As 
Leiss observed, the earlier generation of Frankfurt School theorists presented the form 
of knowledge oriented towards the mastery of external nature, i.e. technology, as “one 
of the means by which mastery of [external] nature is linked to mastery over man. [text 
added]”6 With the critique of instrumental reason, then, one discovers that the prospects 
of human emancipation could no longer merely rely on the development of productive 
forces. Social critique could no longer trust practice:  
 
Marx received the thesis of the primacy of practical reason from Kant and the German idealists, 
and he sharpened it into a challenge to change the world instead of merely interpreting it. He 
thus underwrote something as arch-bourgeois as the program of an absolute control of nature. 
What is felt here is the effort to make things unlike the subject and make them like the subject – 
the real model of the principle of identity, which dialectical materialism disavows as such.
7
  
 
 Marx‟s apparent attempt to link theory with the bourgeois practice of the 
mastery of external nature prevented him from equipping his critique of political 
economy with the theoretical tools capable of identifying the repressive character of 
technology under the modern age. Thus, with the earlier generation of Frankfurt School 
theorists, the narrative of autonomy (as emancipation) remains central to theory, but is 
no longer tied to a specific project of political action oriented towards the 
institutionalisation of emancipatory practice. Emancipation, here, effectively becomes a 
strictly theoretical “force of resistance” aimed at negating the “technological 
domination” concealed by the reified social reality.8 As such, social critique‟s primary 
concern no longer consists in transcending the existing social reality. Instead, its task 
involves providing the theoretical tools with which individuals can treat society as a 
function “which originates in human action and therefore is a possible object of planful 
                                                 
6
 Ibid, p 147 
7
 Adorno, T.W. (1997) Negative Dialectics, New York: Continuum, p 244 
8
 Adorno, T.W.  “Resignation,” in Adorno, T.W. (1991) The Culture Industry, ed. J.M. Berstein, London: 
Routledge, pp 202-3. Under this guise, critique began to assume an “artistic” form. See The New Spirit of 
Capitalism by Boltanski and Chiapello for a detailed account of the distinction between “social” and 
“artistic” critiques.  
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decision and rational determination of goals.”9 Having acquired, here, an immanent 
character, social critique can no longer be expected to anticipate the objective 
conditions of existence required for the actualisation of human emancipation.  
 The theoretical developments undertaken by second generation theorist Jürgen 
Habermas, however, have contributed to the revision of social critique‟s practical 
content.
10
 In his famous work entitled The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere, for example, Habermas sought to draw some of the basic institutional contours 
capable of yielding autonomy. His nuanced praise of the Bourgeois public sphere 
emerging in the early stages of modernity did provide a somewhat clear indication of 
some of the institutional features thought to be suitable for the actualisation of 
autonomy. In his following works Habermas did nevertheless make it clear that 
although human emancipation must be understood as a phenomenon regarding the 
communicative practices of the “lifeworld,” it effectively depends on humanity‟s 
emancipation from the forces of external nature through the latter‟s instrumental 
mastery in the “system.” On the one hand, then, the theoretical developments 
undertaken by Habermas stripped critical theory of its critique of technology. On the 
other hand, he re-oriented critical theory towards matters of a normative nature thought 
to be regarding institutions and forms of social practice located outside the sphere of 
material reproduction. Habermas‟s re-assessment of the link between theory and 
practice, therefore, could be understood as a renewed attempt to assign a prescriptive 
role to social critique, where the latter aims to explore the possible objective conditions 
for moral autonomy alongside the capitalist organisation of material reproduction. As 
such, his critical theory sought, like Marx‟s own social critique, to explore the 
institutional conditions under which autonomy, justice and equality for all are possible, 
whilst both rejecting the need for a radical re-organisation of economic life and 
abandoning the critique of instrumental reason elaborated by the previous generation of 
Frankfurt School theorists.  
 The present work nevertheless proposes that the formulation of a critical theory 
oriented towards the institutionalisation of emancipatory practice does not necessarily 
presuppose an apology for the instrumental mastery of external nature. A revision of 
                                                 
9
 Horkheimer, M. “Traditional and Critical Theory,” in Horkheimer, M. Critical Theory: Selected Essays, 
New York: herder and Herder, p 207 
10
 His work entitled Theory and Practice was Habermas‟s most explicit attempt to rethink the link 
between theory and practice.   
 
  
12 
 
the practical content of critical theory may indeed succeed in combining the earlier 
generation‟s critique of instrumental reason with an insight into the objective conditions 
of existence required for human emancipation, thereby maximising critical theory‟s 
political impact in an age whereby both the actual and potential material and human 
costs resulting from the mastery of nature have gained a prominent significance in 
collective consciousness.
11
   
 In the first chapter of the present work I shall attempt to show that the 
aforementioned task ought to be undertaken by re-assessing Marx‟s own concept of 
labour. A close inspection of his early works, and particularly his Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts, will reveal that Marx had in fact developed a conception of 
autonomous practice presupposing a relationship between humanity and nature 
distinguishable from his predecessors – Kant and Hegel – and exhibiting an affinity 
with the conception of human emancipation as reconciliation defended by the earlier 
generation of critical theorists, and exposed in the second chapter. At this point, it shall 
be shown in what ways Marx‟s concept of labour as self-realisation could serve the 
function of mediating agent for the reconciliation of humanity and nature, and be 
combined with Adorno‟s critique of instrumental reason in such a way as realise the 
transformative potential of critical theory.  
In the third chapter, I shall seek to expose the compatibility of the unity of 
critical theory with a practical content oriented towards the institutionalisation of 
emancipatory practice. It shall be argued that whilst the transformative potential of 
critical theory derives from the principle of negativity, its realisation effectively depends 
on giving the utopian content unleashed by the latter its due. Whilst such a task was 
partly undertaken by Jürgen Habermas, chapter four will seek to demonstrate that the 
prospects of the reconciliation of humanity with itself rest, contra the second-generation 
theorist, upon a re-organisation of the relationship between humanity and external 
nature. Consequently, the dependence of communicative practices upon subject-object 
relations must be recognised. The task set out in chapter five shall, in this sense, consist 
in both exposing the problems posed by Habermas‟s theory of communicative action, 
                                                 
11
 Climate change science has significantly contributed to the increasing awareness of the human causes 
of environmental problems. In the academic world, Beck‟s Risk Society (1992) represents a major turning 
point, for it introduced such concerns into mainstream sociological thinking. A plethora of texts 
addressing such issues have been published since then. See, for example, Redclift‟s and Benton‟s Social 
Theory and the Global Environment (1994), Martell‟s Ecology and Society (1994), and Bellamy Foster‟s 
Ecology Against Capitalism (2000). 
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and exploring the theoretical premises for the conceptualisation of non-manipulative 
subject-object relations.  
In the last two chapters, a case for an alignment of critical theory with the 
libertarian socialist institutional framework elaborated by G.D.H. Cole will be made. In 
chapter six, the elective affinity between the broad theoretical orientations of the earlier 
generation of Frankfurt School theorists and Cole‟s social and political theory will be 
exposed. The next, and final chapter of the thesis, shall serve to demonstrate the 
suitability of the latter‟s institutional framework for the task of reconciliation, and to 
present it as both the appropriate insight into the objective conditions of existence 
required for human emancipation, and the culmination of the theoretical reconstruction 
oriented towards the realisation of critical theory‟s transformative potential. It must 
nevertheless be noted here that the attempt to link the broad theoretical orientations of 
the critical theory of the Frankfurt School with Cole‟s own work is not new.12 However, 
whilst previous attempts to establish such a link have tended to concentrate on the 
possibility of institutionalising the Frankfurt School‟s approach to emancipation as 
reconciliation from a libertarian socialist standpoint, the author of the present work shall 
proceed with the more specific task of proposing that such a project requires the re-
conceptualisation of Marx‟s concept of labour into a form of practice capable of 
mediating humanity and nature (both internal and external).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 See Darrow Schecter‟s Beyond Hegemony (2005). 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
 
From Autonomy to Human Emancipation: the Mediating Function of 
Labour as Self-realisation 
 
 
 
 Marx‟s work has often been treated as somewhat continuous with the conception 
of autonomy first formulated by Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant.
1
 The practice of 
autonomy Marx is often thought to advocate has, in this sense, been associated with 
humanity‟s mastery of both internal and external forces of nature. The present chapter 
shall nevertheless seek to demonstrate that, in sharp contrast with orthodox 
interpretations of his work, Marx‟s concept of labour provides a potential basis upon 
which a concept of practice oriented towards the mediated non-identity of humanity and 
nature can be formulated.  
 
 
 
Idealism, Autonomy, and the Mediated Unity of Humanity and Nature 
 
 Kant‟s most explicit formulation of the conditions for autonomous practice can 
be found in his essay entitled What is Enlightenment? In it he describes enlightenment 
as a condition whereby one is able “to use one‟s own understanding without the 
guidance of another.”2 Individuals can only expect to realise their freedom  once they 
have developed the capacity to “think for themselves.”3 For Kant, the problem of 
autonomy begins with an investigation of the conditions under which humanity‟s 
emancipation from the fetters of nature and other external forces, and ends with the 
“freedom to make public use of one‟s reason.”4 The capacity to think rationally is 
central. It is not only inseparable from, but also a precondition of autonomy. Despite 
                                                 
1
 Adorno‟s own stance can be said to characterise the orthodox interpretations of Marx‟s work, namely 
those emphasising the continuity between the latter‟s approach to the relationship between humanity and 
Kant‟s. In Negative Dialectics, for example, he charged Marx for advocating the “absolute control of 
nature.” Adorno, T.W. Negative Dialectics, p 244 
2
 Kant, I. What is Enlightenment?, in Reiss, H. (1991) Kant: Political Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p 54 
3
 Ibid, p 55 
4
 Ibid, p 55 
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such a heavy emphasis on reason, Kant wished to demonstrate that that neither the 
purpose of his task nor his conclusions could be compared to the rationalist tradition of 
epistemology. 
 Central to Kant‟s “Copernican Revolution” was the demonstration that 
epistemology should cease to seek the origins of knowledge in either humanity or 
nature, and move beyond the antagonism between pure rational thinking and sensory 
perception.
5
 Epistemology could no longer limit itself to the task of investigating the 
origins of knowledge per se. In order to satisfy the demands of autonomous practice, 
epistemology had to realign its goals to include within its scope concerns regarding the 
conditions under which knowledge becomes possible. Such a realignment, Kant 
believed, should begin with the recognition of the fact that humanity is both part of, and 
distinct from nature. Rather than dismissing the realm of sensory experience as 
unworthy participant in knowledge, the Kantian conception of autonomous thinking 
accepts the existence of contradictory – “sensible” and “intelligible” – forces in the 
constitution of knowledge, and seeks to mediate them. However the transcendental 
subject, in possession of a transhistorical rational faculty now seeking to master the 
chaotic impulses of sense-perception, cannot claim to know the “things in themselves” 
(noumena). It must accept that any attempt to “think for oneself” is limited to the 
knowledge of things as they appear (phenomena). In order to present themselves to the 
“twelve categories of the understanding”‟ and thus acquire validity in the constitution of 
knowledge, the sensuous objects must subject themselves to the rule of reason, whose 
function is to prepare such objects for their synthesis with the understanding, and 
eventually turn them into reliable representations, i.e. the actual substance of rational 
experience.  Failure to do so would deny knowledge its contradictory character by 
effecting a return to the relativism of empirical experience, thus reducing humanity to 
nature. Kant‟s investigation of the conditions under which knowledge is possible 
consisted of a reassessment of the relationship between concepts and senses, between 
humanity and nature. He found that rather than acting as two distinct sources of 
representation, they in fact belonged to a single epistemological foundation, but that in 
order to hold the chaotic nature of the subjective phantasy in check, and convert the raw 
energy of sense perception into a constructive component of autonomy, the senses had 
to be brought under the control of reason. Thus, according to Kant, the prospects of 
                                                 
5
 It is indeed the self-proclaimed task of his first critique – the Critique of Pure Reason – to revolutionise 
epistemology by overcoming the antagonism between rationalism and empiricism.   
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autonomous thinking rest on reason‟s capacity to mediate the forces of humanity and 
nature.   
 The realisation of such a form of autonomy in practice does nevertheless depend 
upon further conditions. As was mentioned above, one must be capable of making 
public use of one‟s reason. For Kant, this refers to “that use which anyone may make of 
it as a man of learning addressing the entire reading public.”6 Conditions must be such 
that all enlightened individuals have the opportunity to comment on the public affairs of 
a given society and political community. In order to become a member of the “public 
sphere,”7 and be in a position to question and eventually subvert the power in place, 
however, one must first develop one‟s own conception of the common good. This, Kant 
argued, can be achieved only by fulfilling one‟s “duty” as a public person. Under this 
“absolute law of reason,”8 the potentially chaotic spontaneity of the will would be held 
in check. One would indeed be encouraged to act according to clearly defined 
motivations, be inclined to subsume individual happiness under motives of a universal 
nature, thus equipping citizens with a constant capacity to make decisions in line with 
the common good and ultimately providing the conditions required for the universal 
exercise of autonomous practice. The presence of a public sphere, in other words, 
ensures that the principle whereby “the freedom of each can co-exist with the freedom of 
all others,”9 itself embodied in the laws of the state, governs the actions of individuals 
and, as such, serves as a key condition for the practice of autonomous thinking. By 
allowing sense-experience to be legislated by reason, Kant‟s mediation of humanity and 
nature also favours the satiation of those faculties capable of protecting the former 
against its dependence on the latter‟s forces,10 thereby treating sensations and other 
                                                 
6
 Kant, I. What is Enlightenment?, p 55 
7
 This term was coined by Habermas with reference to Kant‟s own conception of “publicity” in his work 
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. 
8
 Kant, I. “On the Common Saying : „This may be true in theory, but it does not apply in practice,‟” in 
Reiss, H. (1991) Kant: Political Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p 67 
9
 Kant, I. “The Metaphysics of Morals,” in Reiss, H. (1991) Kant: Political Writings, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p 191 
10
 Kant‟s distinction between autonomy and heteronomy is key to grasping the  mediating role played by 
reason. While he understood the former as a condition whereby the independence of the will is secured 
when desires and other inclinations are legislated by reason, he described the latter as a state of affairs 
where the will is under the influence of forces independent of our control, such as natural inclinations, or, 
the will. Kant presented such a legislating role of reason in autonomy as a moral “duty” which “is nothing 
more than a limitation of the will within a universal legislation” Kant, I. “On the Common Saying : “This 
may be true in theory, but it does not apply in practice,‟” p 65 
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“natural” inclinations as potential obstacles to autonomous thinking.11 Autonomy, as a 
result, becomes synonymous with the rational mastery of forces of internal and external 
nature, a condition of existence equated to a liberation through thought relying on both 
a transhistorical and purely subjective conception of reason.  
According to Hegel, however, such a state of affairs could only emerge as the 
culmination of a historical process of self-creation. Whilst Hegel maintains that 
knowledge is constituted through the interplay of contradictory forces, and presents the 
rational will as the fundamental component of “self-determination,” he makes several 
key adjustments to the Kantian concept of enlightenment. With Hegelian idealism, 
rational thinking no longer stands as a fixed faculty of the mind freeing individuals from 
the fetters of tutelage whilst securing the peaceful coexistence of autonomous wills 
through self-imposed limitations (duty). Instead, “absolute knowledge”12 emerges as the 
culmination of the historical unfolding of “spirit” (Geist) which, following a process of 
externalisation and re-appropriation between individuals‟ determinate existence and 
their essence, eventually finds refuge in the rational laws of the state as the moment of 
“absolute freedom.” The individual, now acquiring his/her freedom through the 
recognition of the fact that “the real is rational, [and] the rational is real,” can expect to 
engage in autonomous practice only when reason “transforms thought into an existent 
thought, or being into a thought-constituted being”.13 Hegel‟s liberation in thought, 
therefore, may only be possible under historically specific socio-political institutions, 
but echoes Kant‟s emphasis on reason as the mediating agent of humanity and nature, 
only this time by assuming the form of objective substance embodied in historically 
specific socio-political institutions. In his work The Philosophy of Right Hegel famously 
claimed that self-determination would be most effectively secured by a political 
institution like the state. The state is the “ethical Idea,” the objective substance of reason 
as spirit, and the moment of identity between the self-conscious subject and its re-
appropriated essence. As such, the state is the embodiment of the subject‟s will and the 
so-called rational character of its laws serves to secure the free, competitive, yet 
harmonious, self-interested satisfaction of needs taking place in the sphere of civil 
                                                 
11
 The term “natural” used here refers to both external and internal nature. Kant‟s liberation from nature is 
not only a liberation from the external forces of nature but, more generally, from those forces independent 
of our control. Desires, and other forms of “natural” inclinations do therefore fit into the definition.  
12
 In contrast to Kant, Hegel believed that one could know the “things in themselves” but thought that this 
absolute form of knowledge could only be attained under particular socio-historical conditions.  
13
 Hegel, G.W.F. (1961) The Phenomenology of Mind, 2
nd
 ed, George Allen and Unwin: London: p 283 
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society.
14
 Its abstraction from, and protection of, civil society and the family allow it to 
create the most favourable conditions for the self-conscious determination and 
realisation of particular ends within society at large. The laws of the state, in this sense, 
not only embody the concept of absolute freedom, they are also the conditions for its 
actualisation.  
A key concern for the idealist thinker – one that is echoed in the works of his 
predecessor Kant – revolved around the resolution of the riddle caused by the 
coexistence of particular and potentially conflicting wills. The two German 
philosophers were aware that both the determination and the realisation of an 
individual‟s particular ends could not be taking place in isolation from other individuals. 
Whereas for Kant such a problem is resolved by the limitation that one imposes on 
one‟s will (duty) in one‟s role as a public person (citizen), for Hegel the solution lies in 
the particular individual‟s recognition of the “welfare of others” as a precondition of the 
realisation of his or her own ends.
15
 For the latter philosopher, individuals seeking to 
realise their ends as members of civil society must therefore treat the will of others as a 
constitutive part of their own.
16
 Only this way can the universal content of the will be 
expressed and serve as a basis for the collective satisfaction of needs. Such conditions 
cannot be met, however, by merely calling onto the subjectivity of the will. Doing so 
would indeed mean leaving the realisation of particular ends to the arbitrary and chaotic 
rule of phantasy, and undermine the possibilities for a peaceful coexistence of 
individual wills. The orderly satisfaction of needs would instead be secured by the 
objective moment of the will which Hegel thought to be embodied within the laws of 
the state. As spirit, reason would, as in  the case of Kant, mediate the actions of 
individuals. In the Hegelian system, however, the manifestation of reason does not limit 
itself to the channelling of the raw energy of sensory experience through the isolated 
action of an individual but crucially depends upon the recognition of other individuals‟ 
wills as a precondition of one‟s own.  
According to Hegel, individuals may be in a position to determine their own 
ends – as the subjective moment of freedom – but can only expect to realise these ends 
as beings fully conscious of their of their role as members of the “family,” “civil 
society,” and the “state.” Whereas the development of  the “subjective needs” of the 
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individual will already depends on the mere existence of  “external things” such as “the 
property and product of the needs and wills of others,”17 their satisfaction can take place 
only once such external things have been recognised, or as Hegel put it, “negated,” as 
integral components of a person‟s will. In the relationship between a slave and a master, 
for example, the formal independence of the latter as a being driven by desires heavily 
depends on the labour of the former to realise such drives. Similarly, as the material 
form of the slave‟s capacities, the object of labour is the external confirmation of his or 
her individuality. Both parties can nevertheless expect to move closer to their spiritual 
independence (self-consciousness) only once “each is for the other what the other is for 
it,”18 once each party recognises the other as the externalised form of their own 
individuality, with, on the one hand, the master conscious of his dependence upon the 
powers of another and, on the other hand, the slave realising “that it is precisely in his 
work wherein he seemed to have only an alienated existence that he acquires a mind of 
his own.”19 The subject‟s conscious re-appropriation of its objectified self (self-
consciousness) is the next and ultimate step towards the actualisation of self-
determination. It is the stage whereby, as the embodiment of the universality of the will, 
the rational laws of the state accommodate the various particular wills so that each 
conscious individual (“being with oneself”) recognises the other as his or her 
externalised self (“being with oneself in another”), and the totality of the social order as 
a realm of human practice.  
While Kant addressed reason as a subjective faculty freeing individuals from the 
fetters of nature and other forms of dependence, and located the basic conditions for 
autonomy in a ahistorical mediation of humanity and nature, Hegel believed the latter 
conditions to be found in a historically specific stage marked by the intersubjective 
recognition of the laws of the state as the “substantial will.”20 Drawing his inspiration 
from his reading of Feuerbach, however, the young Marx expressed serious doubts 
about the capacity of the latter socio-political model to provide individuals with the 
necessary form of freedom for autonomous practice. Although an advocate of Hegel‟s 
historicised reading of the dialectics of humanity and nature, he was keen to expose the 
problems associated with their mediation by the state. For him, such a mediating role 
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could not be performed by the abstract laws of such an institution, and would have to be 
found, instead, within the economic base of society. 
 
 
Labour as Mediation 
 
 Marx is well known for writing some of the most famous of his early works as a 
form of critique of idealist philosophy, and more particularly of Hegel‟s own system of 
thought.
21
 In these same works, however, can also be found passages in which Marx 
more or less explicitly acknowledges his debt to the German philosopher. In the 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, for example, he made the following remark: 
 
the greatness of Hegel‟s Phenomenology and its final product, the dialectic of negativity as the 
moving and creating principle, is on the one hand that Hegel conceives of the self-creation of 
man as a process, objectification as loss of the object, as externalisation and the transcendence of 
this externalisation. This means, therefore, that he grasps the nature of labour and understands 
objective man, true, because real, man as a result of his own labour. The real, active relationship 
of man to himself as a species-being or the manifestation of himself as a real species-being, i.e. 
as a human being, is only possible if he uses all his species powers to create (which is again only 
possible through the cooperation of man and as a result of history), if he relates himself to them 
as objects, which can only be done at first in the form of alienation.
22
  
 
 Although Kant, in his attempt to find the conditions under which knowledge is 
possible, had already re-conceptualised the subject‟s relation to the world of objects, 
Marx thought that it was not until Hegel that the most fundamental dynamics of such a 
relation had been discovered. Marx was particularly seduced by Hegel‟s approach to the 
subject as a being endowed with an objective existence. From the Phenomenology of 
Spirit onwards, the prospects of autonomy would no longer rest on a world of objects 
mastered and dialectically mediated by the subject‟s rational faculty (subjective man), 
but would instead depend on the subject‟s recognition of this world as the objective 
manifestation of the subject‟s very own powers (objective man), and consequently 
allow this same subject to gain consciousness of this same world as a realm of human 
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practice. Marx was in fact keen to praise Hegel for grasping autonomy as a condition 
realised through subjectively and objectively mediated forms of practice. Like Hegel, 
therefore, Marx construed the development of the individual as a process of creation 
whereby “all objects become for him the objectification of himself. They are objects 
that confirm and realise his individuality, his own objects, i.e. he becomes an object 
himself.”23 
 Like Hegel, then, Marx conceived of self-creation as a process involving both a 
stage of estrangement and one of re-appropriation. He nevertheless expressed serious 
doubts regarding Hegel‟s own approach to the latter stage.24 Indeed, as was explained 
by the idealist philosopher, re-appropriation would take place through a process of 
recognition regulated by the rational laws of the state whose embodied universality acts 
as the substance required for the subject to become conscious of the limited freedom 
gained from the objectification of its own essence, and subsequently consider the 
abolition of such alienation as a condition for the realisation of absolute freedom. For 
Hegel, it meant recognising the external world as the subject‟s “other,” a condition 
perceived as thoroughly problematic by Marx who, inspired by Feuerbach‟s The 
Essence of Christianity, expressed doubts regarding the predominant role the former 
thinker assigned to subjectivity in human practice. Leaving the task of abolishing 
alienation to the mere activity of the mind indeed means that the “appropriation of 
man‟s objectified and alienated faculties is […] only an appropriation that occurs […] in 
pure thought, i.e. in abstraction.”25 In the last instance, the actualisation of self-
determination does not require the subject to abolish the existing social, political and 
economic conditions of existence. For example, the state, as the objective moment of 
the subject‟s freedom, need only be thought as the subject‟s externalised essence for the 
laws to acquire validity and the process of intersubjective recognition to come to 
fruition. If Hegel ultimately reduced the reconciliation of essence and existence to a 
mere activity of the mind, however, it is because he approached the relation between 
humanity and nature from the standpoint of “abstract, mental labour,” from a process of 
objectification whereby the individual producer fails to confirm himself or herself 
practically. Hegel does indeed fail to see or at least account for the fact that, as the 
institutional expression of a non-autonomous form of practice, namely alienated labour, 
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the reconciliation of the particularity of concrete existence and the universality of the 
abstracted essence cannot take place unless their separation is abolished practically. 
Thus, whilst Marx acknowledged the fact that the mediation of the particular existence 
and the universal essence of the modern individual by the rational laws of the state, 
marked the advent of a distinctively new and more advanced stage in the development 
of human capacities, he rejected the Hegelian argument according to which 
“supersession in thought […] lets its object remain in reality [but] believes it has really 
overcome it.”26 The ultimately subjective nature of re-appropriation led him to dismiss 
the mediating role of the abstract laws of the state as a justification for the self-
interested particularism of the immediate existence characterising bourgeois societies, 
and denied this historically specific “true” and “concrete” form of life the possibility to 
be reconciled with its universal essence. According to Marx, the project of an actual 
reconciliation of essence and existence, of “real, practical emancipation” does not end 
with the abstraction of the state from civil society or “political emancipation,” and thus 
cannot be found within the socio-political institutions of the bourgeois order.
27
 Instead, 
such a project depends on the following conditions:
 
 
 
The actual individual man must take the abstract citizen back into himself and, as an individual 
man in his empirical life, in his individual work and individual relationships become a species-
being; man must recognize his own forces as social forces, organize them, and thus no longer 
separate social forces from himself in the form of political forces. Only when this has been 
achieved will human emancipation be completed.
28
  
 
 With Marx, then, autonomy becomes synonymous with “human emancipation.” 
But if the prospects of human emancipation depend on the objective abolition of 
alienation how, then, does Marx envisage the mediation of the political community and 
civil society? What form of human practice can allow the individual to “take the 
abstract citizen back into himself”? To answer such questions one has to turn to his 
concept of “species-being.” 
 In his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts Marx, like Kant and Hegel 
before him, sought to extract the conditions for autonomy from the mediated relation 
between the universality of essence and the particularity of existence. However, whilst 
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the two idealist philosophers ultimately left the task of mediation to the synthetic 
activity of reason (Kant) or to the historical unfolding of the “concept” (Hegel), Marx 
re-conceptualised practice in line with his effort to turn the process of re-appropriation 
into a form of action bearing real consequences for the objective world. In his 
materialist schema, humanity remains a part of nature while consciously making it the 
object of its self-formative activity. As the “inorganic body of man,”29 however, nature 
is both the object and the subject of practice. It is an “immense material” transformed by 
human powers, “but also a potential” dialectically realised by nature‟s transfer into the 
products of such an activity.
30
 As a result, it is outside the abstract realm of the state and 
into the productive sphere of labour that Marx envisaged to reconcile humanity‟s 
essence with its existence.  
 Universality could no longer remain an illusory reality, the exclusive content of 
a political community abstracted from the “sensuous, individual, immediate existence” 
of the member of civil society.
31
 With Marx, the state becomes the necessary 
companion
32
 to an insufficiently emancipatory “vital activity.”33 It is the 
institutionalised form of a problematic relation between humanity and nature; a mere 
transitory stage in the development of human powers that Hegel had been capable of 
grasping only in positive terms. For Marx, it is in the active process of self-creation 
mediating humanity and nature (the economy) that the individual finds the means to 
“relate[…] to himself as to a universal and therefore free being.”34 Through an activity 
in which he makes “practically and theoretically […] both his own and other species 
into his objects [italics added]”35 the individual acquires the capacity to recognise the 
products of labour “as examples of the kind,”36 thus “relat[ing] to himself as to the 
present, living species”37 and obtaining confirmation of his universal essence within the 
sphere of labour itself.   
 Whilst Marx praised Hegel for grasping autonomy as the product of a historical 
process culminating in the unity of the subject and the object, the former located the 
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agent of mediation of such a unity in a form of human practice to be found beyond the 
confines of Hegel‟s own pinnacle of human development. Autonomy, now conceived of 
as human emancipation, would no longer manifest itself as a mere product of the mind, 
but would instead begin to signify the realisation of capacities one possesses in virtue of 
one‟s being a member of the human species.  
 
 
Autonomy as Human Emancipation 
 
According to the two idealist philosophers, the prospects of autonomy ultimately 
depended upon individuals‟ capacity to allow their actions to be freely governed by 
reason, i.e. act rationally; a force manifesting itself either subjectively, as the 
quintessential human faculty, or objectively, through laws of a state acting as the 
embodiment of an individual‟s will, thus restricting the emancipation of humanity from 
the fetters of nature and tutelage to the free development of a set of cognitive faculties. 
The significance of the industrial age for the development of what came to be known as 
specifically human faculties, was also central to Marx‟s works. For him, the age of 
progress was characterised by “relationships [that] are no longer determined by nature 
but are set up by society,”38 and by the fact that, for the first time in its history, 
humanity could begin to contemplate “making its own and other species into its 
objects.” Capitalism, in fact, marked the advent of a new relation between humanity and 
nature: 
 
Industry is the real historical relationship of nature, and therefore of natural science, to man. If 
then it is conceived of as the open revelation of human faculties, then the human essence of 
nature or the natural essence of man will also be understood. Natural science will then lose its 
one-sidedly materialist, or rather idealistic, orientation and become the basis of human science as 
it has already, though in alienated form, become the basis of actual human life.
39
  
 
At least three key elements can be observed here. Firstly, Marx attempted to 
draw attention to the fact that the rise of the capitalist mode of production signifies a 
radical break with all previous relations between humanity and nature. Whilst, prior to 
it, the development of the human species had remained dependent upon the contingency 
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of natural forces, the emergence of capital and the corresponding introduction of new 
methods of production meant that “[n]ature bec[ame] for the first time an object for 
mankind,”40 and the latter a species finally acquiring the technical means to emancipate 
itself from the bonds of nature. However, the emergence of scientific knowledge and the 
achievement of an unprecedented growth in productive forces made possible by the 
mediation of both natural and human forces, do not by themselves create conditions 
entirely favourable for human emancipation, or, as Marx put it, for the realisation of 
“natural science as the basis of actual human life.” This brings us to the second point. 
While Marx recognised that the intellectual and material wealth generated by 
capitalist methods of production marked a breakthrough in the history of human 
development, he was much less enthusiastic regarding the conditions under which such 
wealth was being accumulated. Capitalism, he thought, may have developed the 
technology necessary for the mastery of the forces of nature, but the introduction of the 
wage-system also meant that the immediate producer‟s capacity to produce freely, and 
therefore consciously would be jeopardised. Indeed, as soon as workers are forced to 
sell their labour to another person in order to have access to the basic means of 
subsistence, their relation to both the product and the activity performed for its creation 
tend to alter. No longer in control of the labour process, and with an activity performed 
as a means rather than an end in itself, the worker is forced to seek the confirmation of 
his essence in a sphere outside labour. Now only capable of satisfying his needs 
indirectly, he confronts both labour and the product created therefrom as moments 
external to the needs themselves, or “alien” moments, and comes to experience 
objectification as alienation, “a loss of reality.”41 By denying the labourer the means to 
confirm his essence, his “vital activity” turns him into “a purely subjective force 
without objective existence.”42 As a result, and in order to achieve autonomy, humanity 
must not only master the forces of nature through labour. Individual producers must 
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also be in a position to create the sensuous objects that will confirm their essence as 
members of the human species. 
As a third key point made by Marx in the passage above can be found the notion 
that the process whereby humanity appropriates nature acts as a source for “real 
historical relationship of nature to man” only by allowing the individual to realise the 
“open revelation of human faculties.” Labour, if performed under the right conditions, 
would mediate the unity of humanity and nature as an activity serving the development 
of a wide range of capacities through the transformation of nature. However, Marx‟s 
early works rather inconsistently address the form assumed by the relationship between 
humanity and nature in question, and tend to approach it from two more or less 
distinguishable angles. The first thesis running through his works was developed in 
conjunction with the distinction he made between the animal and the human species: 
 
It is true that the animal, too, produces. It builds itself a nest, a dwelling, like the bee, the beaver, 
the ant, etc. But it only produces what it needs immediately for itself or its offspring; it produces 
one-sidedly whereas man produces universally; it produces only under the pressure of immediate 
physical need, whereas man produces freely from physical need and only truly produces when he 
is thus free; it produces only itself whereas man reproduces the whole of nature. Its product 
belongs immediately to its physical body whereas man can freely separate himself from his 
product. The animal only fashions things according to the standards and needs of the species it 
belongs to, whereas man knows how to produce according to the measure of every species and 
knows everywhere how to apply its inherent standard to the object; thus man also fashions things 
according to the laws of beauty.
43
 
 
To be human here means, once again, being capable of making nature the object 
of human practice, of transforming nature in a manner suitable for the development of 
what Marx thought to be an exclusively human quality, namely consciousness. Hence 
humans do not merely produce, they create. Their capacity to think (cognition) means 
that through labour, they do not only produce the objects that will satisfy basic needs 
such as “eating, drinking and procreating,”44 but also find an outlet for the expression of 
their creativity and the satisfaction of their highly sophisticated needs. Thus, insofar as 
they allow human beings to make nature into an object of human practice, cognitive 
faculties perform a central role in the realisation of autonomy. For this reason, the rise 
of industry marks a turning point in the development of humanity‟s transformative 
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capacities. However, as suggested by his emphasis on the creative role of truly human 
practice, and his call for human emancipation, Marx‟s approach to autonomy cannot be 
understood merely in terms of either an independence from external forces made 
possible by the cognitive faculty of reason (Kant), or a political emancipation ultimately 
reducing the scope of self-determination to the one-sided development of cognitive 
faculties (Hegel). Human emancipation, instead, assumes the form of a process of self-
realisation aimed at the “complete emancipation of all human senses and qualities.”45 
Thus, inspired by Feuerbach‟s materialist critique of religion and his attempt to restore 
the significance of humanity‟s sensuous existence in philosophical thinking, 46  Marx 
believed sense-experience to be playing a central role in emancipation. He insisted that, 
in virtue of his being a creative creature with the capacity to feel as well as think, “man 
is affirmed in the objective world not only in thought but through all his senses [italics 
added].”47 Labour-mediated practice, therefore, not only frees humanity from the fetters 
of nature, but also realises a human essence whose content expands well beyond the 
confines delimited by cognitive faculties. The “real relationship of man to nature” thus 
involves a process through which the same activity making the latter the object of the 
former, also serves the development of a multiplicity of human faculties, both cognitive 
and sensuous.
48
  
After careful examination of Marx‟s materialism, man‟s relationship to nature 
does nevertheless begin to acquire an additional dimension. Indeed, while nature is in 
most places presented as an object of human practice, Marx also makes several 
utterances pointing towards a more active role for natural forces: 
 
The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is that the thing, 
reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as 
sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, 
the active side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, 
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sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects really distinct from the thought 
objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective activity.
49
 
 
Here, understood in terms of both cognition and sensuousness, the term “human” 
echoes the all-encompassing meaning so far discussed. The key message Marx intends 
to convey in this passage, however, takes the form of a clarification of his conception of 
sensuousness. As a feature of the human essence, sensuousness already performed a 
central role. However, it is as sense-experience in general that Marx, here, wishes to 
present the “active side” of objects. Since “directly sensuous nature for man is man‟s 
sense-experience (the expressions are identical),” the potentialities of both nature and 
humanity are realised through one and the same process.
50
 Thus, by treating the internal 
nature of humanity and external nature as “identical expressions,” Marx does not 
actually invert Hegel‟s subject-object relation through Feuerbach‟s materialism but, 
rather, shows that the “real relationship of man to nature” must also be understood as a 
relation of man to his own, individual essence. In other words, while the first thesis 
distinguishes a relation between man and external nature from the relation between man 
and his own, the second sees nature as “non-ontological,” or, as Schmidt also put it, as 
“socially mediated,” and thus understands nature as another subject in human 
emancipation.  
Central to Marx, and in accord with the idealist conception of autonomy, was his 
concern for humanity‟s independence from the forces of nature. Like Kant and Hegel, 
Marx saw modernity as an era whereby the human species would, for the first time in 
development, turn nature into its own object, thus gaining the technical means to make 
its own history. However, while the idealist philosophers have tended to construct 
autonomous practice out of an asymmetrical unity understood either as a subjection of 
nature to the legislative power of cognitive faculties (Kant), or as a “thought-constituted 
being” (Hegel), Marx‟s call for human emancipation gave natural forces a more 
significant role to play in autonomy. A case can in fact be made for an interpretation of 
Marx‟s conception of autonomy as ecological human emancipation.51 A problem 
nevertheless arises when one observes that not one, but two approaches to this unity can 
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in fact be found in his works. Indeed, how can he safely defend the view that on the one 
hand, the emancipation of humanity from the fetters of nature depends on the 
subjugation of the latter by the former whilst, on the other hand, arguing that human and 
natural sense-experience are identical?
52
 In order to be in a position to resolve this 
apparent contradiction, one must first investigate a last key element of Marx‟s concept 
of human essence, namely communality.   
 
 
On the Social Character of Human Emancipation 
 
 In the first section of the present chapter it was briefly pointed out that central to 
the idealist project of autonomous practice could be found a concern for the socially 
cohesive character of rational thinking. Whereas Kant‟s warning against the dangers of 
tutelage suggests that autonomy manifests itself through a form of freedom exercised 
independently of other individuals, Hegel‟s philosophy of recognition appears to 
embody a conception of enlightenment that not only accepts the contingence of freedom 
upon the presence of other individuals, but turns those individuals into the very 
condition of autonomous practice. It is out of this latter (Hegelian) conception of 
autonomy, one grounded in a form of freedom consciously exercised through others, 
that Marx would draw the inspiration for his own solution to the individual-society 
riddle.   
Like Hegel, Marx regarded the labour process as a key phenomenon in the 
realisation of autonomy. Both did indeed present the objectification of human powers as 
the material basis upon which the individual producer would, provided he can recognise 
the product as the external form of his individuality, eventually “become[…] conscious 
of what he truly is,”53 and thus understood it as a necessary step in the development of 
the capacity to “think for oneself.” But since modern forms of production are 
undertaken under the principle of exchange rather than immediate consumption, they do 
not merely satisfy the individual producer‟s very own needs. Through exchange, the 
products of labour also become objects that will meet another person‟s needs. They are 
endowed with the purpose of serving the development of the species as a whole, and as 
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such perform a central function in the process of realisation of both the individual and 
the communal essence. However, while Hegel thought that such a process would 
depend on a law-mediated recognition of others as conditions for the satisfaction of an 
individual‟s needs, Marx saw its completion as entirely mediated by labour itself: 
 
Supposing that we had produced in a human manner; each of us would in his production have 
doubly affirmed himself and his fellow men. I would have: (i) objectified in my production my 
individuality and its peculiarity and thus both in my activity enjoyed an individual expression of 
my life and also in looking at the object have had the individual pleasure of realising that my 
personality was objective, visible to the senses and thus a power raised beyond all doubt. (ii) In 
your enjoyment or use of my product I would have had the direct enjoyment of realising that I 
had both satisfied a human need by my work and also objectified the human essence and 
therefore fashioned for another human being the object that met his need. (iii) I would have been 
for you the mediator between you and the species and thus been acknowledged and felt by you as 
a completion of your own essence and a necessary part of yourself and have thus realised that I 
am confirmed both in your thought and in your love. (iv) In my expression of my life I would 
have fashioned your experience of your life, and thus in my own activity have realised my own 
essence, my human, my communal essence. 
54
 
 
So with Marx, relations between individuals no longer rely on the laws of the 
state for their mediation. Instead, the character of such relations is determined by the 
sphere of “sensuous [and] immediate existence,”55 namely labour as self-realisation – 
itself a process that needs an institutional framework other than those found under 
capitalism.
56
 In fact, as the passage above demonstrates, Marx went as far as presenting 
the activity through which humanity transforms nature as the exact same process 
whereby both the individual and communal essence of the human species are realised. 
However, in order to meet the conditions whereby both the immediate producer‟s 
“sense-experience becomes human for him,”57 and the satisfaction of his own needs  the 
very same process as the satisfaction of the needs of the species, specific conditions of 
production must be met. What Marx understood by “human production” means, on the 
one hand, that labour must assume the form of “open revelation of human faculties.” It 
is by developing both cognitive and sensuous faculties through the appropriation of the 
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material of nature that the objects produced can confirm an individual‟s essence as 
identical to the essence of the species as a whole. Consequently, any attempt to mediate 
social relations through a political community standing outside the sphere of material 
production would ultimately fill the individual existence with an abstract 
communality.
58
 What Hegel saw as the most absolute expression of the communal 
essence was thus understood by Marx as an unreal manifestation of social freedom, the 
historical formation of a society organised around non-human conditions of production. 
Communality, therefore, is no mere “idea.” It is an integral component of the human 
essence, a need realised through a form of sensuous practice common to the entire 
human species, namely labour.  
On the other hand, Marx thought that the very possibility of developing the wide 
range of faculties available to human beings through labour was dependent on the 
nature of the intentions with which one enters such a process. What truly matters for 
him is not objectification per se, but the purpose one attaches to it. In other words, 
production can become human, and therefore social, only if the individual producer is 
conscious that the objects created will not only meet his needs but the needs of other 
individuals too.
59
 However, with the introduction of private property, Marx pointed out, 
one participates in production with a significantly different purpose in mind: 
 
I have produced for myself and not for you, as you have produced for yourself and not for me. 
You are as little concerned by the result of my production in itself as I am directly concerned by 
the result of your production. That is, our production is not a production of men for men as such, 
that is social production. Thus, as a man none of us is in a position to be able to enjoy the 
product of another. We are not present to our mutual products as men. Thus, neither can our 
exchange be the mediating movement which confirms that my product is for you, because it is an 
objectification of your own essence, your need. For what links our production together is not the 
human essence. Exchange can only act in motion and activate the attitude that each of us has to 
his own product and thus to the product of another. Each of us sees in his own product only his 
own selfish needs objectified, and thus in the product of another he only sees the objectification 
of another selfish need independent and alien to him.
60
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 Such an abstract communality has in fact historically been translated into practice as either liberal 
democracy or state planning.   
59
 Chapter seven shall demonstrate that such a mutual recognition of needs depends on an effective 
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The emergence of the wage-system and the corresponding need to sell one‟s 
labour-power as a condition for survival meant that labour transformed itself into a mere 
means for the satisfaction of a strictly individual need, thus effectively losing sight of its 
social character. What may appear at first glance as a change of mere technical 
significance does actually play a central role in the determination of relations between 
the individual and the human species as a whole, and stands in evident contradiction to 
the possibility for socialised production. Unable to transform nature in a conscious and 
therefore free manner, and thus prevented from investing the range of faculties required 
for the labour-mediated confirmation of the human essence, the individual producer is 
constrained to look outside labour itself, and into the process of exchange for the 
satisfaction of his needs. Now forced to “exchang[e] his products for the products of 
other people,”61 the individual begins to relate to others with the self-interested 
inclinations characteristic of a being dependent on an external agent for the realisation 
of his own essence. This is precisely what Hegel regarded as the “system of all-round 
interdependence” whereby state mediated relations means that “each asserts itself and 
gains through the others.”62 He saw the emergence of a political community alongside 
the sphere of civil society as incontestable evidence that self-determination had not 
fallen prey to the hostile character of crude individualism. Instead, he thought that the 
state would ensure that “the subsistence [Subsistenz] and welfare of the individual [das 
Einzelnen] and his rightful existence [Dasein] are interwoven with, and grounded on, 
the subsistence, welfare, and rights of all, and have actuality and security only in this 
context.”63 However, since such an interdependence is in actual fact the expression of a 
condition of existence whereby the individual producer fails to relate to the objects 
created through labour as “examples of the kind,” Marx saw it as an abstract form of 
communality, or the historically specific form of a society organised around the 
differentiation between individual needs and those of society as a whole.   
In sum, therefore, although Marx drew his inspiration for the conceptualisation 
of a socially cohesive form of autonomy from Hegel‟s process objectification, he did 
not seek its completion outside the sphere of labour. As sensuous beings humans, Marx 
thought, must be capable of realising their essence through labour. The state, as the 
institutional basis upon which individuals who, as beings forced to sell their own 
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labour-power in order to live, systematically favour the satisfaction of their own needs 
over the needs of the species, could only be expected to protect the self-interested 
particularism of bourgeois immediate existence. Hegel‟s conception of autonomy, in 
other words, does not resolve in any concrete manner the tension between the individual 
and society brought about by the organisation of social life around the principle of 
private property but, instead, tends to favour the former at the expense of the latter, thus 
defending a strictly individual form of freedom masquerading as social freedom. For 
this reason Marx insisted that the prospects of closing the gap between particular 
existence and human essence, and eventually turning the individual act of satisfaction of 
needs into a process confirming the essence of the species as a whole, depended on the 
individual‟s participation in a free and conscious transformation of nature, and the 
corresponding capacity to experience such an activity as a process of self-realisation. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
 By shifting the focus of epistemology from an attempt to find the source of 
knowledge to the task of investigating the conditions under which its constitution is 
possible, Kant was the first philosopher to locate autonomy within the mediated unity of 
humanity and nature. Freedom from tutelage, he thought, could not be conceptualised 
without addressing the issue of the relation between humanity, its own nature, and 
external nature. Any attempt to achieve autonomy whilst fulfilling the demands of the 
common good, should indeed be presupposed by the rational mastery of the chaotic 
world of sense-experience. In response to Kant‟s conception of enlightenment can be 
found Hegel‟s own, which, by giving objectification a key role in human practice, 
somewhat succeeds in formulating the conditions that could potentially mitigate the 
asymmetry between humanity and nature found in the philosophical system of his 
predecessor. As Marx convincingly pointed out, however, Hegel‟s own schema fails to 
meet its own expectations. Indeed, with the role of mediating agent now assumed by the 
so-called rational laws of the state, Hegel‟s institutional framework not only constrains 
individuals to realise their freedom as a mere exercise of the mind, it also falls short of 
restoring the due role of sense-experience which Marx believed to be of particular 
significance in the mediated relationship between humanity and nature. As such, he 
conceptualised a form of autonomous practice understood as the emancipation of both 
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cognitive and sensuous faculties. But by presenting human and natural sense-experience 
as intimately related expressions, whilst admitting that autonomy is predicated upon the 
transformation of nature as mere object of human practice, is Marx, on the one hand, not 
contradicting himself and, on the other hand, running the risk of confounding the 
subjugation of nature with that of humanity, thus leaving his theoretical framework 
vulnerable to potential vulgarisation and pernicious interpretations?
64
 The present thesis 
shall contend that this has in fact been the case, and that a critique of political economy 
ought to be supplemented by a critical approach capable of grasping the full 
implications of the aforementioned dialectical asymmetries. The following chapter shall 
seek to demonstrate that such a task ought to be undertaken by exploring the 
development of reason from an emancipatory force into an instrument of domination 
under modernity. 
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nature.  
  
35 
 
Chapter 2  
 
 
Towards the Reconciliation of Humanity and Nature 
 
 
As a period marking humanity‟s intention to free itself from the fetters of nature 
and tradition, the Enlightenment has traditionally been viewed as an age of progress. 
The proliferation of human and natural sciences brought about by reason meant that 
humanity was beginning to develop an understanding of both itself and the laws of 
nature. However, what was originally thought to consist in a liberating process would 
soon reveal its insufficiencies and inherent flaws, such as those identified by Adorno in 
the philosophy of one of the Enlightenment‟s most fervent proponents, Kant.1 The 
present chapter shall therefore seek to expose the limitations of the latter‟s attempt to 
mediate what had previously been viewed as two distinct sources of representation, i.e. 
reason and experience, and identify the epistemological conditions required for the 
formulation of a critical theory oriented towards the implementation of emancipatory 
practice.  
 
 
Problematising the Primacy of the Subject 
 
 According to Kant‟s moral philosophy, the public person must ensure that the 
absolute law of reason, otherwise known as duty, governs his/her every action. The 
search for personal happiness, he thought, lacked the universal, and therefore moral, 
orientations which ought to accompany all individuals in the process of their 
enlightenment. To guarantee the development of a form of knowledge capable of 
yielding autonomy at the most general level, reason not only had to hold the forces of 
external nature in check, it would be called upon to impose a limitation on the will, 
thereby ensuring that the autonomy realised does not conflict with the common good. 
                                                 
1
 Adorno‟s claim that a classical German idealism like Kant‟s is the philosophical manifestation of 
bourgeois society is, according to Robert Pippin, not given explicit justification in the member of the 
Frankfurt School‟s works. Due to space limitations, this chapter shall not attempt to address such a 
debate. It shall indeed accept Adorno‟s immanent criticism of idealism as the epistemological counterpart 
of his critique of bourgeois society at face value. However, for an exposition of Pippin‟s argument, see 
his chapter on Adorno in The Persistence of Subjectivity. 
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Thus, in the process of freeing oneself from self-incurred tutelage, one “must totally 
separate his desire for happiness from the concept of duty, in order to preserve the 
latter‟s purity.”2 Presented in this manner, autonomy appears to be consisting in a 
struggle against both external and internal forces of nature, as a condition of existence 
caused by the necessity to exert control over those influences capable of impinging 
one‟s capacity to maximise the prospects of a self-sufficient life. Such an understanding 
of the function performed by reason is precisely what led Adorno to make the following 
conclusion:  
 
The system the Enlightenment has in mind is the form of knowledge which copes most 
proficiently with the facts and supports the individuals most effectively in the mastery of nature. 
Its principles are the principles of self-preservation. Immaturity is the inability to survive.
3
  
 
 Employing reason in a struggle against external forces and natural inclinations 
implies removing the potentially normative orientations associated with the 
maximisation of self-sufficiency, thus restricting the scope of the knowledge constituted 
thereby to the instrumental domain of self-preservation.
4
 Once it has assumed such a 
form, Adorno suggested, reason would necessarily “adjust[…] the world for the ends of 
self-preservation,”5 thus reaching far beyond a mere understanding of nature, and 
eventually serving as a force aimed at its domination: 
 
Reason must approach nature with the view, indeed, of receiving information from it, not, 
however, in the character of a pupil, who listens to all that his master chooses to tell him, but in 
that of a judge, who compels the witnesses to reply to those questions which he himself thinks fit 
to propose.
6 
 
 That reason should assert its authority in its dealings with nature has been made 
rather explicit here. Rather than limiting its scope of action to a merely receptive role, 
                                                 
2
 Kant, I. “On the Common Saying: „This may be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice‟‟, p 69 
3
 Adorno, T.W and Horkheimer, M. (1997) Dialectic of Enlightenment, London: Verso, p 83 
4
 Under conditions of self-preservation, reason no longer serves the individual in his or her quest of what 
ought or ought not to be. Issues of “right” and “wrong,” and the subversive potential of reason have been 
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5
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6
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the Kantian conception of autonomy as self-preservation is forced to regard reason‟s 
“adjusting” function as a faculty aimed at legislating on the material provided by nature. 
Consequently, it should come as no surprise to find, in Adorno‟s works, an 
enlightenment project equated with the domination of nature by humanity, one whereby 
the laws of nature are substituted for those of reason. The aforementioned criticisms do 
nevertheless appear somewhat surprising, if not almost contrary to the purpose of 
Kant‟s groundbreaking work entitled The Critique of Pure Reason, where he made it 
clear that  the constitution of knowledge could not be reduced to a preferential treatment 
of either subjective or objective forces.
7
 One is therefore justified in further 
investigating the role played by nature in his most famous work. As a critique of pure 
reason, Kant‟s first critique was partly aimed at distancing his own epistemology from 
the crude subjectivism of rationalist thinkers such as Descartes, Leibniz or Spinoza. In 
this key epistemological work, he also intended to distinguish his stance from the 
relativism of the empiricists, who, like the rationalists, had been misled by conforming 
to the traditional attempt of finding out the sources of knowledge, rather than 
identifying the conditions under which it is possible. A key task of his so-called 
“revolutionary” work would therefore consist in re-assessing the relation between 
subjective and objective forces in the constitution of knowledge, or to put it in Kantian 
terms, in identifying the role of experience in such a process: 
 
That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that 
the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects 
which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our 
powers of understanding into activity, to compare, to connect, or to separate these, and so to 
convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is 
called experience? In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to 
experience, but begins with it.
8 
 
 So for Kant, experience plays a key role in the constitution of knowledge, but 
since, as was pointed out above, his critique of pure reason also aimed to distance his 
epistemology from the empiricist tradition, one is justified in asking what exactly 
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 In the preface of this work Kant insisted that his epistemology revolved around a “critical distinction of 
the two modes of representation (the sensible and the intellectual) and the consequent limitations of the 
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Pure Reason, p xxxiv 
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allowed him to make such a claim? Indeed, how can one assign such a role to 
experience without falling into the empiricist reductionism of thinkers such as Hobbes 
and Locke? Kant certainly believed he could, but did not do so by merely re-assessing 
the role of experience in knowledge. In fact the idealist philosopher could not accept the 
empiricist concept of experience at face value, and, as a result, wished to redefine the 
terms under which one could speak of experience. While he accepted the view that 
sensations played a role in experience, he believed that their “undifferentiated and 
indeterminate”9 character meant that the material received directly from them could not 
constitute experience by itself. In order to make sense of the realm of sensibility, a 
faculty that could “compare, connect, separate” sensations and eventually convert them 
into a material intelligible for the laws of the understanding would be required. An 
investigation of the conditions under which knowledge is possible, and, by extension, 
conditions under which experience itself is constituted, must therefore proceed, in a first 
instance, with the separation of the “understanding” and “sensibility” into two distinct 
epistemic elements, that must be consequently re-united for an actual account of 
experience to be possible. The function of joining up the two elements, Kant thought, 
would be assigned to reason, which he claimed “furnishes us with the principles of 
knowledge a priori”10 required for the constitution of experience. With Kant, therefore, 
experience no longer refers to a raw form of sensory perception, but is treated, instead, 
as the product of a dialectically mediated relation between subjective and objective 
forces, a relation that prevents him from falling into the dogmatic realm of rationalism 
or the relativist trap of empiricist epistemology, and that, at first glance, reveals a 
relation between humanity and nature far more symmetrical than the one found in his 
political works.  
However, an investigation of Kant‟s own understanding of the subject-object 
relation – as an attempt to uncover the epistemological conditions stifling emancipation 
– would not be complete unless the respective role of “concepts” and “intuitions” is 
further explored. While he famously claimed that “thought without content are empty”11 
and “intuitions without concepts are blind,”12 thus clearly affirming the symmetrically 
dialectical character of the subject-object relation, his differentiation of the intelligible 
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and the sensible worlds into “spontaneity” and “receptivity” respectively seems to 
suggest that not only were the two epistemic elements intertwined, the role performed 
and the place held by these two elements were also distinct. In his attempt to identify 
the conditions under which knowledge is possible, Kant found that the undifferentiated 
and indeterminate character of the “sensory manifold” significantly restricted its role as 
a source of representation. Sensations could enter the realm of representation as 
experience only after being located in space and time
13
 as “ideal forms of sensibility,”14 
which Kant called intuitions. As such, one could only claim to know the objects as they 
appear to the subject. Furthermore, as ideal forms of a “passive contact with objects,”15 
intuitions can only perform a receptive role. Their conversion into the actual content of 
knowledge therefore begins only once the synthesising power of reason has unified the 
appearances of objects into an intelligible whole or, as Kant would put it, after being 
“subsumed” under the universality of concepts: 
 
Before objects are given to me, that is, a priori, I must presuppose in myself laws of the 
understanding which are expressed in conceptions a priori. To these conceptions then, all objects 
of experience must necessarily conform. 
16 
 
 A close inspection of the process whereby concepts and intuitions are mediated 
thus exposes a degree of disparity between their respective contribution to the process 
of constitution of knowledge, with the latter assigned a somewhat more passive role 
than the former. The asymmetry consequently produced by such a relation led Adorno 
to conclude that despite Kant‟s concern with the conceptualisation of a dialectical 
relation between subject and object, reason‟s grip over the latter effectively renders the 
sensory manifold obsolete, thus causing the potentially liberating and expressive 
framework of a mediated unity between humanity and nature to evolve, and indeed 
regress, into the very foundation of a system of repression of both internal and external 
nature.
17
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Adorno explained such a development by exposing two correlated tendencies in 
Kant‟s works. Firstly, Adorno suggested that the transcendental character Kant 
attributed to the subject, namely its capacity, through reason, to establish what counts as 
experience and what does not meant that the idealist philosopher could not conceive 
experience in any way other than as a mere product of subjective forces. The member of 
the Frankfurt School believed such a condition to be truly problematic as by endowing 
the subject with such a sovereign power,
18
 Kant not only assigned it the primary 
constitutive role in knowledge, it also entitled it to constitute experience itself, thus 
diminishing the role played by the sensory manifold in experience itself, and ultimately 
failing to realise its expressive and liberating potential as a source of reflexive 
pluralism. By claiming to experience objects only as they subjectively appear, and 
“ground[ing] objectivity in[,] the subject,”19 thereby transferring the object‟s attributes 
onto the subject, Kant effectively assigned a constitutive function to a non-entity, while 
liquidating the givenness of the world of objects. However, as Adorno pointed out, the 
nature of the subject is such that “no matter how we define [it], some entity cannot be 
juggled out of it.”20 The social reality both constituted and known by the transcendental 
subject must therefore be false: 
 
The subject itself is an object insofar as existence is implied by the idealist doctrine of 
constitution – there must be a subject so that it can constitute anything at all – insofar as this has 
been borrowed in turn, from the sphere of facticity. The concept of what “is there” means 
nothing but what exists, and the subject as existent comes promptly under the heading of 
“object.” As pure apperception, however, the subject claims to be the downright Other of all 
existents. This, too, is the negative appearance of a slice of truth: that the reification which the 
sovereign subject has inflicted on everything, including itself, is mere illusion.
21
  
 
Adorno was clearly keen to express his astonishment at the form assumed by the 
Kantian conception of objectivity, and, crucially, at the relation between the subject and 
the object arising out of such a conception. Kant is here being criticised 
22
 for ignoring 
the key fact that “whilst it is impossible for us even to conceive of a subject which is not 
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an object, we can very easily conceive of an object which is not a subject.”23 The 
subject‟s conditional existence is precisely what led Adorno to argue that not only are 
concepts empty without intuitions, they are also unthinkable. Kant‟s contention that 
concepts can indeed be thought prior to experience is, in this case, fallacious, and any 
facticity extracted from “pure” concepts must, as a result, be illusory. Inherent to Kant‟s 
theory of cognition can thus be found a formulation of the relation between subject and 
object whereby the alleged self-facticity of the former serves to produce an illusory 
reality. In sum, having been denied the capacity to convert the particularity of their 
existence into the content of experience, individuals are ultimately prevented from 
relating to the social totality as a realm of human practice. A key explanatory feature of 
the system of domination Adorno believed to be embodied in Kant‟s “philosophy of 
identity” is therefore found in the reifying tendency arising out of the sovereign power 
of the subject. The asymmetry between the subject and the object could therefore be 
understood as a set of conditions giving way to a form of individual self-sacrifice.  
Unfolding alongside the reification of reality can be observed a second, 
correlated tendency. In the process of establishing itself as constituens,
24
 the subject 
does not only produce an illusory reality, it also calls on reason to “discriminate the 
world”25 and subsume it under the rule of conceptual universality. To question and, 
ultimately, know the world, i.e. internal and external nature, meant, according to Kant, 
allowing reason to impose its truths upon this world. It involved leaving the task of 
answering questions, posed by phenomena previously left unexplained by the 
predominance of myths and other traditional beliefs, to the rational faculty. For Adorno, 
however, the aforementioned process becomes problematic when the truths in question 
are equated to “whatever remains once everything sensory, everything ephemeral and 
hence deceptive has been subtracted,”26 which is, as partly demonstrated above, 
precisely the case with Kant. The consequence of such an approach to truths, Adorno 
warned, is that the knowledge and with it the reality upon which those truths have been 
imposed, assume a “permanent, eternal and timeless”27 character. Accordingly, the 
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radically different and new would emerge as undesirable occurrences, as “a source of 
insecurity, a threat, something worrying,”28 i.e. as false. Reason would no longer be 
capable of questioning the established order. It would be the established order itself. By 
turning into the very thing it was originally employed to subvert, reason thus would lose 
its reflexive, and therefore liberating, character.
29
 Already with Kant‟s rational 
mediation of humanity and nature as a relation paving the way for the development of 
the truths of reason into both immutable and unquestionable facts standing higher and 
above empirical individuals, can one find the germs of historical circumstances under 
which individuals are not only prevented from relating to the wider social reality as 
their own (reification), but also from challenging it (absolutisation). The sovereign 
power of the subject, whose origins Adorno traced back to the limitations reason 
imposes on the will and to the concepts‟ involvement in the “sensory uptake of the 
world,”30 laid the foundations for a system whereby individuals not only confronted the 
wider social reality as a given and insuperable other, but also failed to realise the full 
range of their capacities as cognitive and sensuous beings.
31
 In Kant‟s works, Adorno 
concluded, are found the elements of a repressive form of knowledge and social reality 
in nucleo.  
While Adorno‟s criticisms against Kant convincingly exposed the problematic 
nature of conditions of existence arising out of the subsumption of particularity under 
universality – finding their political expression in the repressive laws of the modern 
state and its bureaucratic apparatus – one is then justified in asking what place, exactly, 
                                                                                                                                               
developed.” For him, therefore, one could find in Kant‟s works the epistemological equivalent to the 
bourgeois institutions flourishing under modernity.  
28
 Ibid, p 26 
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should concepts hold in the constitution of an emancipatory form of knowledge? What 
form, in other words, should the relation between subject and object assume in order to 
preclude humanity‟s domination over its own and external nature, and create, thereby, 
conditions favourable for the emancipation of both mental and physical capacities? The 
following section shall begin to answer such questions.  
 
 
From Identity to the Non-identical 
 
While most of Adorno‟s criticism against Kant was founded upon the latter‟s 
apparently problematic distinction between the spontaneity of concepts and the 
receptivity of intuitions, and the asymmetrical relation resulting therefrom, Robert 
Pippin questioned Kant‟s success in maintaining such a distinction, thus opening up the 
way for a re-assessment of the subject-object relation suggested by the idealist 
philosopher. In his article entitled “Concepts and Intuitions: On Distinguishability and 
Separability” Pippin, pointed out a tension in Kant‟s work. Like Adorno, he believed 
that Kant‟s own dialectical approach failed to fulfil its promises – such as the move 
away from subjectivism – a failure which he too identified as being caused by a tension 
between concepts and intuitions. However, while for Adorno, the identity of subject and 
object is symptomatic of Kant‟s formal separation between concepts and intuitions and 
the respective distinction between spontaneity and receptivity, for Pippin the fact that 
intuitions are “unusual species of conceptual representations”32 effectively serves to blur 
the latter differentiations. The Kant of the “second-edition Transcendental Deduction,” 
33
 he argued, does not appear to suggest that concepts impose themselves upon the 
world of objects from the outside, having to bring, and ultimately subsume, intuitions 
under their rule, but are instead already present in the sensory uptake of this same 
world: 
 
[T]hought is not merely presented with and then applied to and restricted by, a thoroughly non-
conceptual sensory manifold. The manifold is already conceptually articulated; concepts are 
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engaged in our “sensory uptake” of the world, and the separation claim and the strategy it 
grounds and the mind-world picture it assumes must now all be qualified, even re-thought.
34 
 
What Pippin is suggesting, here, is the fact that Kant does not consistently 
defend the view whereby the subject and the object are united “mechanically,” with 
conceptual universality having to impose itself upon, and subsume, the realm of 
sensibility. Instead, a case is being made for a Hegelian reading of Kant‟s dialectics, 
namely the treatment of the relation as an “organic unity” between the subject and its 
“negated other” (the object), which Pippin grounds in the conceptual qualities of the 
sensory manifold. Could the recognition of the object as a “negated other,” then, offer a 
foundation upon which knowledge can be stripped of its subsumptive and repressive 
character? In order to answer this question, we shall now turn to Adorno‟s treatment of 
Hegel‟s dialectics. 
A key problem Adorno discovered in his investigation of Kant‟s own identity 
thinking revolved around the absolutising and reifying tendencies arising out reason‟s 
role as mediating agent.
35
 By imposing its truths upon the objects, reason not only 
achieves the classification of the content (subject) under the form (predicate) of any 
knowledge claim, but also, and more crucially, their identity.
36
 The permanent character 
attributed to those truths, and the strict concern with the immediate  relation between the 
subject and the predicate eventually serve to congeal such a relation, thereby eradicating 
the contradictions making up the reality claimed to be known here, and ultimately 
failing to account for the fact that the truth of “what is” actually depends on “what is 
not.” As Hegel put it: 
 
The untruth of the immediate judgement lies in the incongruity between its form and its content. 
To say “This rose is red” involves (in virtue of the copula “is”) the coincidence of subject and 
predicate. The rose however is a concrete thing, and so not red only: it also has an odour, a 
specific form, and many other features not implied in the predicate red. There are other flowers 
and objects which are red too. The subject and predicate in the immediate judgement touch, as it 
were, only in a single point, but do not cover each other.
37
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Hegel‟s dialectics, Adorno thought, provided a framework within which “the 
protest against any philosophy of identity”38 could be articulated. By “reliquifying” the 
subject-predicate relation, Hegel did indeed succeed in revealing the contradictions 
making up the reality and was, as a result, capable of exposing the dependence of “what 
is” on “what is not,” or, as Adorno put it, “[i]dentity‟s dependence on the 
nonidentical.”39 By turning the object into a negated “other,” i.e. a definite entity now 
capable of retaining its character as particular, Hegel also turns the subject-predicate 
identity into a mere moment in the historical formation of knowledge. Now released 
from the shackles of eternal identity, the non-identical object can begin to endorse a 
multiplicity of forms, thus opening up the way for critical thinking. The treatment of the 
object as the non-identical, then, serves to free it from the dictates of conceptual 
universality and, accordingly, preclude the repressive asymmetry arising out of the 
subsumptive function of reason. Hegel, therefore, furnishes the philosophical tools for a 
critique of both identity-thinking and the repressive reality corresponding to it.   
What allowed Hegel to reliquify the form-content relation was the fact that, 
contrary to Kant, he saw reason as a historicised form of consciousness called Spirit 
(Geist). In Hegel‟s works, then, the subject enters a formative process taking place 
through “movement, contradiction and negation”40 to attain its most accomplished form 
in the objectivity of rational social and political institutions. Reason, here, unlike 
Kant‟s, does not consist of a cognitive faculty employed with the aim of controlling the 
forces of both internal and external nature. Instead, as objective spirit, it effectively 
mediates the subject. However, by famously declaring that “the real is rational” and the 
“rational is real,” or affirming that “the whole is true,” Hegel significantly narrowed the 
gap between his own philosophy and Kant‟s identity-thinking.  
In its formative process, the subject does not merely recognise the object as an 
other. The dialectical trajectory pursued by the subject does indeed involve yet another 
negation, which this time consists in the subject‟s recognition of itself in that other, or, 
as Hegel put it, a “negation of the negation.” In the Hegelian system of thought, the 
subject recognises the socio-political institutions as the objective form of itself, thus 
ultimately relating to the object as its very own other. Objectivity, therefore, mediates 
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subjectivity only insofar as the former is the rational and self-conscious manifestation of 
the latter: 
 
the laws give expression to that which each individual is and does; the individual knows them 
not merely to be what constitutes his universal nature as a “thing,” but knows himself, too, in 
that form, or knows it to be particularised in his own individuality and in each of his fellow-
citizens.
41 
 
So for Hegel the universal does not perform a subsumptive role akin to Kant‟s 
mechanical unity,
42
 but, instead, serves as a medium for the differentiation of the 
particular. With reason now embodied in the laws of the state (the object), universality 
no longer imposes itself upon the particular, but instead serves as a medium for the 
subject to gain consciousness of itself as particularised universal. In order to do so, 
however, it must first recognise itself in those laws. In this sense, knowledge of the 
“thing” begins with the discovery of the contradictions and particularities making up the 
reality (negation), and ends with the subject overcoming those contradictions through 
the recognition of the negated other as the subject‟s externalised self (“negation of the 
negation”). For Hegel, then, knowledge is presupposed by a movement steered by the 
subject itself, namely the movement in thought through which the subject identifies 
itself with the object, and gives the latter and itself their place within the 
epistemological totality. In this totality, each element is said to have found its identical 
other. The subject/form/universal/individual has identified itself with its respective 
predicate/content/particular/institution. This subject-led process of knowledge formation 
through differentiation, which Hegel understood as totalising and absolute, therefore, 
exhibits similar features to Kant‟s identity-thinking. As Adorno pointed out, “[e]ven to 
Hegel, after all, subjectivity is the universal and the total identity,”43 in which the 
particularity of existence begins to gain epistemological significance only “in its 
conveyance to the knowing subject that rediscovers itself” in the reality.44 At first 
glance, then, and in virtue of the fact that the negation of the object as an other not only 
opens up an horizon for a constitution of knowledge steered by the contradictions 
                                                 
41
 Hegel, G.W.F. The Phenomenology of Mind, pp 377-8 
42
 Worth reminding here is the fact that, as Pippin argued, Kant‟s understanding of the subject-object 
unity assumes this mechanical form in most of the passages of the Critique of Pure Reason, whereas the 
organic unity appears confined to the second edition „Transcendental Deduction.‟ See Pippin, R. 
“Concept and Intuition. On Distinguishability and Separability” 
43
 Adorno, T.W. Negative Dialectics, p 350 
44
 Ibid, p 10 
  
47 
 
making up the social reality, but also recognises the dependence of knowledge upon the 
non-identical (thus offering a framework within which the integrity of the object is 
maintained), Hegel‟s conception of the relationship between subject and object does 
appear to contain the foundations for the development of a non-repressive form of 
knowledge. However, by proclaiming the possibility of absolute knowledge, following 
the subject‟s recognition of the object as its externalised self, Hegel eventually gives 
primacy to the subject, whose task eventually appears to consist in a resolution of the 
aforementioned contradictions, and the subsequent classification of the sensuous 
particulars under a totalising conceptual apparatus. Critical theory, Adorno argued, 
should therefore attempt to realise the epistemological potential already embodied in 
Hegel‟s thought, whilst aiming to “transcend the concept.”45  
One is nevertheless justified in asking, at this point, what epistemological 
alternative to the aforementioned conceptual apparatus Adorno is effectively defending, 
and which set of political forms can be intuited from such an approach. In order to 
answer the question, one must refer to the hitherto undisclosed first half of the quote 
regarding his treatment of the concept. There, Adorno recognises the fact that 
“[p]hilosophy [...] must strive, by way of the concept, to transcend the concept” [Italics 
added].
46
 In another chapter of Negative Dialectics, he even admits the following: 
 
The purely particular activity and business of the individual refer to needs which he has as a part 
of nature, i.e. as a mere existent particular. That even these, its commonest functions, do not 
come to nothing, but have reality, is brought about by the universal sustaining medium.
47 
 
Rather than an outright rejection of the concept, then, Adorno's task involves a 
re-assessment of its role in knowledge. Above all, in its exercise as a “universal 
sustaining medium” giving “reality” to the particularity of existence, the concept must 
be prevented from realising its absolutising tendencies. While in Kant's works, the 
concept's role as medium manifests itself as a subsumptive force, in Hegel such a role is 
overshadowed by the concept's position as telos of knowledge. Thus, while its 
epistemological necessity is recognised, the conceptual apparatus cannot be expected to 
serve as the dominant or final epistemic moment in the constitution of knowledge. 
Instead, Adorno suggested, one should expect it to assist the sensuous particulars in 
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their conversion into constitutive components of knowledge, whilst preserving their 
non-identical character. Within such a process, universality no longer designates, 
anticipates or absorbs the particular. Instead, it merely unfolds in a symmetrical 
partnership with the relevant particular. Nor does the concept eternalise its bond with 
sensuous experience. The universal now enters into a situated and non-identical 
relation with the particular, which no longer restricts the objects to a single possible 
configuration with concepts. Movement and contradiction can henceforth be preserved. 
Adorno‟s concern with the preservation of reflexive diversity, i.e. non-identity, in his 
epistemological project can therefore be said to point towards a pluralist form of 
politics.  
 Whether Adorno is dealing with Kant or Hegel, his diagnosis is clear: idealist 
epistemology not only elevates the subject above the object, it is also underpinned by a 
positivist frame of reference (identity-thinking) precluding the pluralisation of thoughts, 
and ultimately closing up possibilities for change. In response to such repressive forms 
of epistemology – linked to oppressive social forms – Adorno undertook a re-
assessment of the relation between the subject and the object whose form, he believed, 
ought to be defined in terms of affinity
48
 rather than unity. Both anti-conceptual and 
anti-nominalist,
49
 Adorno's epistemological stance attempts to locate the subject-object 
relation halfway between the objectivism of materialist thought and the subjectivism of 
idealist philosophies such as Kant's and Hegel's. In sum, therefore, the epistemological 
project defended by the critical theory of Adorno aims to reconcile humanity and nature 
through their mediated non-identity. The following section shall explore the 
implications of such a relation for the nature of the mediating agent. 
 
 
From Instrumental to Aesthetic Rationality 
 
 In his attempt to conceptualise the foundations of a form of knowledge 
underpinned by a mediated non-identity of subject and object, Adorno also exposed 
what he believed to be a rationality of a non-instrumental form.  As he consistently, and 
rather convincingly, demonstrated in both Negative Dialectics and Dialectic of the 
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Enlightenment, identity-thinking is characterised by a concept of reason which has lost 
its capacity to realise the critical and expressive nature of individuals, and merely 
subjects them to the imperatives of universality. Whether subsumptive or totalising, the 
bureaucratisation of the social reality engendered by identity-thinking eventually turns 
both reason into an instrument geared towards the domination of both external and 
internal nature, and individuals into passive consumers of culture. Reason, in this sense, 
no longer serves individuals in their quest  for autonomy. Its motives are those of self-
preservation. Adorno, as a result, sought to cultivate reason's critical orientations, 
namely its capacity to preserve the non-identity of subject and object.  
  At first glance, Adorno's call for a reflexive form of rationality presents little 
differences with Kant's “practical reason.” Both thinkers do indeed place a strong 
emphasis on the role played by reason in autonomous reflection. Adorno, however, 
takes issue with Kant regarding the nature of the mediation involved in such a process. 
Indeed, as was shown above,
50
 Kant understands autonomy in terms of “freedom from 
self-incurred tutelage [Emphasis added],” i.e. negatively, where reason is primarily 
employed to both preserve the self against the so-called chaotic world of objects by 
ordering it and exerting control over natural forces, rather than as a medium for the 
actual realisation of the self. This view of the mediating role of reason as a “causal 
necessity,”51 and of its nature as instrumental, has been presented by Adorno as deeply 
problematic: 
 
 [R]eason constitutes the court of judgment of calculation, which adjusts the world for the ends of 
 self-preservation and recognizes no function other than the preparation of the object from the 
 mere sensory material in order to make it the material of subjugation.
52
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 By presenting reason as a transcendental faculty effectively legislating with 
strength over natural forces and causing the conceptual apparatus to determine the 
senses,
53
 Kant developed a form of reflexivity founded upon reactive self-subjugation 
and the superiority of universality. He therefore explained the manifestation of the 
critical orientations of reason as a subsumptive process leading to the repressive and 
permanent resolution of the contradictory character of the reality.  
 It was not until Hegel that  the dependence of “what is” on “what is not” in the 
process of reflection was recognised. Here reason only emerges as the result of a 
historical process of formation attributing a constitutive function to the object. No 
longer understood as a regulative faculty always at the disposal of humanity, reflexivity 
opens itself up to the spontaneity of natural inclinations. Such an opening,  
however, only emerges as an incomplete moment – as a negation to be superseded by an 
additional one. The fact that the object can expect to mediate the subject only following 
the latter's recognition of the former as its externalised self presupposes that in its final 
developmental stage, i.e. as reason, reflexivity loses, once again, its critical function. As 
a self-conscious subject, the individual merely recognises the whole as true, the real as 
rational, and is thus left with a contemplative form of reflexivity in which reason  
accommodates the differentiated needs of each individual to the totalised, i.e. non-
contradictory, reality.  Thus, identity-thinking could be said to find its most complete 
political expression in the modern bureaucratic state.  
 Adorno, who praised Hegel for presenting reason as a moment, wishes to 
preserve the “negative” or “non-identical” stage of reflection in such a way as to give 
the spontaneity of human existence its due in reflexivity. The conceptual tools 
employed by Adorno against Hegel, then, point towards a political form that is not only 
pluralist, but that also corresponds to an institutional framework sufficiently flexible to 
allow individuals to make decisions voluntarily and continually on the basis of both 
their cognitive and sensuous faculties, i.e. libertarianism. For reason, he believed, can 
retain its critical character only by giving sensuous experience the means to direct the 
process of reflection. It unfolds in what Adorno called the “aesthetic feeling”: 
 
Aesthetic feeling is not what is being aroused in us. It is more like a sense of wonderment in 
 the presence of what we behold; a sense of being overwhelmed in the presence of a 
 phenomenon that is nonconceptual while at the same time being determinate. The arousal 
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 of subjective effect by art is the last thing we should want to dignify with the name of  aesthetic 
feeling. True aesthetic feeling is oriented to the object; it is the feeling of the object,  not 
some reflex in the viewer.
54
  
 
 In virtue of his/her capacity to experience the aesthetic feeling, the artist is in a 
position to grasp the moment of affinity between concepts and sensuous particulars, and 
preserve their non-identity, through what Adorno called “mimesis.” Reason is thereby 
reconciled with the natural inclinations of the will. Adorno, however, did not claim to 
be exposing the dynamics of a new form of rationality. As Jarvis pointed out: 
 
 Negative Dialectics […] does not recommend an „aestheticized reason‟, but is  giving an 
 account of what reason is like. Reason cannot avoid being aesthetic,  in the minimal sense 
 that its concepts are all entangled with experience,  rather than being rigid atoms of 
 designation. Mimesis itself is a kind of rationality for Adorno […]55  
 
 Adorno's mimetic mediation of the subject and the object cultivates the aesthetic 
moment of reflection, and turns it into the very fabric of emancipatory criticism. 
Through mimesis, then, rationality preserves the moment of the non-identical as a 
situated and symmetrical partnership between a concept and a particular, and eventually 
serves as an outlet for the channelling of the plurality of sensuous experience into social 
criticism, the outcome of which assumes the form of what Adorno called “constellation 
thinking.”  
 Presented as the non-repressive alternative and as a response to the absolutising, 
reifying and homogenising tendencies of identity-thinking, Adorno's constellations aim 
to accommodate the pluralistic character of sensuous experience with the rational 
character of human cognition. By allowing the object to gain a constitutive function sui 
generis, constellations can form a framework loose enough to yield expressive potential 
to the spontaneity of natural inclinations. As such, constellations are thought processes 
that capture the movement of the objective reality and, for this reason, consist of a form 
of knowledge capable of accommodating the rapidly changing character of aesthetic 
impulses. Adorno therefore concluded that in advanced capitalist societies, the only 
individuals capable of mimetically mediating the subject and the object are the artists. In 
a work of art, then, the artist can channel his/her sensuous energies into the negation of 
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the existing reality, which embodies a singular and alternative affinity between a 
particular and its universal. Without a “unifying moment,” however, sensuous 
particulars would find no affinity with the cognitive faculties, and be precluded a 
conversion into the material of critique. Thus, even in non-identity thinking “the 
unifying moment survives,” but rather than causing concepts to “progress step by step 
to a more universal cover-concept,” it brings them “into a constellation,” where “what is 
specific in the object” is brought to the fore.56 Achieved through mimesis, this unifying 
moment does not involve the subject seeking to master the object (Kant), or the 
absorption of the latter into the former (Hegel) but can, instead, expect to constitute a 
basis for constellation thinking “only on the condition that the subject could accept what 
is other to it as other.”57 Adorno‟s own approach to the non-repressive relation between 
subject and object thus refers to a particular attitude to world, namely the critique of the 
autonomous artist‟s mimetically mediated negation of the social reality. 
Through mimesis, the artist can explore a “new” affinity between subject and 
object, and through negation it is also able to represent the contradictions making up the 
social reality. For this reason, works of art embody both a critical and utopian character: 
 
One of the crucial antinomies of art today is that it wants to be and must be squarely Utopian, as 
social reality increasingly impedes Utopia, while at the same time it should not be Utopian so as 
not to be found guilty of administering comfort and illusion.
58
  
 
 The mimesis-negation matrix of Adorno‟s critical theory is therefore geared 
towards the exposition of a tension between an existing and a possible reality, whilst 
remaining within the realm of immanence. A degree of utopianism, then, is accepted 
only to the extent that it can serve individuals to accept “what is other to it as other,” 
and not drive them into the false and complacent security of a world-to-be. Through the 
critique of autonomous
59
 works of art, then, the critical theorist discovers “pure and 
uncompromised” contradictions which both reveal “that it is not ideology itself which is 
untrue but rather its pretension to correspond to reality,” and open up possibilities for 
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thinking in terms of alternatives.
60
 According to Adorno, the failures of the Marxian 
critique of political economy lay precisely in its inability to combine the critical and 
utopian elements in such a manner. Instead of attempting to reveal the tension between 
the “pretension” of ideology and the objective reality, it sought to falsify ideology itself 
and was, in turn, forced to remain within the exclusive confines of a form of critique 
adopting a standpoint outside culture and, consequently, overlook the liberating 
potential of the superstructural elements. Thus, instead of succeeding in revealing 
existing contradictions and preserving the autonomy of culture, Marx‟s critique 
effectively aimed to resolve the former, and end the latter, thereby failing to appreciate 
the problems associated with the move from negation to affirmation through the 
positive unity of subject and object, and ignoring the radical potential of the “reflection 
of the mind on its own failures.”61 After all: 
 
Cultural criticism is […] only able to reproach culture so penetratingly for prostituting itself, for 
violating in its decline the pure autonomy of the mind, because culture originates in the radical 
separation of mental and physical work. It is from this separation, the original sin as it were, that 
culture draws its strength.
62
  
 
 By vacillating between an immanent (revealing contradictions) and transcendent 
(utopian) critique of culture, Adorno does not only claim to be safeguarding critical 
theory against contemplation and illusion respectively,
63
 but also against the vain and 
potentially pernicious attempt of seeking to uncover the seeds of emancipation through 
the critique of political economy alone, thus setting up the broad issues included in the 
Cole-Habermas debate discussed in the ultimate chapters of this thesis. As the very 
source of the aforementioned “original sin,” and in contrast to the work of art, labour 
cannot serve as a medium for the reconciliation of humanity and nature. Advanced 
capitalist societies do indeed deny the majority of workers the possibility of employing 
their mental faculties in labour. As a primarily “physical” – and therefore one-
dimensional – sphere of activity geared towards the mastery of nature by humanity 
under the capitalist division of labour, labour remains a sphere exclusively confined to 
the rule of instrumental reason and, as a result, cannot constitute the target of a critique 
                                                 
60
 Adorno, T.W. “Cultural Criticism and Society,” p 32 
61
 Ibid, p 32 
62
 Ibid, p 26 
63
 See “Cultural Criticism and Society,” pp 31-34 
  
54 
 
aiming to reveal contradictions making up the reality. Why then, should yet another 
one-dimensional sphere like culture constitute a more appropriate object of critique?  
He defended his own critique of culture for two main reasons. A first reason, 
partly revealed in the passage above, regards his own critique of Marx‟s base-
superstructure schema. On the one hand, he believed that “[b]y transferring the notion 
of causality directly from the realm of physical nature to society, it [transcendent 
critique] falls back behind its own object. [text added],”64 as it eventually turns the very 
conditions it sought to problematise into immutable natural laws. On the other hand, the 
somewhat unilateral logic of causality employed by Marx led him to ignore the 
possibility of, and necessity for, autonomous works of art and the liberating potential of 
culture itself. The second and co-related reason regards the relationship between theory 
and practice. While Marx and Marxists are keen to emphasise the role of practice, 
Adorno contends that 
 
[t]he trouble with this view is that it results in the prohibition of thinking. Very little is needed to 
turn the resistance against repression repressively against those who – little as they might wish to 
glorify their state of being – do not desert the standpoint that they have come to occupy. The 
often evoked unity of theory and praxis has a tendency to give way to the predominance of 
praxis.
65
  
 
Adorno‟s emphasis on cultural critique, then, aims to both preserve criticism as 
the central instrument of resistance and protect critical theory and society from the 
repressive potential of revolutionary action.
66
 However, although he does describe his 
own critique of culture as vacillating between immanence and transcendence, his 
caution, combined with the firm belief that “[a]t the present moment, no higher form of 
society is concretely visible”67 forced him to favour the former over the latter, and to 
fall into the contemplative realm of aporetic resistance. Indeed, not only has his critical 
theory been deprived of its utopian element,
 68
  it has also never attempted to include a 
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transformative one.
 
The task at hand, then, is to combine both the critical and utopian 
moments as Adorno presented them in “Cultural Criticism and Society,” but without the 
pessimistic rejection of the latter moments. In other words, critical theory should 
somehow aim to revive the transcendent character of critique. While Adorno believed 
that such a task would necessarily lead to repressive forms of praxis, he failed to 
identify the “implicit thesis” of the symmetrical relationship between humanity and 
nature in Marx‟s works, and was therefore significantly less inclined to consider labour 
as a sphere of self-realisation, or the critique of political economy as a fruitful 
instrument of resistance against the rule of instrumental reason. A close inspection of 
Marx‟s approach to labour does nevertheless reveal the multi-dimensional character of 
this key transformative activity, which is indeed presented as one capable of giving 
expression to aesthetic rationality.
69
 Marx‟s critique of labour, then, remains 
transcendent, to the extent that it requires the critic to contrast “what is” and what 
“ought to be” corresponding to the opposition of alienated and free labour respectively, 
and tending towards the resolution of this contradiction in favour of the latter. However, 
it is also immanent to the extent that it reveals the contradictions between “what is” and 
“what is not,” as the tension between the promises of bourgeois ideology and the reality 
of material conditions, all of which without necessitating a standpoint outside the 
immediate reality. Marx‟s critique of political economy can, in sum, serve as a 
framework within which any individual taking part in production can aporetically resist 
the repressive rule of instrumental rationality within such a sphere. On the other hand, 
as a transformative critique, Marx‟s approach to labour effectively aims beyond the 
merely contemplative task of resistance, thereby raising the stakes and expectations of 
critical theory. However, having reached a stage of capitalism under which the rule of 
instrumental reason has become so total, the consideration of critical instruments 
capable of both resisting and overcoming the reifying, absolutising and homogenising 
tendencies of the culture industry, and part of which are contained in Adorno‟s own 
critique of knowledge, is more pressing than ever. 
 
 
 
                                                 
69
 See the third section of chapter one for a more detailed account of Marx‟s approach to the relationship 
between sensuous and cognitive faculties in labour. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
Drawing its inspiration from Adorno‟s own views on Kant‟s epistemology, the 
critique of knowledge formulated here sought to expose the limitations and problems 
emanating from the Enlightenment thinker‟s attempt to mediate humanity and nature 
through reason. It has been shown that by assigning a more active role to concepts in 
knowledge, his epistemology effectively paved the way for humanity’s domination of 
nature and the development of repressive socio-political institutions, which Hegel 
himself failed to overcome. An alternative epistemological project aimed at reconciling 
humanity and nature and inspired, once again, by Adorno is here being defended. It was 
nevertheless argued that in order to take critical theory beyond the narrow and merely 
contemplative realm of aporetic resistance, the non-identity of subject and object 
corresponding to the aforementioned reconciliation ought to be mediated by a 
transformative activity conceptualised by Marx in his early works, namely labour as 
self-realisation.  The task of the remaining chapters shall therefore consist in identifying 
the conditions under which the transformative critique of labour can succeed in 
capturing the principle of negativity embodied in Adorno‟s critique of knowledge, 
whilst maintaining the utopian elements of Marx‟s critique of political economy.  
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Realising the Transformative Potential of Critical Theory 
 
 
 The task of the previous two chapters mainly consisted in revealing labour‟s 
central role in a form of critical theory seeking to free humanity and nature from the 
repressive rule of instrumental reason and the socio-political institutions ensuing 
therefrom. As such, it was argued that the realisation of the transformative potential of 
critical theory depended on its anticipation of alternative subject-object relations 
mediated by labour as self-realisation. Whilst such an insight into alternative objective 
conditions of existence may, at first glance, deviate from the task set out by the earlier 
generation of the Frankfurt School, the present chapter shall seek to demonstrate the 
manner in which aesthetic negation can be reconciled with an active utopian content in 
critical theory. For this reason, I shall mainly concentrate on the work of Marcuse 
which, despite several limitations, provided some of the theoretical tools necessary for a 
critical theory aiming to reach beyond the narrow scope of aporetic resistance 
 
 
Uniting Theory and Practice 
 
 In line with one of Adorno‟s central goals, Marcuse wished to elaborate a “mode 
of thought capable of [both] piercing the ideology”1 and resisting the technological 
domination produced by a society founded upon an asymmetry between humanity and 
(both internal and external) nature. In order to achieve such a goal, Marcuse, like 
Adorno before him, founded part of his critical theory upon Hegel‟s “determinate 
negation.” However, several of his works2 indicate that, in contrast with Adorno, he 
believed in the possibility of supplanting the existing socio-political institutions with 
                                                 
1
 Marcuse, H. “A Note on Dialectic” in Arato. A. and Gebhardt, E. (eds.) (1987) The Essential Frankfurt 
School Reader. New York: Continuum, p 451 
2
 Marcuse‟s optimism regarding the prospects of supplanting the so-called repressive institutions of 
advanced capitalism with liberating ones is particularly evident in Eros and Civilization and An Essay on 
Liberation.  
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new, non-repressive ones. As a result, Marcuse could not accept the limitations imposed 
upon critical theory by Adorno,
3
 and therefore attempted to identify the ways in which 
the critical content of theory could inform a form of practice oriented towards radical 
change. 
 Marcuse began his attempt to unite theory and practice by undertaking a return 
to the works of Hegel. Although he clearly praised Hegel for the same reasons as 
Adorno had before him, that is for uncovering the reliance of “what is” on “what is not,” 
and coming up with a “tool for analysing the world of facts in terms of its internal 
inadequacy,” 4 Marcuse did so with the aim of  “comprehending the reality whole.”5 As 
he put it: 
 
[Hegel‟s negative philosophy] starts with the concepts that grasp reality as a multitude of 
objective things, simply “being,” free from any subjectivity. They are qualitatively and 
quantitatively connected with each other, and the analysis of these connections hits upon 
relations that can no longer be interpreted in terms of objective qualities and quantities but 
requires principles and forms of thought that negate the traditional concepts of being and reveal 
the subject to be the very substance of reality.
6
  
 
As the passage seems to suggest, while the first-phase negation remains a key 
moment in revealing the contradictions making up social reality, it can only perform a 
limited role in the wider and more ambitious project of social transformation. According 
to Marcuse, the prospects for the realisation of the latter project effectively depend on 
individuals‟ capacity to grasp social reality as the product of human action, or as a 
“multitude of objective things” that are not “free from any subjectivity,” thereby 
piercing the veil of reification. By revealing the subject as the “very substance of [the 
total] reality,” the second-phase negation thus offers a basis for “mastering reality 
through self-conscious practice.”7 Armed with this mode of thought, individuals are said 
                                                 
3
 It should be noted here that even in his most pessimistic work, One-dimensional Man, Marcuse 
continues to present revolutionary action as a possibility: “One-dimensional Man will vacillate 
throughout between two contradictory hypotheses: (1) that advanced industrial society is capable of 
containing qualitative change for the foreseeable future; (2) that forces and tendencies exist which may 
break this containment and explode the society.” Marcuse, H. (1964) One-Dimensional Man, London: 
Routledge and Keagan Paul Ltd., p xv  
4
 Ibid, p 445 
5
 Ibid, p 451 
6
 Marcuse, H. (1955) Reason and Revolution, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, p 65 
7
 Ibid, p 110 
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to be in a position to grasp the “reality [as] realization.”8 Here the object appears to the 
collective subject as a known totality whose contradictions it can now aim to resolve.  
Despite frequently praising Hegel‟s “determinate negation” for both its critical 
and transformative potentials, Marcuse noted a significant problem with the idealist 
philosopher‟s own system of thought. Although Hegel provided a framework within 
which one could both identify and potentially resolve the contradictions making up the 
social reality, he reduced the moment of “absolute freedom” to a process of self-
reflection, thereby taking “refuge in the pure mind.”9 It thus follows that while the 
subject can become conscious of a contradiction caused by a phenomenon such as 
estrangement in labour, it can only expect to resolve it by “reflecting into its own self in 
and from its other,”10 i.e. as a purely intellectual exercise reduced to the discovery of the 
subject in the object, thus leaving the material conditions causing alienation unchanged. 
With the role of resolution assigned to the mind, then, Hegel‟s Phenomenology of Spirit 
and his Elements of the Philosophy of Right could only be expected to serve as a 
defence of a “reconciliation with the prevailing system”11 rather than a call for its 
transformation. For this reason, Marcuse turned to Marx‟s critique of alienated labour, 
which has been elaborated partly as a critique of Hegel‟s idealism. As the member of 
the Frankfurt School put it: 
 
Insight into objectification as insight into the historical and social situation of man reveals the 
historical conditions of this situation and so achieves the practical force and concrete form 
through which it can become the lever of the revolution. We can also understand how far 
questions concerning the origin of estrangement and insight into the origin of private property 
must be an integrating element in a positive theory of revolution.
12
 
 
While Hegel‟s dialectical thought was capable of uncovering contradictions, it 
could only be expected to resolve them theoretically, through the subject‟s discovery of 
itself as substance of the reality.  The subject, in other words, could only proceed with 
an insight into itself. The real, objective conditions for a phenomenon such as 
alienation, therefore, could not be identified, let alone be superseded, by adopting a 
                                                 
8
 Marcuse, H. “A Note on Dialectic,” p 446 
9
 Marcuse, H. Reason and Revolution, p 92 
10
 Hegel, G.W. The Phenomenology of Mind, 2
nd
 Edition, London: George Allen and Unwin, pp 80-1 
11
 Marcuse, H. Reason and Revolution, p 92 
12
 Marcuse, H. “The Foundations of Historical Materialism,” in Marcuse, H. (1972) Studies in Critical 
Philosophy, Boston: Beacon Press, p 35 
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strictly Hegelian stance. With Marx‟s critique of the “vital activity” through which 
individuals transform both nature and themselves, i.e. labour, not only do “relations of 
things and „natural‟ laws” appear as “relations of men and historical forces,”13 thereby 
allowing for contradictions to be uncovered, but the practical origin of such 
contradictions is also revealed. Marx, then, endows critique with the insight required to 
turn it into a “practical force.” As Marcuse himself put it, “insight [into objectification] 
is no mere theoretical cognition or arbitrary, passive intuition, but praxis: the 
supersession of what exists.”14 What is implied, then, by the elaboration of a theory 
aimed at informing revolutionary action is the notion that critique draws its practical 
potential from the mere fact that it addresses itself to objective conditions of existence. 
The combination of Hegel‟s discovery of the subject and Marx‟s insight into 
objectification as a basis for a transformative critique is nevertheless ridden with well 
known problems. Common to both Hegel‟s and Marx‟s systems of thought, and central 
to Marcuse‟s own critical theory, is the belief in the historical emergence of a self-
conscious subject. While it is presented by Marcuse as a central element of his own 
critical theory and, as will be argued here, also constitutes the core source of its 
limitations, it falls short of undermining the transformative potential of some of his 
other key theoretical orientations.  
A first and evident problem concerns Marcuse‟s  defence of Hegel‟s second-
stage negation. Although the former located the conditions of freedom outside the 
existing realm of social relations, his reliance on a historical subject for social 
transformation effectively reproduces a key concern expressed by Adorno in his critique 
of the primacy of the subject.
15
 By presenting the resolution of contradictions, i.e. the 
identity of subject and object, as a process taking place in the consciousness of a 
revolutionary subject, he is forced to leave the absolutisation of a single relation 
between a concept and a particular, unproblematised, and ultimately reproduce 
epistemological conditions which Adorno had identified as sources of reification and 
totalisation. Marcuse‟s approach to transformative critique, then, fails to safeguard 
critical theory against the repressive tendencies of identity-thinking.  
Furthermore, conscious of the specific problems that a highly rationalised and 
affluent society is likely to cause to the prospects of revolutionary emancipation, 
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 Marcuse, H. Reason and Revolution, p 112 
14
 Marcuse, H. “The Foundations of Historical Materialism,” p 34-5 
15
 See chapter two. 
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Marcuse no longer thought that the proletariat would be in a position to serve the 
interests of society as a whole. As a result, he undertook the task of formulating a theory 
of revolution independently of Marx‟s theory of class. According to him, “Marx‟s 
concept of labour has led far beyond the economic sphere.”16 Alienation, oppression, 
and exploitation have developed into conditions of existence that can no longer be 
confined to a particular economic group, but have in fact become the very “forms of 
life”17 that a “new subject” would come to negate through the self-conscious re-
appropriation of the world of objects. However, while the correlation between a critique 
of labour and the collective interest of the working class in taking part in revolutionary 
action was somewhat self-evident, a difficulty arises when one attempts to find such a 
correlation between diverse forms of resistance resulting from generalised conditions of 
existence and collective action. This is probably what led Marcuse to adopt a typically 
Marxian stance, namely a deterministic reliance on structural change or “shifting 
situation.”18 Indeed, like Marx, he identified several tendencies19 indicating advanced 
capitalism‟s move towards self-destruction and the emergence of a free society. 
However, unlike Marx., who by presenting the proletariat as the “universal class” had 
provided an explanation for the translation of conscious experiences of alienation, 
oppression and exploitation into the material of collective action, Marcuse did not 
explore the mechanisms whereby individual experiences of negation and resistance 
could be translated into wider, collective ones,
20
 thus leaving the medium through 
which the bearers of change can gain consciousness of their mutual interests 
unaccounted for. Even his latest work, entitled The Aesthetic Dimension, in which he 
exposed art‟s role in revealing the “exemplary fate of individuals,”21 presented little 
evidence of any intention to explain how the so-called truths of art can become the very 
substance of a collective experience. Stripped of a theory of class, the fate of change is, 
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 Ibid, p 14 
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 Marcuse, H. “A Note on Dialectic,” p 450 
18
 Marcuse, H. (1969) An Essay on Liberation, Boston: Beacon Press, p 53 
19
 The tendencies leading to what Marcuse called the “Aesthetic Form” have been summarised as follows: 
“first of all the growing technological character of the process of production, with the reduction of the 
required physical energy and its replacement by mental energy – dematerialization of labor. At the same 
time, an increasingly automated machine system […] would allow […] the emergence of a free subject 
within the realm of necessity. Already today, the […] material becomes increasingly susceptible and 
subject to aesthetic forms […]” Marcuse, H. An Essay on Liberation, pp 49-50 
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 See Bernstein, R.J. “Negativity: Themes and Variations” in Pippin, R., Feenberg, A. and Webel, C.P. 
(eds.) (1988) Marcuse: Critical Theory and the Promise of Utopia. London: Macmillan Education, pp 24-
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 Marcuse, H. (1978) The Aesthetic Dimension. Boston: Beacon Press, p xi 
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as a result, forced to rely on a somewhat providential and undefined revolutionary 
consciousness.
22
  
Thirdly, while Marcuse‟s revision of Marx‟s theory of revolution imposes real 
limitations upon the elaboration of a critical theory capable of justifying the emergence 
of a self-conscious subject engaging in revolutionary practice, it shall also be contended 
here that no resolution of the theory-practice riddle can be found until the wider issue of 
revolution-as-practice itself is re-assessed. Marcuse‟s critical social theory has been 
founded upon the presuppositions that radical change is both possible, and necessarily 
preceded by an explosion of society,
23
 beginning with the “Great Refusal”24 and 
culminating in revolutionary action. The risks of adopting such a standpoint, however, 
consist in allowing theory to treat revolutionary practice or civil disobedience as an end 
instead of a means. Indeed, by failing to anticipate the institutional framework likely to 
emerge in the aftermath of such an explosion, critical theory effectively displaces its 
expectations onto a form of practice limited to the destruction of the existing social 
relations, thus leaving other avenues for the implementation of radical change 
unaccounted for, and, more crucially, failing to protect action against a potentially 
pernicious opportunism rising out of the ashes of repression, and blossoming out of a 
system lacking the institutional maturity to produce non-oppressive social relations.
25
 
Marcuse‟s reliance on practice-as-destruction, therefore, contributed to the elaboration 
of a critical theory aimed at both informing a reductionist, short-sighted, and hazardous 
form of political action, and increasing the likelihood of reducing the radicalism of 
social criticism to a merely destructive function.
26
 
Finally, despite Marcuse‟s apparent concern for social transformation, his 
reliance on the emergence of a self-conscious revolutionary subject ultimately causes 
him to favour theory over practice:  
 
                                                 
22
 In his An Essay on Liberation, for example, Marcuse relied on the revolutionary potential of students 
and the Third World without clearly seeking to find out how and why they could perform the role of 
collective subject.  
23
 See Marcuse, H. One-dimensional Man, p xv 
24
 See Marcuse‟s One-Dimensional Man 
25
 It will be shown below that despite insisting on the “positive” or constructive character of negation, 
Marcuse fails to solve such problems.  
26
 The lack of a constructive component anticipating an alternative “life in common” in critical theory 
was in fact emphasised by Peter Wagner as a possible reason for the rise of individualism in the years 
following 1968. See Wagner, P. (2008) Modernity as Experience and Interpretation: A New Sociology of 
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Since the established universe of discourse is that of an unfree world, dialectical thought is 
necessarily destructive, and whatever liberation it may bring is a liberation in thought, in theory. 
However, the divorce of thought from action, of theory from practice, is itself part of the unfree 
world. No thought and no theory can undo it; but theory may help to prepare the ground for their 
possible reunion, and the ability of thought to develop a logic and language of contradiction is a 
prerequisite for this task.
27
  
 
“Liberation in thought,” then, constitutes the central goal of both Adorno‟s and 
Marcuse‟s critical theory. The former warned against the “barbarism” of praxis and, 
consequently, favoured “open-thinking” above concerns regarding the translation of 
theory into political action.
28
  Both did indeed believe that the nature of the “unfree 
world” is such that no unity of theory and practice is possible under its auspices, thereby 
assigning theory the central function in liberation. However, while Adorno‟s pessimism 
could explain such a stance, Marcuse‟s emphasis on the primacy of theory was in fact 
justified by his reliance on the eventual emergence of a collective subject. Such an 
asymmetry between theory and practice nevertheless raises several issues regarding the 
prospects of elaborating a form of critique aimed at social transformation. Indeed, in the 
case of Marcuse‟s particular emphasis on the preparatory function of theory, not only 
does it involve a reliance on both providential change and a form of action potentially 
incapable of yielding sustainable social and institutional changes, it also fails to 
safeguard critical theory against a fall into contemplation. Critical theory must therefore 
attempt to transcend the reductionist interpretation of its own role as theoretical 
resistance to advanced capitalism, and be prepared to accept challenging its institutions 
with concrete proposals oriented towards the implementation of a political form lying 
somewhere beyond the existing reality (social democracy) and aesthetic negation. While 
Marcuse‟s “language of contradictions” may succeed in revealing the internal 
inadequacies of advanced capitalism, it falls short of arming critical theory with the 
practical orientations required to turn it into a language effectively contradicting the 
existing reality. In order to overcome such limitations, I shall contend that the unity of 
theory and practice must become a priority of social criticism. In other words, the 
language of contradictions must no longer limit itself to a negation of the social reality 
assuming the form of theoretical resistance, but must begin to challenge it with 
sufficiently radical (beyond social democracy) and constructive (beyond mere negation) 
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alternatives to satisfy the demands of a critical theory oriented towards the 
institutionalisation of emancipatory practice. In the following section I shall seek to 
explore Marcuse‟s further contributions to critical theory, and find out whether they 
could in fact serve the realisation of the aforementioned project. 
 
 
The Promises of the Principle of Negativity 
 
The principle of negativity underpins both Adorno‟s and Marcuse‟s critical 
theories. The role assigned by Adorno to his negative dialectics consisted in capturing 
the movement of what the reifying, totalising, and absolutising forces of identity-
thinking led the individual to experience social reality as an immutable fact. With the 
capacity to grasp the reliance of “what is” on “what is not,” he thought, the individual 
would be in a position to re-assess his or her relation to the social reality, and resist the 
institutional repression resulting from the ever-increasing rationalisation of the latter. 
By applying the principle of negativity, then, individuals would become capable of 
apprehending what appeared to them as a) the only possible relation between 
themselves and the wider social reality, and b) the only possible mediation between 
humanity and nature, as one configuration among various others, and eventually 
discover alternative ways of experiencing social life.  Negative dialectics, therefore, 
equips individuals with the theoretical material to cease accepting the reality as it 
immediately appears to them by opening up an horizon of possibilities, albeit without 
the anticipation of a political alternative. Since Adorno‟s pessimism led him to present 
negative dialectics as a form of resistance against the existing state of affairs, the role 
assigned to the exposition of potentialities would effectively be reduced to a sort of 
individual and protective intellectual shield against institutional repression.
29
 
 Marcuse, however, appeared to hold higher expectations for the principle of 
negativity. The negation of the existing social reality, he thought, would eventually give 
rise to a new form of society. Thus, although he believed that to “tread on alien ground, 
external to the theory”‟30 would consist in distracting critical theory away from the more 
                                                 
29
 An affinity between Adorno‟s critical theory and Habermas‟s theory of communicative action could be 
identified here, for, as will be shown in chapter four, the latter‟s call for the maximisation of socially 
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defence for a liberation in thought.  
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pressing task of piercing the veil of reification, he maintained that the revelation of the 
contradictions would eventually serve as the material for revolutionary action: 
 
The negation is determinate if it refers the established state of affairs to the basic factors and 
forces which make for its destructiveness, as well as for the possible alternatives beyond the 
status quo. In the human reality, they are historical factors and forces, and the determinate 
negation is ultimately a political negation.
31
  
 
Negation is political inasmuch as the revelation of the contradictions does not 
merely consist of a contrast between “what is” and “what is not,” but sets a conception 
of “what ought to be” in opposition to the “is.” For Marcuse then, negative thinking 
does not limit itself to the revelation of potentialities, but is a process whereby the 
subject also strives to realise them. It is a “state of privation that forces the subject to 
seek remedy” and, as Marcuse claimed, is therefore endowed with a “positive 
character.”32 In fact Hegel, who was the first to capture the movement of “spirit” as one 
underpinned by the principle of negativity, had himself pointed out that “the 
externalisation of self-consciousness has not merely negative, but positive 
significance.”33 In virtue of its positive character, then, the principle of negativity 
cannot be expected to limit itself to the mere knowledge of the existence of human 
potentialities, but effectively drives individuals towards their realisation. Despite the 
problematic character of his concept of practice,
34
 Marcuse offers an approach to 
negativity intrinsically compatible with the challenge of a reality that “ought to be” 
with one that already “is.”  For this reason, I contend that negative dialectics does not 
necessarily limit the scope of critical theory to aporetic resistance, but could instead be 
re-formulated in such as way as to accept its role in providing a framework within 
which the realisation of the negativity principle‟s political potential can immediately be 
employed to inform practice. 
One is here nevertheless justified in asking exactly how Marcuse expected to 
realise negativity‟s potential without “treading on alien ground” or, as Adorno would 
put it, how he could prevent his critical theory from falling into the illusory, and 
potentially hazardous, realm of a strictly transcendent critique.
35
 The answer lies in his 
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adaptation of some of Freud‟s and Nietzsche‟s ideas, particularly those related to the 
“return of the repressed” and the “perpetuity of pleasure,”36 respectively.  Indeed, like 
the latter two thinkers, Marcuse believed in the possible re-surfacing of instincts. 
However, while Freud believed that such a return would manifest itself as a source of 
psychological disorders, the member of the Frankfurt School incorporated it in his 
critical theory to refer to the moment whereby negativity exposes the potentiality of 
reconciling humanity with internal nature, which a revolutionary subject would 
eventually seek to realise. Marcuse, then, identified the “what ought to be” uncovered 
by negativity as the positive expression of the “inherent truth values of the senses,”37 
which, in virtue of their being identified as repressed forms of life by the self-conscious 
subject, are not sought outside the  immanent reality. The positive moment of Marcuse‟s 
principle of negativity, in other words, manifests itself as a form of life, i.e. the 
reconciliation of humanity and internal nature which Marcuse called the “Aesthetic 
Form,” repressed by the heavily bureaucratised social reality, whilst also constantly 
seeking realisation. In this sense, the positive content of Marcuse‟s principle of 
negativity equips critical theory with the utopian moment required in order to become 
technically capable of challenging the existing reality, whilst retaining the immanent 
character necessary to prevent it from developing into fiction.  
 As soon as his affirmative principle of negativity is combined with a concept of 
practice both understood as a destructive moment and founded upon the emergence of a 
providential revolutionary consciousness, however, the capacity of Marcuse‟s critical 
theory to challenge the existing social reality is forced to face significant limitations. As 
the principle underpinning the great refusal, negativity may indeed serve immediately 
practical ends, but since the form of practice it is meant to inform consists of civil 
disobedience culminating in revolutionary action, Marcuse effectively stripped the 
utopian content of a direct role in practice and, by reducing negativity to “the protest 
against that which is,”38 ultimately let the utopian moment – the vaguely defined 
“Aesthetic Form” – of his critical theory recede into the background to favour the 
seemingly more urgent task of civil disobedience. It shall therefore be contended that in 
order to overcome such limitations and turn critical theory into a force capable of 
challenging the existing social order, not only must it strive to inform practice directly, 
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it must do so by attributing the utopian content of negativity a key function in the 
process, i.e. by ensuring that the utopian moment plays as central a role in practice as its 
critical counterpart. Such a task would involve the translation of the return of the 
repressed into a political programme directed towards the implementation of 
alternative material conditions and corresponding socio-political institutions. To use 
Marcuse‟s own terms, critical theory must no longer rely on a “shifting situation,” but 
must instead serve as a force steering the tendencies within advanced capitalism 
towards the “Aesthetic Form.” The absence of a clearly identifiable collective 
revolutionary subject does indeed make such role for critical theory all the more 
pressing, necessary and justified.  
 So far, I have contended that not only should critical theory aim to alter the 
objective reality through mediated unity of theory and practice, it must also accept that 
success in achieving such a goal is presupposed by the presence of an active utopian 
element. In his essay entitled “Resignation,” however, Adorno expressed his concerns 
regarding any attempt to elaborate a critical theory on the basis of such propositions. 
With both Marx‟s theory of revolution and the Soviet experience in mind, Adorno 
argued that “thinking, employed only as an instrument of action, is blunted in the same 
way as all instrumental reason.”39 Such an attempt to unite theory and practice, he 
believed, would turn knowledge into a means for the mastery of the social reality, and 
with it, transform the relation between the subject and the object into one whereby the 
former seeks to dominate the latter. As such critical theory would effectively create the 
conditions favouring the unfolding of reason into a medium supporting the primacy of 
the subject, and the resulting “prohibition of thinking.”40  Adorno, therefore, associates 
any attempt to unite theory and practice, at least prematurely, with the suppression of 
thinking – itself a fundamental condition for the development of repressive conditions 
of existence. Whilst such a view rightly emphasises the risks of reproducing the subject-
object asymmetry in practice, the most significant element conducting this member of 
the Frankfurt School to reach such a conclusion is nevertheless derived from an 
orthodox, and somewhat problematic, interpretation of a particular form of practice, 
namely Marx‟s. Indeed, what effectively led Adorno to reject praxis,41 when achieved 
under duress, as a desirable project, is the view that since Marx reduced practice to the 
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“increased production of the means of production,” 42 he was forced to approach the 
relation between humanity and nature from the standpoint of domination, thereby 
abandoning “criticism” in favour of a form of knowledge subjected to, and supporting 
the primacy of practice. As a result, Adorno failed to account for the implicit thesis of 
Marx‟s concept of labour,43 and was therefore unable to anticipate the possibility of 
uniting theory and practice in such a way as to cultivate the critical content of thinking. 
It shall be contended here that Marx‟s concept of labour as self-realisation in fact offers 
a framework within which the reconciliation of humanity and nature can be realised, 
the non-identity of subject and object maintained, and the principle of negativity 
perform an emancipatory function.
44
 
 Having established, in chapter two, that the success of praxis depends on critical 
theory‟s capacity to anticipate a concept of practice capable of accommodating 
constellation thinking, one is now justified in asking how exactly the translation of the 
utopian content into a practical force can be prevented from undermining the possibility 
of engaging in “open thinking”?45 While Adorno eventually came to regard the task of 
steering society towards what it “ought to be” as a course of action antagonistic to the 
principle of negativity, Marcuse presented the utopian content as an inherent component 
to it. The latter also recognised that “the critical theory which is to guide political 
practice still lags behind,”46 thereby making the unity of theory and practice a desirable 
goal. However, since he understood political practice as a “methodical disengagement 
from and refusal of the Establishment […] aiming at the transvaluation of values,” his 
proposed unity of theory and practice not only prioritised destructive resistance over 
constructive challenge, but also clearly excluded the direct involvement of utopia in 
political action.
47
 Thus, although Marcuse offered a basis upon which to combine 
negativity and utopia, his conflation of criticism and practice implies that whilst critical 
theory can oppose the values of the “Aesthetic Form” to those belonging to the existing 
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order, the fear of “treading on alien ground” eventually turns it, at best, into a 
destructive project and, at worst, into a contemplative one. It shall therefore be 
contended here that critical theory must overcome such a fear and finally accept that the 
insight into objectification does not merely remain critical but also involves a utopian 
component, and begin to address the objective conditions required for emancipation by 
translating the principles underpinning such a utopian content, i.e. the “Aesthetic 
Form,” into the material conditions and alternative socio-political institutions guiding 
political practice in its challenge of the existing social reality. In order to do so, 
however, critical theory must first ensure that the unity of theory and practice is 
prevented from causing the suppression of thinking. The proposed material conditions 
and institutional arrangement, then, must be able to guarantee the preservation of the 
non-identity of subject and object, which involves giving the former the constant 
possibility to negate the latter.
48
 Thinking, in this sense, would not limit its scope to 
action and fall into the reductionist realm of instrumentality, but by reaching beyond 
civil disobedience and revolutionary practice, and into the material conditions required 
for the emergence of an institutional framework capable of guaranteeing the perpetuity 
of the non-identity of subject and object, its scope would in fact be extended to the 
promotion of thinking itself, thus satisfying the conditions Adorno had identified for 
constellation thinking. Before identifying the material conditions in question, and 
drawing the contours of the institutional framework corresponding to them, however, 
one must first explore the content of the “Aesthetic Form.”  
 
 
Utopia and Practice 
 
   Like Freud, Marcuse observed that since the conflict between instinctual 
gratification and the imperative of social order has historically and continuously been 
resolved in favour of the former, “the history of man” has effectively assumed the form 
of a “history of repression.”49 In contrast with the psychoanalyst, however, Marcuse 
believed in a possible, and somewhat inevitable, resolution of such a conflict without 
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the domination of the “reality principle” over the “pleasure principle.” In fact, in his 
most generic formulations, he presented the “Aesthetic Form” as the historical stage 
marking the “reconciliation between pleasure and reality principle.”50 Although 
Marcuse believed the task of exploring the new organisation of the productive forces 
(institutions) to be lying outside the scope of critical theory, several discussions more or 
less scattered throughout his works not only presented the aforementioned 
reconciliation as the fundamental axiom underpinning his utopian content, but also 
revealed its implications for the material and cultural conditions (foundations) of the 
aesthetic form.  
 As the product of negative thinking, Marcuse‟s utopian content rests on theory‟s 
capacity to develop into a critical force. To do so, reason, which under the domination 
of the reality principle over the pleasure principle treats “phantasy as a separate mental 
process,”51 must accept that as a critical force it effectively “originates in […] value-
judgment,”52  thereby recognising its convergence with, rather than opposing, aesthetic 
judgements. As the exclusive realm of the aesthetic form in advanced capitalist 
societies, then, art serves as an outlet for the conversion of reason into a subversive 
force: 
 
In contrast to Orthodox Marxist aesthetics I see the political potential of art in art itself, in the 
aesthetic form as such. Furthermore, I argue that by virtue of its aesthetic form, art is largely 
autonomous vis a vis the given social relations, and at the same time transcends them. Thereby 
art subverts the dominant consciousness, the ordinary experience.
53
  
 
 Dismissed by several Marxists as infected by, and an ally of, capitalist relations 
and forces of production, art is here being presented by Marcuse as an autonomous 
sphere and central medium of liberation. He therefore located the seeds of emancipation 
in what are thought to be the last vestiges of the aesthetic form within a heavily 
rationalised society, and believed that although “[a]rt cannot change the world […] it 
can contribute to changing the consciousness and drives of the men and women who 
could change the world.”54 Once matured, however, such a revolutionary consciousness 
would seek to turn the aesthetic form into the basis for the generalised “order of 
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values”55 of the new society by making art‟s “traditional function […] obsolete.”56 As 
the negation of a heavily bureaucratised form of life, such an “abolition of art” would 
indeed mark both the destruction of the repressive society, and the advent of a new, 
non-repressive order founded upon “a harmony of the mental faculties”57 so far 
rendered unrealisable by the capitalist division of labour. Once reconciled with reason, 
then, aesthetic judgements can begin to enter the sphere of labour and affect it in such a 
way that “the convergence of technology and art and the convergence of work and 
play”58 effectively underpin the material conditions of a new order. Marcuse‟s 
reconciliation of the pleasure and reality principles, therefore, assumes the form of a 
“harmony of the mental faculties” presupposed by the development of the recognition of 
the “cognitive and emancipatory power of sensuousness”59 realised through autonomous 
works of art, into a fundamental condition of existence whereby the senses are capable 
of performing a socially useful and productive function, brought about by the abolition 
of art itself as emancipatory practice. 
Marcuse, in fact, believed in the historical possibility of a form of civilisation – 
the “Aesthetic Form” – whereby instinctual energies enter the process of production as 
the realisation of already existing and creative potentialities formally excluded from 
such a process as a result of the division of labour and, as such, was also keen to 
emphasise the fact that such a phenomenon was presupposed by the release of such 
energies under non-repressive conditions of existence. To be prevented from assuming a 
chaotic character, and become a productive force in the satisfaction of needs, the release 
of instinctual energies must nevertheless be subject to a certain degree of control. As 
Marcuse himself pointed out:   
 
To be sure, if freedom is to become the governing principle of civilization, not only reason but 
also the sensuous impulse requires a restraining transformation. The additional release of 
sensuous energy must conform with the universal order of freedom. However, whatever order 
would have to be imposed upon the sensuous impulse must itself be “an operation of freedom.” 
The free individual himself must bring about the harmony between individual and universal 
gratification. In a truly free civilization, all laws are self-given by the individuals: “to give 
freedom by freedom is the universal law” of the “aesthetic state”; in a truly free civilization, “the 
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will of the whole” fulfils itself only “through the nature of the individual.” Order is freedom only 
if it is founded on and sustained by the free gratification of the individuals.
60
  
 
In order to become “an operation of freedom,” restrictions imposed by the 
heavily administered society must be removed to be replaced by others laid down by the 
free individuals themselves. The logic of this “non-repressive sublimation”‟61 assuming 
the form of “self-sublimation,”62 effectively derives from the belief that if “free 
gratification” becomes universal, the reconciliation of reason and the senses that such a 
process would involve, would ultimately serve the reconciliation between individuals 
themselves. Implicit in such a view is the notion that the harmony of individual and 
universal gratification effectively depends on the primacy of the particular.
63
 What is 
meant here is the fact that freedom would no longer be understood as a state of affairs 
involving limitations imposed by reason upon the will and resulting in the subsumption 
of particularity under universality, i.e. negative freedom, but that it would instead 
manifest itself as a condition of existence whereby the individual would make his/her 
free gratification the primary goal of his/her actions. Since Marcuse‟s positive 
conception of freedom depends on a reconciliation of subject and object, it is capable of 
transcending the competitive and self-interested inclinations corresponding to negative 
types of freedom, and yield cooperative forms of behaviour. While the principle of self-
preservation underpins a society assuming the form of an aggregate of competing self-
interests, the reconciliation of the pleasure and reality principles underpinning the 
“Aesthetic Form” gives rise to a harmony of free and cooperative self-gratifications. 
Social order, here, would therefore be maintained through the reconciliation of reason 
and the senses, yielded by the productive and socially cohesive process of self-
sublimation, and actualised under non-repressive conditions of existence. It follows, 
then, that the emergence of the “Aesthetic Form” crucially rests on the presence of 
institutions capable of both achieving the abolition of art and accommodating the self-
sublimation of the senses.  
The institutions of advanced capitalism, underpinned by the principle of self-
preservation and modelled around the capitalist division of labour, have both developed 
from, and served to cultivate, a conception of reason stifling the release of instinctual 
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energies. Despite making numerous references to the general morphology of the 
“Aesthetic Form,” Marcuse always approached it from the standpoint of the subjectivity 
of experience, and consistently held back from venturing into an exploration of its 
objective counterpart. In fact it could be argued that Marcuse‟s “failure to come to grips 
theoretically with the problem of social objectivity”64 was caused by his reliance upon 
the development of a new sensibility thought to culminate in the unity of theory of 
practice brought about by a yet-to-be-known revolutionary subject. As I have already 
contended, a critical theory aiming to actualise emancipatory practice cannot afford to 
ground the prospects of change on a providential collective subject. Instead, the unity of 
theory and practice should involve the translation of the utopian content into the 
immediate goal of critical theory. In other words, critical theory must inform a form of 
political action both aiming to abolish art by seeking to transform labour into a process 
of free gratification, and steering the tendencies within capitalism towards the creation 
of conditions favourable for the universal self-sublimation of the senses by ensuring 
that the free gratification of one individual becomes the precondition for the free 
gratification of another. It could therefore be suggested that what Marcuse understood 
by the “convergence of art and technology” as the “harmony between individual and 
universal gratification” not only echoes Marx‟s implicit approach to labour as a socially 
cohesive process of self-realisation, but is also best served by assigning free labour the 
role of mediation in such a process.
65
 In practical terms, then, the reconciliation of the 
pleasure and reality principles involves both a change of the purpose of production into 
one whereby both the transformation of nature itself is a process of self-realisation, i.e. 
an end in itself, and the satisfaction of the needs of an individual is consciously 
experienced by another as an integral part of his/her own self-realisation. While the 
former element is presupposed by an effective control over the productive process by 
the producers, the latter depends on the institutionalisation of a dialogue between the 
two dimensions of self-realisation,  namely production and consumption.
66
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Concluding Remarks 
 
As a member of the Frankfurt School particularly confident and enthusiastic 
about the prospects of change, Marcuse elaborated a critical theory thought to perform a 
central function in the practical transformation of the social reality. By uniting theory 
with a concept of practice understood as a unity of subject and object and reduced to a 
merely destructive function, however, Marcuse not only failed to safeguard critical 
theory against both epistemological and institutional forms of repression, he also fell 
short of realising the potentially constructive function of the utopian content unfolded 
by his principle of negativity. It has therefore been suggested that in order to overcome 
such limitations and realise the transformative potential of critical theory, the latter 
ought to be revised in such a way as to both include an insight into the objective 
conditions, i.e. the socio-political institutions, favourable for the reconciliation of 
humanity and nature (universal free gratification) and turn the unity of theory and 
practice (the abolition of art) into its immediate goal. It was finally argued that the 
realisation of the aforementioned reconciliation would be presupposed by the 
transformation of labour into a sphere of self-realisation, and its institutionalisation as a 
dialogical mediation between particularity (individual free gratification) and 
universality (universal free gratification). However, can labour as collective self-
realisation also serve as a basis upon which the non-identity of subject and object be 
maintained, i.e. where self-realisation is collective without being collectivised? Can it 
be expected to produce the epistemological forms required for emancipation? The next 
two chapters shall attempt to answer these questions by exploring the works of the 
member of the Frankfurt School who was first to anticipate the institutionalisation of the 
non-identity of subject and object, namely Habermas.  
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Chapter 4 
 
The Premises of Institutionalised Emancipatory practice. 
 
 
 
 In the last chapter I sought to explore the manner in which the transformative 
potential of critical theory could be maximised. It was shown that the success of such a 
task depends upon critical theory‟s orientation towards the implementation of an 
institutional framework capable of creating the conditions of existence required for 
reconciliation. However, it was not until Habermas‟s The Structural Transformation of 
the Public Sphere that explicit considerations of such a nature made their way into the 
Frankfurt School tradition. The present chapter shall therefore address the relevant 
theoretical developments pursued by the second-generation Frankfurt School theorist, 
and explore their implications for critical theory‟s practical content.  
 
 
Habermas, Modernity, and Emancipation 
 
Habermas shared very similar concerns to those expressed by other members of 
the Frankfurt School. Like them, he sought to understand the development of capitalism 
into its “advanced” form as a phenomenon closely connected with the seemingly 
unstoppable spread of instrumental rationality thought to be detrimental to the prospects 
of human emancipation. Habermas also shared with the earlier generation of critical 
social theorists the view that the development from liberal to advanced capitalism not 
only corresponded to an alteration in the nature of domination and consequently to a 
change in the way individuals related to the world around them, but also called for the 
elaboration of a social critique capable of addressing such changes. However, 
Habermas‟s optimism with respects to the promises of the Enlightenment caused his 
critical theory to depart significantly from those of his predecessors. With Habermas, 
then, modernity would no longer be interpreted as a constellation of economic, social 
and cultural forces, all failing to create the conditions favourable for human 
emancipation, but is now thought to consist in an “unfinished” project,1 whose 
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completion thus becomes the task of critical theory. It is in this particular context that 
Habermas presented modern societies as ones characterised by not one, but two forms 
of rationality – instrumental and communicative – which he, later in his work, described 
as the differentiation between “system” and “lifeworld.” 
Although clearly indebted to Weber‟s distinction between instrumental 
rationality (Zweckrationalität) and value-rationality (Wertrationalität),
2
 it is through a 
reconstruction of Marx‟s historical materialism that Habermas begins to re-assess the 
achievements of modernity. Central to the critical theorist‟s early works is the view that 
despite the high level attained by the productive forces – a level indicating humanity‟s 
success in mastering the forces of external nature – modernity had fallen short of 
yielding conditions favourable for the development of a class consciousness seeking 
human emancipation, thereby calling into question the validity of Marx‟s 
base/superstructure schema. Whilst the first generation critical theorists concluded that 
the failed emancipation of internal nature was inextricably linked to processes involved 
in humanity‟s relation with external nature,3 Habermas was critical of such a holistic 
approach to modernity, which, like Marx‟s, reduces the epistemological achievements 
of the modern age to the rise of instrumental reason. The prospects of emancipation, 
Habermas thought, depend on the evolution of two distinct logics of action: 
 
A society owes emancipation from the external forces of nature to labor processes, that is to the 
production of technically exploitable knowledge (including „the transformation of the natural 
sciences into machinery‟). Emancipation from the compulsion of internal nature succeeds to the 
degree that institutions based on force are replaced by an organization of social relations that is 
bound only to communication free from domination. This does not occur directly through 
productive activity, but rather through the revolutionary activity of struggling classes (including 
the critical activity of reflective sciences).
4
  
 
 With Habermas, then, the reflexive activity of social agents is no longer directly 
determined by the sphere of activity geared towards the transformation of external 
nature. The success of bourgeois ideology in hindering the revolutionary struggle of the 
working class should indeed serve to confirm the distinction between the two spheres of 
activity, for if class consciousness depended solely on “the growing potential of control 
                                                 
2
 Habermas makes his debt to, and criticism of, Weber most explicit in his work The Theory of 
Communicative Action. 
3
 See chapter two. 
4
 Habermas, J. (1987) Knowledge and Human Interests, Cambridge: Polity Press, p 53 
  
77 
 
over the natural processes objectified in work,” the superstructure would transparently 
reveal, and fail to succeed in concealing, the alienating and exploitative conditions 
under which material reproduction takes place.
5
 Somewhere along the line, therefore, 
the “object of conflict” had to be made “unrecognizable for both parties, capitalists as 
well as wage laborers.”6 Whilst such observations suggest that consciousness emerges 
as a result of processes distinguishable from those involved in material reproduction 
Marx, according to Habermas, claimed that the self-reflexive activity necessitated for 
the supersession of false-consciousness – a distortion made possible by the ostensible 
exchange of equivalents legitimated by market relations – depends on the level of 
development attained by the productive forces. As such,  his “critique of commodity 
fetishism” may be able to reveal the distorted nature of communication in bourgeois 
societies, but falls short of identifying the distinctive character and full range of the 
processes involved in the development of such a distortion, thus overlooking the 
analytical distinction between a logic of action geared towards “emancipation from 
external constraints” and another seeking to eliminate “repressions of internal nature.”7 
Consequently, Habermas argued, a social theory aiming to identify the conditions 
required for human emancipation must be reconstructed in such a way as to 
accommodate both levels of analysis.   
Several sociological and epistemological inferences can be drawn from 
Habermas‟s distinction of the two logics of emancipation. Firstly, and from a 
sociological standpoint, the distinction effectively corresponds to a differentiation 
between processes of social integration which involve “systems of institutions in which 
speaking and acting subjects are socially related” (interaction), and processes of system 
integration maintaining “their boundaries and their continued existence by mastering the 
complexity of an inconstant environment” (work).8 The evolution of the human species, 
then, can be fully comprehended only by differentiating the evolutionary dynamics of 
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the “self-formative” and “self-generative” spheres and not, as Marx understood it, by 
reducing the former to the “self-generative act.”9 Consequently: 
 
the introduction of new forms of social integration, as for instance, the replacement of the 
kinship system with the state, demands knowledge of a practical-moral kind. Technical 
knowledge, which can be implemented with rules of instrumental and strategic action, or an 
expansion of our control over external nature, is not what is required, but, rather, a knowledge 
which can seek its embodiment in structures of interaction. We can understand the development 
of the productive forces as a problem-generating mechanism that releases but does not create the 
evolutionary renewal of the mode of production.
10
 
 
Secondly, then, the constitution of knowledge follows two distinct trajectories. 
On the one hand, the knowledge constituted in the sphere of work, where actions are 
oriented towards the mastery of the forces of external nature, is said to embody the 
“technical” or manipulative interest of reason. Here, individuals  relate to nature and 
each other through the steering mechanisms of “power” and “money,” which cause their 
actions to be governed by imperatives of efficiency and productivity, also known as 
“systemic imperatives.” On the other hand, when actions are oriented towards “mutual 
understanding,” such as those found in the sphere of interaction, the knowledge arising 
therefrom is constituted on the basis of what Habermas termed the “practical” or 
normative interest of reason. Since this particular sphere of activity comprises 
individuals reflecting on their internal nature and interacting on a strictly intersubjective 
basis – between individuals and internal nature – relations are now mediated by the 
communicative mechanisms of “language” and “symbols,” thereby causing their actions 
to be governed by the consensual and deliberative principles of “practical discourse.” 
Following Adorno and Horkheimer‟s analysis in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, the rise 
of instrumental reason, then, ought to be understood as the epistemological 
manifestation of the human interest in technical control, spreading over the entire 
history of the human species.
11
 A social theory seeking to identify the conditions 
favourable for human emancipation, Habermas contends, ought to give recognition to 
the sociological and corresponding epistemological distinction between work and 
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interaction, for the “emancipatory interest” of such a critical social theory itself 
effectively depends “on the interests in possible intersubjective action-orientation and in 
possible technical control.”12 It therefore follows that the unfinished character of 
modernity and its project of emancipation cannot be fully grasped unless it is re-
articulated as a problem connected with the failure to introduce an institutional 
framework providing conditions favourable for the exercise of communication free from 
domination, rather than a failure to reconcile humanity with external nature.
13
 It is in the 
light of these observations that Habermas re-assesses the development from liberal to 
advanced capitalism. 
Whilst Habermas‟s reconstruction of historical materialism aimed to overcome 
the latter‟s incapacity to address the distinct sociological and epistemological character 
of interaction, it did not originally intend – at least before the linguistic turn taken by his 
work from The Theory of Communicative Action onwards –  to result in an outright 
rejection of all of its key tenets. In fact he agreed with Marx as regards to the economic 
nature of the relations of production in the modern age: 
 
The identification of substructure with economic structure could lead to the assumption that the 
substructural level is equivalent to the economic system. That is, however, valid only for modern 
societies. Relations of production are defined by their function in regulating access to the means 
of production and indirectly the distribution of social wealth. This function is assumed in 
primitive societies by kinship systems and in traditional societies by political institutions. It is 
not until the market, in addition to its cybernetic function, also takes over the function of 
stabilizing class relations that the relations of production assume a purely economic form.
14
  
 
The central aim of Habermas‟s critique of Marx, therefore, was to historicise the 
latter‟s base/superstructure schema as one only applicable to the modern age and, more 
specifically, to a critique of “the [liberal] capitalist principle of organization,”15 whilst 
reconstructing it to include the two aforementioned levels of analysis required to turn it 
into a critique of society capable of grasping the strictly modern social conditions 
whereby the “uncoupling of the state and the economy” provided the institutional 
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framework within which the “socially integrative functions”16 previously performed by 
the political system could be transferred to “a subsystem that primarily fulfills system 
integrative functions,”17 namely the market. As such, the dynamics involved in the 
distortion of communication could, as Marx insisted in his critique of the fetishism of 
commodities,
18
 be explained by the “double function” performed by the market as 
“steering mechanism” (through the medium of money) and ideology (through the 
symbols generated by the “value form”)  but their origins and conditions for their 
dissolution, Habermas contends, can only be adequately grasped from a standpoint lying 
outside the sphere of work and capable of uncovering the interplay between 
communicative and instrumental forms of knowledge.
19
 Thus, in order to discard the 
veil of distorted communication arising from the social conditions of existence found 
within the liberal capitalist framework, the phenomenon itself must first be explained as 
a transfer of the function of social integration over to the market,  and problematised as 
a conflict between the power-driven character of the social relations governed by 
instrumental rationality and the consensual nature of those developing under the rule of 
its communicative counterpart.   
However, the age of bourgeois capitalism was also marked by a significant 
achievement. The uncoupling of state and economy,
20
 or “depoliticisation of the 
relations of production,” resulted in the creation of a social space permitting individuals 
to interact on the basis of communication free from domination:  
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The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people who 
come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above against 
public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing 
relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and 
social labor. The medium of this political confrontation was peculiar and without historical 
precedent: people‟s public use of their reason (öffentliches Räsonnement).21 
 
Individuals could, for the first time in history, engage with “the public 
authorities themselves” and make use of a “morally pretentious rationality that strove to 
discover what was once just and right,” thus finding the means to form a “public 
opinion” which would ultimately serve as “the only legitimate source of th[e] law.”22 
Access to such a space of subversive self-reflexive practice was nevertheless limited. 
Only autonomous individuals, or, as Kant put it, those free “from self-incurred 
immaturity” could expect to participate in such democratic processes.23 In a bourgeois 
society, i.e. a society where relations of production assume an economic form, the free 
“homme,” as the only person capable of being his own (moral) master, is the “property-
owning private person” who, as Habermas observed, could appear “morally free” 
precisely due to the apparent “justice immanent in free commerce.”24 The moral 
freedom of the bourgeois was, therefore, nothing more than a “fiction.” Thus, although 
the emergence of a public sphere mediating the state and civil society consisted in a 
hitherto unseen and potentially liberating social development, the fact that the socially 
integrative functions happened to be performed by a system founded on an exchange of 
equivalents such as the market effectively concealed the “conflation of bourgeois and 
homme” as citoyen,25 thereby making the communicative freedom of the public sphere 
particularly vulnerable to “processes of concentration and crisis” that would eventually 
“pull[..] the veil of an exchange of equivalents off the antagonistic structure of 
society.”26 The emergence of the bourgeois public sphere, therefore, heavily depended 
on the distorting tendencies of the market as a system of social integration, whose 
incapacity to prevent the development of conflicts of interests into organised private-
interest groups eventually led to “structural transformation of the public sphere” and the 
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corresponding demise of the subversive function of public opinion. It was such a 
transformation that marked the advent of the latest stage in capitalist development and 
led to the highly problematic spread of instrumental reason. 
Although Habermas problematised from diverse angles
27
  the development of 
capitalism into its advanced stage, all of the accounts in question have been 
underpinned by one of his primary concerns, namely the distortion of communication 
and its effects on modernity‟s capacity to realise its promises. Under advanced 
capitalism, then: 
 
The social potential of science is reduced to the powers of technical control – its potential for 
enlightened action is no longer considered. […] Emancipation by means of enlightenment is 
replaced by instruction in control over objective or objectified processes. Socially effective 
theory is no longer directed toward the consciousness of human beings who live together and 
discuss matters with each other, but to the behavior of human beings who manipulate.
28
  
 
In what Habermas also called the “scientific civilization,” the interest in 
technical control spreads to such an extent that it subjects all forms of knowledge to its 
own imperatives, thus causing an identity of the two logics of action – work and 
interaction – assuming the form of a subsumption of the normative fabric of society 
under the power-driven actions of instrumental reason. What, then, are the changes that 
have led to such a state of affairs? 
The incapacity of the market to solve its socially integrative “functional 
weaknesses” and “dysfunctional side effects” as steering mechanism, has led the state to 
re-appropriate the latter functions.
29
 Since the role of the state as steering mechanism 
meant that it would have to become “actively engaged in” the “general conditions of 
production,”30 we are effectively witnessing, under the advanced capitalist stage, a “re-
coupling of state and economy” and the corresponding repoliticisation of relations of 
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production. Consequently, the state found itself confronted with the “problem of how 
socially produced wealth may be inequitably, and yet, legitimately distributed.”31 
Having to seek, under such a re-feudalisation with a smiling face, the validity claims 
required for the legitimation of unequal access to the means of production and uneven 
distribution of wealth, the state would be forced to seize control of the normative sphere 
of social life, thus prompting Habermas to argue that “[d]uring the course of capitalist 
development, the political system shifts its boundaries not only into the economic 
system but also into the socio-cultural system.”32 Under a social system governed by the 
advanced capitalist state, then, actions oriented towards the emancipation of internal 
nature no longer address socio-cultural matters from the standpoint of intersubjective 
communication, but rather turn such matters into problems of “administrative 
manipulation.”33 With a “public authority” now “compet[ing] for publicity,”34 
communication becomes distorted in such a way that the members of advanced 
capitalist societies “are no longer able to distinguish between practical and technical 
power,”35 thereby paving the way for the suppression of “a critical public reflection still 
preoccupied with itself,”36 and a corresponding democratic deficit.37 It therefore follows 
that the realisation of the promises of modernity are presupposed by the capacity of 
individuals to engage in democratic processes assuming the form of public self-
reflection which, Habermas contends, is itself dependent upon both their capacity to 
identify the distinction between communicative and instrumental rationality, and the 
institutionalisation of their non-identity.   
 
 
Restoring Communication Free From domination: Non-identity and the Public 
Sphere 
 
So far in this chapter, it has been shown that some of Habermas‟s fundamental 
assumptions regarding both the prospects and conditions of human emancipation, 
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contained the seeds of a break away from those underpinning Marx‟s critique of 
political economy and the critical theory of his Frankfurt School counterparts, and 
which his linguistic turn will later confirm and extend.  Firstly, Habermas is a firm 
believer in modernity‟s capacity to deliver the democratic foundations required for the 
realisation of the self-reflexive potential of individuals. Secondly, his “functionally 
differentiated” approach to social evolution enabled him to differentiate between the 
logic of emancipation from external nature, and that of internal nature, thereby causing 
him to defend the possibility of a coexistence between a form of knowledge arising out 
of activities geared towards the domination of nature, and another emerging out of 
actions seeking to realise the self-reflexive potential of the human species.
38
 Thirdly, 
and drawing on his previous assumption, he located the conditions of human 
emancipation outside the sphere of work, and predicated them upon the undistorted 
consummation of communicative reason. Lastly, it was suggested that, according to the 
second generation critical theorist, the realisation of the self-reflexive potential of 
humanity depended upon the implementation of institutions capable of securing the 
non-identity of instrumental and communicative reason. How, then, does Habermas 
propose to achieve such a state of affairs under an advanced (capitalist) stage of 
modernity characterised by the penetration of systemic imperatives into a sphere of 
activity originally concerned with the emancipation of internal nature? 
Before exploring the nature of the challenge facing Habermas in his quest to 
solve the problem of distorted communication, one must first seek to comprehend the 
distinctive mechanisms involved in the exercise of communicative reason. Although no 
explicit account of this form of rationality can be found in his work The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere, it is through his qualified defence of this 
institution that the first glimpses of communicative reason can be identified. Here, 
Habermas had already hinted at a type of action and form of knowledge which he would 
further elaborate later in The Theory of Communicative Action, where he made the 
following observation: 
 
This concept of communicative rationality carries with it connotations based ultimately on the 
central experience of the unconstrained, unifying, consensus-binding force of argumentative 
speech, in which different participants overcome their merely subjective views and, owing to the 
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mutuality of rationally motivated conviction, assure themselves of both the unity of the objective 
world and the intersubjectivity of their lifeworld.
39
  
 
In the light of such an observation, the emphasis placed by Habermas on the role 
played by the public sphere in the exercise of communicative reason becomes fairly 
straightforward. As a public space of free argumentation serving “privatized 
individuals” in their quest for the “peculiar obviousness [emphasis added]” of the 
“criteria of generality and abstractness characterizing legal norms [emphasis added],” 
the public sphere performed a central function in unleashing the subversive force of 
communicative rationality.
40
 It also allowed the members of the “public sphere in the 
world of letters” – where culture is made into “an object of critical debate”41 – to 
channel the particularity of their experiences (needs, desires, feelings emotions and the 
like) as private individuals into the “rational-universal”42 force of a public opinion 
formed through public deliberation, and converted into a public criticism of the 
established authority by the “political public sphere.” The subversive exercise of 
communicative reason, in this sense, involves the dual process of “universalistic 
justification of norms” and “democratic generalization of interests,” whose ultimate end 
is the self-regulated discovery of the “ethical life” framing social relations.43 The form 
of interaction underpinning these processes, then, aims to reach beyond the confines of 
mere compromise.
44
 Indeed, compromises begin with a conflict of at least two parties 
each seeking to maximise its own interest. The resolution of such a conflict must 
assume the form of a trade-off between the relevant interests. For this reason, 
compromises not only arise from the particularity of self-interested power relations, but 
also tend to remain within the normative space framed by these relations as 
“generalised particularism [emphasis added].”45 Rational consensus, on the other hand, 
in virtue of its reliance on the impartiality of communicative reason and the “consensus-
binding force of argumentative speech,” seeks to uncover the general interest and, as 
such, aims to transcend the normative boundaries erected by the subjectivity of the 
world of private individuals. The public sphere, in sum, serves as a platform for 
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individuals seeking to uncover the “ethical life” of society through the free exercise of 
communicative reason and, as such, constitutes the key institutional basis upon which 
the realisation of a pluralist “democratic universalism” can be made possible.46  
However, Habermas‟s work on the public sphere also sought to expose the 
structural limitations of this historically unique institution. Indeed, he observed that with 
the commercialisation of the press and the pluralisation of competitive interests that 
ensued, the process of formation of public opinion began to assume a different form. As 
conflicts of interest began to spread into the political public sphere, the power of private 
organisations and inequalities between various class interests became visible, thereby 
undermining the impartiality of public opinion, and forcing the state to seek “temporary 
compromises between groups” of private interests.47 Thus, as Habermas pointed out:  
 
In the same degree to which this kind of mutual penetration of state and civil society dissolved a 
private sphere whose independent existence made possible the generality of the laws, the 
foundation for a relatively homogenous public composed of private citizens engaged in rational-
critical debate was also shaken. Competition between organized private interests invaded the 
public sphere. If the particular interests that as privatized interests were neutralized in the 
common denominator of class interest once permitted public discussion to attain a certain 
rationality and even effectiveness, it remains that today the display of competing interests has 
taken the place of such discussion. The consensus developed in rational-critical debate has 
yielded to compromise fought out or simply imposed nonpublicly.
48
  
 
 As institutionalised class compromise, the welfare state of advanced capitalist 
societies ultimately acts as a source of communicative distortion, where the latter is 
directly analogous to the way surplus value is appropriated. The state‟s involvement in 
the resolution of conflicts of interests has effectively stifled civil society‟s capacity to 
both regulate itself and subvert the established public authority, thereby removing the 
basic conditions required for the application of the “criteria of [communicative] 
rationality.”49 The challenge facing Habermas can therefore be stated as follows: how 
can the neutralisation of private interests presupposing the rationally deliberated search 
for “ethical life” be immunised against the highly distorting tendencies of systemic 
imperatives under advanced capitalism?  
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 Since in his early works, such as the Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere and Legitimation Crisis, Habermas traced back the depoliticisation of the 
relations of production necessary for the neutralisation of private interests
50
 and the 
exercise of “democratic universalism” to the formal separation of the state and the 
economy and, correspondingly, explained the suppression of communication in terms of 
a re-coupling of the two spheres under the latest stage of capitalist development, it 
would seem coherent to conclude that the non-identity of communicative and 
instrumental reason must be presupposed by a transformation of advanced capitalism‟s 
institutions to be realised “democratically from within [emphasis added].”51 However, 
Habermas‟s strategy for the restoration of unconstrained communication has changed 
over the years. Whilst in his early works, the non-identity of the two forms of rationality 
still relied on the “parallelization of the action systems” of state and economy with the 
respective “action types” of instrumental and communicative action, from the Theory of 
Communicative Action onwards Habermas abandons such a configuration in favour of 
another that would be capable of giving recognition to the “different resources for 
societal integration” lying outside the state, whose functions are now thought to assume 
systemically integrative forms.
52
  For this reason, the non-identity of instrumental and 
communicative action would now be secured by “erect[ing] a democratic dam against 
the colonializing encroachment of system imperatives on areas of the lifeworld.”53 
Thus, Habermas‟s reconceputalisation of the state as a systemically integrative sphere 
per se has led him to substitute the pessimism regarding the prospects of unconstrained 
communication under a state accused of appropriating systemically integrative 
functions, with an optimism regarding the possibility of maximising the “forces of 
societal integration” for the protection of the lifeworld against imperatives now thought 
to be specific not only to the economy, but to the state as well.
54
 The impact of such an 
alteration on his emancipatory strategy was made most explicit in the following 
passage: 
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The theory of communicative action intends to bring into the open the rational potential intrinsic 
in everyday communicative practices. […] Such a task no longer restricts the search for  
normative potentials to a formation of the public sphere that was specific to a single epoch. It 
removes the necessity for stylizing particular prototypical manifestations of an institutionally 
embodied communicative rationality in favor of an empirical approach in which the tension of 
the abstract opposition between norm and reality is dissolved.
55
 
 
Thus, instead of seeking to identify the conditions required for the argumentative 
discovery of the general interest outside the institutions of advanced capitalism, critical 
theory ought to embrace the more empirical and pragmatic stance of an approach 
seeking a “radical-democratic change in the process of legitimation [emphasis 
added].”56 The task of immunising communicative rationality against the threat of 
systemic imperatives, therefore, no longer depends on a change of a strictly institutional 
form motivated by an idealised institutional arrangement of communicative practices, 
but on cultivating the “transhistorical capacity for human communication” within the 
basic contours offered by the current institutional framework.
57
  
What led Habermas to adopt such a standpoint can be (at least partly) explained 
by his fatalistic concern with the fact  that, as Thornhill put it, “the media of money and 
power have now established themselves instrumentally against their normative 
environments.”58 Such an observation would eventually lead him to conduct a more 
detailed analysis of communicative practices, the implications of which effectively 
informed the development of his thought.
59
 Thus, having established in The Theory of 
Communicative Action that the “normative content of democracy” is realised through 
wide-ranging practices of “discursive public communications” and discovered in truths 
universally implicit in all speech, Habermas could not restrict the scope of his 
democratic procedures to the legal domain, but also had to consider the existence of a 
“spontaneous flow of communication unsubverted by power [emphasis added]” 
effectively escaping the grasp of formal institutionalisation.
60
 The task of securing the 
non-identity of communicative and instrumental reason, therefore, “is based on the 
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interplay between a constitutionally instituted formation of the political will” and the 
“nonorganized” socially integrative resources.61 For this reason, it could be argued that 
although instances of practical discourse do fall outside “formally instituted processes 
of communication and decision-making,” Habermas never fully abandoned his concern 
for institutional changes but, instead, altered them in such a way as to direct social 
criticism primarily towards the realisation of transhistorical communicative potentials 
through the maximisation of resources made available by modernity
62
 Drawing on such 
a line of thought, it could be further argued that, since the discursive discovery of both 
ethical life and the resolution of problems of a practical nature no longer depend on the 
prioritised implementation of fundamental institutional changes, but rather on the 
introduction of structures of communication requiring minor institutional adjustments,
63
 
Habermas has, from The Theory of Communicative Action onwards, “bid a [definitive] 
farewell to the notion of alienation and appropriation of objectified essentialist powers,” 
whose accomplishment was motivated by the emancipatory drive for self-realisation 
pushing humanity beyond the boundaries imposed by the existing historical conditions 
and causing it to necessitate a radical transformation of the wider social reality.
64
  
Habermas‟s confinement of human emancipation to the sphere of interaction, his 
later abandonment of the philosophy of consciousness,
65
 and the reformulation of social 
criticism into a theory of communicative action seeking the non-identity of 
communicative instrumental reason as an empirical legitimation of power rather than a 
structural transformation of the state and the economy, all point towards a repositioning 
of critical social theory from the radical transformation implicit in self-realisation to a 
conciliatory defence of intersubjective self-reflection somewhat reminiscent of the 
subjectivist trajectories followed by Kant and Hegel in their approach to autonomy,
66
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thereby striking the final blows against the transformative radicalism of critical theory
67
 
– blows that constitute a fundamental problem as soon as the possibility of “fair 
negotiations and free debates” under material conditions organised around the division 
of labour, is called into question.
68
 
 
 
On the Material Origins of Reflexivity 
 
The basic contours of the practical content of Habermas‟s critical social theory 
have so far been kept somewhat implicit. It should nevertheless be clear, at this point, 
that the distinction between the spheres of work and interaction ensuing from his 
reconstruction of historical materialism has led him to distance himself from, and even 
reject, a fundamental tenet of the philosophy of consciousness according to which 
human emancipation ought to assume a form no less radical than that of self-realisation. 
Since he presented the repressive character of advanced capitalism as a problem caused 
by the subsumption of the logic of emancipation of internal nature under the logic of the 
emancipation from external nature, and explained it as the consequence of a state 
increasingly present in the resolution of cultural matters, Habermas sought the solution 
to the problem of human emancipation in the radical democratisation of legitimation 
processes thought to be dependent on the social actors‟ capacity to distinguish between 
practical and technical interests. From this moment on, the practical content of critical 
theory would consist in serving the enlightenment of individuals in such a way as to 
raise their consciousness of the distinction between actions oriented towards self-
                                                                                                                                               
autonomy do not rest on a transformation of the objective reality, but is instead confined to the 
subjectivist realm of the categorical imperative and the negation of the negation respectively.  
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reflection and those oriented towards manipulation and control, and maintain the non-
identity of the two forms of actions thought to be the precondition for the exercise of a 
pluralist democratic universalism. With Habermas, then, one witnesses a re-connection 
of the project of human emancipation with the Enlightenment concept of autonomy, 
according to which the transformation of the conditions required for self-reflexivity 
ought to assume a primarily subjective form. The central issue at hand, then, is whether 
critical social theory can realistically serve the interests of human emancipation without 
an immediate and direct defence of a radical transformation of the material conditions 
of existence.  
Habermas‟s reasons for distancing himself from the form of human 
emancipation defended by Marx
69
 are clear and numerous and were discussed in the 
first section of the present chapter. In order to address the aforementioned issue, it is 
nevertheless worth reiterating here the crux of Habermas‟s critique of Marx‟s historical 
materialist stance, namely the so-called “reduction” of “the process of self-reflection to 
the level of instrumental reason:”70 
 
Alongside the forces of production in which instrumental action is sedimented, Marx‟s social 
theory also incorporates into its approach the institutional framework, the relations of 
production. It does not eliminate from practice the structure of symbolic interaction and the role 
of cultural traditions, which are the only basis on which power (Herrschaft) and ideology can be 
comprehended. But this aspect of practice is not made part of the philosophical frame of 
reference. It is in this very dimension, however, which does not coincide with that of 
instrumental action, that phenomenological experience moves.
71
  
 
According to Habermas, then, the form of experience whereby individuals are 
said to be capable of reflecting upon the conditions of their existence – known as 
phenomenological experience – and begin a “world-transforming accumulation of 
knowledge,” lies outside the sphere of material reproduction.72 Thus, according to 
Habermas‟s own schema, one finds, on the one hand, the forces of production which, in 
virtue of direct involvement in the transformation of nature (as instruments and products 
of labour), are thought to release a form of knowledge of a strictly “technically 
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exploitable” form.73 On the other hand, one finds the relations of production, which as 
the field of the social organisation of labour and the site of the “struggle for 
recognition,” are thought to concern a (normative) form of experience and knowledge 
both falling outside the scope delimited by the strategic relationship between humanity 
and external nature, and maximising the socially integrative resources required for the 
formation of socio-political institutions.
74
 Consequently, the prospects of human 
emancipation cannot be said to rest primarily on the development of the productive 
forces. 
However, the criticisms that have led Habermas to reconstruct historical 
materialism in such a way as to accommodate the two logics of emancipation are 
founded upon a somewhat reductionist, albeit conventional, interpretation of Marx‟s 
concept of labour. According to Habermas, a central problem with Marx‟s social theory 
is the fact that, by locating the problem of human emancipation within the framework of 
the “synthesis of man and [external] nature,”75 the latter was incapable of incorporating 
non-instrumental forms of knowledge within the scope of his “philosophical frame of 
reference.” However, as was shown in the first chapter of this thesis, such an 
interpretation fails to do justice to the breadth of Marx‟s approach to the relationship 
between humanity and nature. Indeed, whilst it is possible to identify, in his works, 
explicit references to a conception of labour as a sphere of activity governed by the 
instrumental and strategic orientations manifesting themselves in humanity‟s attempts to 
master the forces of external nature, a less explicit but fairly consistently defended 
thesis whereby external nature is treated as a partner in emancipation can also be found. 
The scope of social practice through labour, in the latter case, is no longer reduced to 
actions governed by what Habermas called “systemic imperatives,” but is now extended 
to include actions geared towards “mutual understanding.” Already with Marx, then, is 
it possible to catch glimpses of the reconciliation of humanity and nature later defended 
by the first generation of Frankfurt School theorists such as Adorno and Marcuse.
76
 
Although Habermas failed to appreciate the existence of such a stance in Marx‟s works, 
                                                 
73
 Habermas, J. “The New Obscurity: The crisis of the Welfare State and the Exhaustion of Utopian 
Energies,” Philosophy and Criticism, Vol. 11, No. 1, January 1986, p 16 
74
 As was shown above, however, Habermas has given some credit to Marx‟s interpretative schema with 
regards to the critique of the liberal stage of capitalist development, which he believed to be characterised 
by a depoliticisation of the relations of production.  
75
 Habermas, J. Knowledge and Human Interests, p 30-1 
76
 See chapters two and three for a more detailed account of Adorno‟s and Marcuse‟s stance on the 
reconciliation of humanity and nature.  
  
93 
 
he made his position on the aforementioned reconciliation known in his assessment of 
Marcuse‟s suggested solution to the problem of “technological domination:” 
 
Instead of treating nature as the object of possible technical control, we can encounter her as the 
opposing partner in a possible interaction. We can seek out a fraternal rather than an exploited 
nature. At the level of an as yet incomplete intersubjectivity we can impute subjectivity to 
animals and plants, even to minerals, and try to communicate with nature instead of merely 
processing her under conditions of severed communication. And the idea that a still enchained 
subjectivity of nature cannot be unbound until men‟s communication among themselves is free 
from domination has retained, to say the least, a singular attraction.
77
  
 
The somewhat satiristic and dismissive style of the above passage reveals 
Habermas‟s doubts regarding the possibility of transforming nature in such a way as to 
treat it as a “partner” in emancipation. This doubtful attitude towards reconciliation 
stems from the view that the relationship between humanity and external nature 
involved in “[t]echnological development […] follows a logic that corresponds to the 
structure of purposive-rational action.” 78 Thus, “as long […] as we have to achieve self-
preservation through social labour […] we could not renounce technology, more 
particularly our technology, in favor of a qualitatively different one.”79 Implicit in such 
an assertion, then, is the assumption that the imperatives of efficiency and productivity 
apply to all processes of transformation of external nature, independently of the form 
assumed by the social organisation of production. It therefore follows that such 
imperatives “cannot […] be themselves conceived as values,” and that, in turn, the 
origins of the normative role played by technology in political domination under the 
rule of the “technocratic consciousness” cannot be traced back to the relationship 
between humanity and external nature.
80
 Habermas justifies such assertions on the basis 
of the distinction between the relations of production and the forces of production as a 
distinction between a normative sphere of action and a value-neutral sphere of action. 
However, it becomes difficult to maintain the distinction, and therefore defend the value 
neutrality of the economic foundation of society, as soon as the role played by the social 
organisation of labour in technological development is  re-assessed.  
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As the previous points revealed, the historical materialist approach attributed to 
Marx by Habermas locates the “stored up forces of production” at the centre of social 
evolution.
81
 Their development, Habermas argued, ought to be interpreted as the key 
driving force identified by Marx behind the transformation of “the world within which 
subjects relate to their objects.”82 Although fairly conventional among both Marxist and 
non-Marxist scholars,
83
 this interpretation of Marx‟s materialism fails to fully appreciate 
the complexity of the dynamics of social structure identified by the latter. As Poulantzas 
put it: 
 
it is the primacy of the relations of production over the productive forces that gives to their 
articulation the form of a process of production and reproduction. The productive forces do 
indeed have materiality of their own that can by no means be ignored; but they are always 
organized under given relations of production. Thus, while the two may enter into contradiction 
with each other and undergo forms of uneven development, they always do so within a process 
that stems from the primacy of the relations of production. [emphasis added].
84
  
 
According to the above passage, then, the materiality of society cannot be 
reduced to the forces of production. In fact, we now discover that an accurate 
understanding of Marx‟s materialist stance ought to place a strong emphasis upon the 
fundamental role played by the organisation of production, i.e. division of labour, 
property, law, legitimacy, into a class of owners of the means of production imposing its 
productivist regime onto a class of dispossessed workers, in both the development of the 
productive forces and society at large.
85
 After all, it was Marx who first raised concerns 
regarding the direct and causal relation between the capitalist division of labour
86
 and 
both the unprecedented pace of development of the productive forces and the conditions 
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of existence (exploitation and alienation) that characterise bourgeois societies.
87
 
Whereas such a clarification may, at first glance, appear to consist in a merely academic 
exercise, its implications effectively call into question Habermas‟s distinction between 
the normative sphere of interaction from its non-normative counterpart, namely work. 
Indeed, by re-assessing the role played by the organisation of production in the 
development of the productive forces and society at large, one also becomes capable of 
fully appreciating the epistemological status of the so-called “systemic imperatives” 
(efficiency and productivity) which, as orientations traced back to the emergence of the 
capitalist division of labour, can no longer be treated as components of a knowledge-
constitutive interest of a merely technical kind but, rather, as ones stemming from the 
sphere of interaction itself. Efficiency and productivity not only inform the technical 
appropriation of the materials of nature, but are also infused with a cultural force 
informing the value-judgements of individuals communicating with each other and their 
internal nature, whilst transforming external nature. The truth content of validity claims 
is therefore assessed according to the normative yardstick framed by the imperatives of 
efficiency and productivity, whatever stage within the development of capitalism one 
seeks to address. The cultural manifestation of what Marcuse called “technological 
domination” cannot, in this sense, be explained in terms of a subsumption of a logic of 
interaction under a formally distinct logic of technical control resulting from the 
supersession of the separation between the state and the economy, but must directly be 
traced back to a sphere of material reproduction organised around the division of 
labour.
88
 Thus, since “there is no [value-]neutral notion of efficiency and productivity” 
and, therefore, no value-neutral material reproduction, it is possible to argue that 
Habermas‟s distinction between a form of knowledge thought to emanate from the 
transformation of external nature, and another from the interaction between humanity 
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and its internal nature, cannot be upheld.
89
 How, then, can the problem of emancipation 
be re-assessed in the light of such observations? 
Having exposed the necessary involvement of normative orientations in the 
economic base of society, one can begin to fully grasp the material origins of the 
repressive social, political and epistemological character of the capitalist mode of 
production and, consequently, identify the fundamental problem with Habermas‟s own 
diagnosis. As an activity whereby individuals transform nature in such a way as to 
satisfy their own needs, performed with the conscious knowledge of satisfying another 
person‟s needs, and requiring them to cooperate with other members of society, labour 
could not only be said to mediate humanity and external nature but also humanity with 
itself.
90
 If one were to agree with Habermas‟s approach, however, one would have to 
claim that attributing such functions to labour would mean reducing reflection to 
framework of instrumental reason, thereby subsuming all forms of interaction to the 
logic of technical control. However, as was mentioned above, what Habermas fails to 
appreciate is the central role performed by the relations of production in the 
transformation of external nature.
91
 Such a failure has indeed led him to overlook the 
fact that the actual problem does not effectively lie in attributing such a dualistic 
function to labour, but derives from the manner in which labour itself is organised. As 
Eyerman and Shipway pointed: 
 
While it is true that the human need to transform nature requires that people turn themselves into 
instruments, and leads them to act purposively as objects rather than communicatively as 
subjects, this is only one dimension of the labor process. To this dimension must be added 
another, reflected in the use of imagination and creativity which precedes, terminates, and 
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weaves its way throughout the instrumental dimension of the labor process. Work is, in other 
words, simultaneously cultural and technical activity, and is never purely instrumental […]92 
 
Addressing the shortcomings of Habermas‟s diagnosis, then, involves 
connecting the rise of instrumental reason with the historical emergence of the division 
of labour, thereby recognising both the historically specific character of the imperatives 
of efficiency and productivity – whose existence stifles the possibility of a reflexive 
engagement in labour – and the possibility of re-organising labour in such a way as to 
maximise the “use of imagination and creativity” in work, whilst re-configuring inner-
external nature relations. The central problem with the capitalist mode of production, 
therefore, revolves around the fact that the form assumed by its relations of production 
has caused the purposeful transformation of external nature to yield a strictly 
instrumental form of knowledge. As such, by stifling creativity, the separation of mental 
and manual labour prevents the powerless worker from “interpret[ing] the implications 
of the technical demands placed upon him,”93 thereby also denying him the capacity to 
engage in labour in such a way as to make the purposeful and cooperative satisfaction of 
another person‟s needs a goal to be achieved simultaneously to the satisfaction of his 
own needs.
94
 It could therefore be suggested that Habermas‟s decision to exclude a 
radical transformation of the material conditions of existence from the practical scope of 
critical social theory, stems from a problematic stance “tak[ing] absolutely for granted 
what is but a tendency under the capitalist mode of production.”95 Such a “conceptual 
„blindness‟ […] places Habermas behind the thinking of Marx himself” who, by 
defending human emancipation as self-realisation in labour,
96
 was able to grasp the fact 
that “the instrumentality of labor was a direct by-product of human social organization 
and interaction” and therefore not, as Habermas contended, a condition that can be 
“absolutized for all historical periods and for all social formations.” 97 Let‟s now turn to 
the political implications of the aforementioned observations.  
Although Habermas undertook a major reconstruction of historical materialism, 
he had credited Marx‟s base/superstructure schema with being capable of grasping the 
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material character of the “steering mechanism” of society and the economic form 
assumed by the relations of production under the liberal stage of capitalism.
98
 As soon 
as the state begins to play an active role in material reproduction and the relations of 
production (re-)assume a political character, Habermas contends, the feasibility of 
Marx‟s schema is immediately called into question, for it is the so-called superstructure 
that is now said to perform the function of “steering mechanism.” According to 
Habermas, the repoliticisation of the relations of production taking place under the 
advanced stage of capitalist development constitutes a key development in the processes 
of legitimation of the laws governing capitalist societies. Correspondingly, such a 
development marked the demise of a rational consensus establishing the truth content of 
the validity claims of a) free and equal citizens who have made their private interest 
public and b) those embodied in the laws, in favour of structures of legitimation 
assuming the form of a political compromise between conflicting economic interests. 
According to Habermas, then, the conflict between labour and capital begins to enter 
legitimation processes and undermine the deliberative – and therefore democratic – 
character of debates only once the state begins to intervene in the economy and resolves 
their opposition into an imposed political compromise failing to reconcile the individual 
and the collective, also known as the welfare compromise. However, as one of the 
prominent marxist figures seeking to reveal the embeddedness of structures of 
legitimation in material reproduction – Nicos Poulantzas – pointed out, the politicisation 
of the relations of production, which Habermas identified as a phenomenon specific to 
traditional societies and the advanced stage of capitalism, is in fact one also found in the 
earlier stage of the latter mode of production. This can, once again, be explained by 
addressing the implications of the primary function performed by the relations of 
production in society:  
 
Form this primacy flows the presence of political (ideological) relations within the relations of 
production: the latter, like their constituent relation of possession and economic property, find 
expression in class powers that are organically articulated to the political and ideological 
relations which concretize and legitimize them. These relations neither represent simple 
additions to already existing relations of production, nor do they merely react upon them in the 
mode of absolute exteriority or temporal sequence. They are themselves present in the 
constitution of the relations of production, in ways that vary with each mode of production. We 
should therefore rid ourselves of the now widespread idea that political (and ideological) 
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relations enter only into the reproduction of the relations of production, which for their part 
retain all the original purity of self-generation. It is precisely because political-ideological 
relations are already present in the actual constitution of the relations of production that they play 
such an essential role in their reproduction; that is also why the process of production and 
exploitation involves reproduction of the relations of political-ideological domination and 
subordination.
99
  
 
Thus, since “[t]he Political field of the State (as well as the sphere of ideology) 
has always, in different forms, been present in the constitution and reproduction of the 
relations of production”100 – relations that play a key role in the material foundation of 
society – it is possible to suggest that the rational universality ensuing from the debates 
in the public sphere was in fact illusory. Whilst Habermas himself had raised concerns 
regarding the bourgeois public sphere,
101
 he maintained that the “bracketing of social 
inequality” constituted a sufficient condition for the relevant “interlocutors” to be able 
to “deliberate as peers,” thereby overlooking the political character of the “relations of 
dominance and subordination” under liberal capitalism.102 Thus, we discover that as the 
“political-ideological” basis of the division of labour, the “relation of possession and 
economic property” performs a distorting function in all stages of capitalist 
development. This, in turn, calls into question Habermas‟s overall position, namely the 
possibility of radically democratising the legitimation structures of capitalist societies 
whilst leaving the material conditions untouched.  
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
In the Postscript of his essay entitled “Traditional and Critical Theory,” Horkheimer 
warned that since “the economy is the first cause of wretchedness, […] critique, 
theoretical and practical, must address itself primarily to it.”103 However, by conceiving 
of modernity as an age unleashing the normative-emancipatory power of 
communicative rationality alongside the manipulative-emancipatory power of 
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instrumental rationality whilst simultaneously distorting the development of the former, 
Habermas has repositioned critical theory in such a way as to direct both its theoretical 
and practical force at the radical democratisation of structures of legitimation lying 
outside the economic sphere. Such a repositioning, which was undertaken on the basis 
of a reductionist conception of labour, marked the demise of the transformative 
potential of criticism unleashed by the critical theory of Marcuse. Indeed, whilst his 
investigations into the institutional arrangement capable of actualising emancipatory 
practice have represented a forward step towards meeting the expectations of the 
principle of negativity underpinning critical theory, the location of alternative 
conditions of existence within structures of legitimation lying outside the material 
conditions of existence has effectively caused the practical content of Habermas‟s social 
theory to fall behind not only Marcuse‟s, but Marx‟s too. Should a form of social 
criticism aiming to find the conditions required for human emancipation nevertheless 
seek to institutionalise the communicative form of rationality defended by Habermas, or 
should it abandon such a project in favour of a more suitable one?
104
  The next chapter 
shall attempt to answer this question.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
104
 Although it should by now be clear that any attempt to undertake such a task ought to address the 
material conditions of existence, the suitability of communicative reason as a basis for an emancipatory 
form of knowledge still remains to be assessed.   
  
101 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
 
Human Emancipation and Communication  
 
 
 Whilst the previous chapter sought to identify the problems associated with 
Habermas‟s attempt to distinguish the contradictory axes of modern differentiation, the 
task here shall consist in establishing whether his theory of communicative action can 
provide a suitable basis for the conceptualisation of communicative practices oriented 
towards human emancipation. More specifically, it shall seek to find out whether 
Habermas‟s rejection of the critique of instrumental reason is adequately justified, and 
whether communicative rationality itself can be expected to succeed in achieving the 
goal of reconciliation.  
 
 
The “Critique of Instrumental Reason” vs. the “Theory of Communicative Action” 
 
Several of Habermas‟s early works served as an attempt to defend the elaboration of 
a theory of knowledge that would not only complement Marx‟s critique of political 
economy, but also prompt significant revisions of some of its central tenets.
1
 Marx, 
Habermas argued, had failed to explore the epistemological implications of repression. 
Such a view, however, had already been expressed by Adorno and Horkheimer who, 
also unsatisfied with Marx‟s economic reductionism, had developed their own theory of 
knowledge, known as the “critique of instrumental reason.” One is therefore justified in 
wondering why, a few decades after the first generation of critical theorists, Habermas 
chose to revive the claim for the elaboration of a theory of knowledge, thereby calling 
into question the relevance of the critical theory of his predecessors. The following 
passage provides an overview of Habermas‟s motivations:  
 
I want to maintain that the program of early critical theory foundered […] from the exhaustion of 
the paradigm of the philosophy of consciousness. I shall argue that a change of paradigm to the 
theory of communication makes it possible to return to the undertaking that was interrupted with 
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the critique of instrumental reason; and this will permit us to take once again the since neglected 
tasks of a critical theory of society.
2
  
 
The previous generation has apparently failed to realise the very goal it had set 
for itself, namely identifying the conditions capable of yielding the reconciliation of 
humanity and nature. The reason for such a failure, Habermas contended, can be found 
in the critique of instrumental reason‟s incapacity to give recognition to the forms of 
action required for reconciliation. Like Marx, the first generation theorists were found 
guilty of turning the emancipation of humanity into a problem inextricably linked with 
the relationship between humanity and external nature. Indeed, whilst Adorno‟s and 
Horkheimer‟s critical theory succeeded in overcoming some of the limitations resulting 
from the epistemological deficit of Marx‟s critique, the reduction of their theory of 
knowledge to the framework of actions oriented towards success, i.e. instrumental 
action, led them to ignore the distinctively human and communicative basis upon which 
reconciliation can be realised. Habermas, then, claimed the task of critical theory to be 
realisable only by elaborating a theory of knowledge both capable of recognising the 
existence of actions oriented towards mutual understanding, and aiming to maximise 
the pursuit of such communicative practices. The possibility of recognising the forms of 
action corresponding to reconciliation must nevertheless be presupposed, as Habermas 
emphasised above, by the abandonment of the “paradigm of the philosophy of 
consciousness” thought to be the central cause of Adorno and Horkheimer‟s failure to 
step outside the framework of instrumental action.
3
 What, then, prevents the philosophy 
of consciousness from fulfilling its promises? 
As Habermas noted in the above passage, the causes of the critique of 
instrumental reason‟s limitations ought to be attributed to the restrictive scope of the 
philosophy of consciousness.
4
 Since the problem of the emancipation of humanity is 
undifferentiated from the relationship between humanity and external nature, such an 
approach can only be expected to “understand […] the capacities to relate oneself to 
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[…] entities in the world in an objectivating attitude and to gain control of objects, be it 
theoretically or practically.”5 For this reason, Habermas argued that it is not only 
incapable of distinguishing between actions oriented towards success and those oriented 
towards mutual understanding, but also effectively reduces all actions to matters of 
manipulation. With such a narrow understanding of the scope of human action,  
Habermas concluded, the earlier generation of critical theorists was eventually 
prevented from stepping outside the framework of action it initially sought to suppress: 
 
The societal subject behaves in relation to nature just as the individual subject does in relation to 
objects: Nature is objectivated and dominated for the sake of reproducing the life of society. The 
resistance of the law-governed nexus of nature, on which the subject toils in knowing and acting, 
thereby continues in the formation of society and of its individual members.
6
  
 
A framework delimited by subject-object relations, according to Habermas, 
causes individuals to treat each other as manipulative objects and, consequently, cannot 
provide a basis for reconciliation. What the philosophies framed by the latter relations – 
such as Adorno‟s “primacy of the object” – have apparently failed to grasp, is the 
specifically human character of the logic of action required for reconciliation. One 
cannot expect nature to voice its arguments, or expect humanity to treat this “other,” 
incapable of argumentation, as a mutual partner in emancipation. The absence of the 
preconditions required for mutual understanding within the relationship between 
humanity and nature led Habermas to conclude that the subject will never succeed in 
treating the object in non-manipulative ways. The conditions for reconciliation, then, 
ought to be located in a framework in which individuals communicate with each other 
as humans qua humans. One must, in other words, raise humanity out of the relations 
framed by its relationship with external nature; a task which he proposes to undertake 
by exploring a logic of action mediated by a distinctively human attribute, namely 
language.
7
 Since, as Habermas insisted, “[r]eaching understanding is the inherent telos 
of human speech,” language is thought to be the medium of reconciliation par 
excellence.
8
 Consequently, in order to be expected to yield the conditions for the 
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emancipation of internal nature, critical theory must abandon any “philosophy that 
withdraws behind the lines of discursive thought to the „mindfulness of nature‟” in 
favour of an approach focusing on the strictly human and consensual character of 
intersubjective relations, namely the “theory of communicative action.”9 This somewhat 
insidious dismissal of Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse as romantics marks 
Habermas‟s more explicit attempt to break with the critique of instrumental reason of 
his predecessors. 
Such a re-positioning of critical theory towards a theory of communicative 
action would, Habermas further argued, not only serve to capture the logic of action 
specific to reconciliation but also give recognition to the emancipatory potential of the 
later period of modernity. Although the advanced stage of capitalist development marks 
the advent of money as a “medium […] replac[ing] understanding in language as a 
mechanism for coordinating action,” it is also characterised by the spread of “mass 
media of communication” that “technically amplify communication, bridge over spatial 
and temporal distances, multiply possibilities of communication and intensify the 
network of communicative action.”10 According to Habermas, the strength of the theory 
of communication lies in its capacity to grasp both the distorting and positive 
achievements of modernity; it can serve both a critical-theoretical purpose and an 
emancipatory-practical one. The incapacity of the critique of instrumental reason to step 
outside the framework of subject-object relations and appreciate the achievements 
obtained at the level of intersubjective relations, meant that Adorno and Horkheimer 
could not be in a position to reach beyond the confines of critique.  
The aforementioned first generation critical theorists did nevertheless attempt to 
conceptualise a form of mediation that would strip the subject-object relations of their 
manipulative character. Their concept of mediation, however, does not rely on language 
but “mimesis.” Here is how Habermas approached it: 
 
The critique of instrumental reason, which remains bound to the conditions of the philosophy of 
the subject, denounces as a defect something that it cannot explain in its defectiveness because it 
lacks a conceptual framework sufficiently flexible to capture the integrity of what is destroyed 
through instrumental reason. To be sure, Horkheimer and Adorno do have a name for it: 
mimesis. And even though they cannot provide a theory of mimesis, the very name calls forth 
associations – and they are intended: Imitation designates a relation between persons in which 
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the one accommodates to the other, identifies with the other, empathizes with the other. There is 
an illusion here to a relation in which the surrender of the one to the example of the other does 
not mean a loss of self but a gain and an enrichment. Because the mimetic capacity escapes the 
conceptual framework of cognitive-instrumentally determined subject-object relations, it counts 
as the sheer opposite of reason, as impulse. Adorno does not simply deny to the latter any 
cognitive function. In his aesthetics he attempts to show what the work of art owes to the power 
of mimesis to unlock, open up. But the rational core of mimetic achievements can be laid open 
only if we give up the paradigm of the philosophy of consciousness – namely, a subject that 
represents objects and toils with them – in favor of the paradigm of linguistic philosophy – 
namely, that of intersubjective understanding or communication – and puts the cognitive-
instrumental aspect of reason in its proper place as part of a more encompassing communicative 
rationality.
11
 
 
According to Habermas, then, the very process of mimesis, i.e. the act of 
imitating nature through a non-instrumental form of reason, requires a communicative 
framework of action. Indeed, since Habermas understood rationality as “a disposition of 
speaking and acting subjects that is expressed in  modes of behaviour for which there 
are good reasons or grounds,” and interprets “imitation” as a process whereby one party 
necessarily seeks to accommodate the interests of another party through identification 
and empathy, he was forced to conclude that mimetic achievements could only be 
attained outside the framework of manipulative subject-object relations, and into the 
realm of “intersubjective understanding.”12 In virtue of its capacity to equip individuals 
with the capacity to imitate, and therefore understand and accommodate the needs of the 
“other,” mimesis could play a potentially significant role in reconciliation. Habermas‟s 
objection, however, consists in revealing the problematic implications in regarding this 
“other” as external nature, i.e. as a entity lacking the capacity to communicate its 
interests. Consequently, subject-object relations constitute an inadequate frame of 
reference for actions oriented towards mutual understanding. According to him, then, 
reconciliation ought to be turned into a matter of linguistic competence, which an 
inanimate party such as external nature must by definition be excluded from. If one 
follows the logic of Habermas‟s argument, then, one becomes confronted with a 
particularly striking equation, namely the view that any party lacking the capacity to 
engage in linguistic forms of communication – the object – must necessarily be 
manipulated by the linguistically competent one – the subject. How, then, could Adorno 
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and Horkheimer justify their call for a reconciliation within the framework of subject-
object relations? 
In order to answer the above question, one must begin to re-assess the nature and 
significance of the “mimetic achievements,” such as Adorno‟s “primacy of the object.” 
What the first generation theorist effectively had in mind by defending the role of the 
object in reflexivity, is, as Habermas himself put it, a specific achievement of the work 
of reason. However, what fails to transpire in second-generation critical theorists‟ 
accounts, is the fact that Adorno interpreted mimesis as the process initiated by reason’s 
reflection upon itself, eventually leading to a reconciliation with its previously 
subsumed self, namely sensuous experience.
13
 Under the principle of self-preservation, 
where reason is employed as a coping mechanism ultimately directed at the mastery of 
the forces of external nature and natural inclinations, an asymmetry between the 
cognitive and sensuous faculties becomes inevitable, thereby stifling the realisation of 
the aforementioned process of reconciliation. Reason‟s capacity to overcome the 
subsumption of sensuous experience under conceptuality therefore depends upon the 
elimination of the principle of self-preservation. The individual must indeed be in a 
position to seek emancipation rather than survival, a condition of existence unrealisable 
under the permanent state of insecurity generated by the constant need to preserve the 
self against the forces of (internal and external) nature. Instead of attempting to step 
outside – as Habermas did – the framework of action giving rise to instrumental reason, 
Adorno in fact sought to conceptualise an alternative, non-subsumptive, relationship 
between cognition and sensation or, to put in his own terms, a non-identity between the 
subject and the object. Above all, therefore, what Adorno thought to achieve through 
mimesis is the reconciliation of humanity and nature (both internal and external) as a 
reconciliation of reason with itself, whereby reason accommodates, rather than 
represses, sensuous experience in emancipation. In order to illustrate such a state of 
affairs, one could reflect upon the contrast between a worker producing under the guise 
of instrumental reason, and another whose labour is mediated mimetically. In the former 
case, the imperatives of efficiency and productivity, and the ensuing division of labour, 
would ultimately stifle the possibility for the worker to be involved in the creative 
execution of the object he produces, for he/she is only required to employ those 
faculties oriented towards the maximisation of productivity within a hierarchically 
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imposed time frame and the application of standardised production methods. In the 
latter case, however, the worker is said to be involved in both the design and execution 
of the product, thereby making it possible for his/her creativity to enter the production 
process.
14
 Here a mediation of his/her instinctual energies (sensuous experience) and the 
planful decisions (cognitive faculties) is effectively being realised. Each product would, 
in this sense, become the material form of the worker‟s mimetically mediated instinctual 
and cognitive energies. Adorno, in other words, does not presume to approach nature in 
such a way as to treat it as another subject, but rather expects the subject to recognise its 
dependence upon the object, i.e. to recognise the role of creative impulses in reflexivity. 
In sum, therefore, any attempt to escape the framework of subject-object relations 
would leave untouched the very conditions upon which subsumption rests. Whereas 
Habermas charged Adorno with failing to step outside subject-object relations, the 
former could be charged with failing to look beyond the narrowly defined concept of 
linguistically mediated reconciliation, and diverting critical theory away from the roots 
of repression.
15
  
Another reason for not choosing to prioritise linguistic communication in 
reconciliation can be found in Adorno and Horkheimer‟s approach to language. Contra 
Habermas, they argued that “speech geared towards intersubjective understanding itself 
relies […] on the coercive, identificatory subsumption of particular objects under 
universal concepts [,] and that these activities are in turn animated by the drive for self-
preservation.”16 Language, in other words, “served (and continues to serve) as a means 
to the end of controlling nature,” and cannot qualify as the primary medium for 
reconciliation.
17
 Such a critical assessment of language led Habermas to conclude that 
the first generation of critical theorists could only be expected to provide a “path of 
reconstruction […] that cannot be traversed discursively” and, as a result, offer a 
restrictive account of rationality.
18
 But, as Bernstein put it:  
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Adorno does not claim that either language or conceptuality is intrinsically identitary, and that 
therefore a relation to the other which does not linguistically or discursively dominate must be 
non-discursive. On the contrary, he contends that nonidentity is “opaque only for identity‟s claim 
to be total […]”; and in The Dialectic of Enlightenment he attempts to reveal how this claim 
became materially and historically dominant.
19
  
 
Thus, whilst Adorno sought to warn us about the potential dangers associated 
with  the prioritisation of language in reconciliation, he did not exclude it entirely form 
the emancipatory project. The function performed by language should instead be 
qualified. Indeed, before linguistic communication can be expected to serve 
reconciliation, reason must first proceed with a reflection upon itself whereby its 
sensuous self is raised to the same level as cognition and the subsumptive identity of 
particularity and universality is abolished. Once it is reconciled with nature, i.e. no 
longer treated as an attribute raising humanity above nature, and its universalising 
tendencies prevented from assuming a repressive character, language can begin to serve 
as a communicative medium for reconciliation.  
How the first generation of critical theorists expected reconciliation to be turned 
into a socially cohesive phenomenon does nevertheless remain to be explored. It was 
Marcuse who, as was shown in chapter three,
20
 provided the most explicit and extensive 
insight into the sublimation of reconciliation. It was argued that, according to him, the 
solution to the riddle of the relationship between “individual and universal gratification” 
was in fact already embodied in the primacy of the object which, by involving a 
reconciliation between reason and sensuous experience, ultimately serves the 
reconciliation of humanity with itself. Thus, the free gratification of one, or the 
reconciliation of an individual with his/her sensuous self, is itself the precondition of the 
free gratification of another – sublimation as “self-sublimation.” However, it was also 
argued that despite its convincing logic, this argument falls short of exploring the 
moment whereby one‟s own reconciliation is consciously interpreted as the 
precondition of another individual‟s. Indeed, as Marx pointed out in his own account of 
“human production,”21 the self-realisation of one individual as the precondition for the 
self-realisation of another means that the individual must be in a position to experience 
the satisfaction of the needs of another individual as one and the same moment as the 
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satisfaction of his/her own. Individuals must therefore find a medium through which 
they consciously communicate their interests and engage with those of other 
individuals. This dialogical moment, which the first generation of critical theorists have 
failed to explore adequately, is precisely what Habermas sought to address with his 
theory of communicative action. However, by turning this moment into a priority over 
reason‟s reconciliation with its sensuous self, and locating it outside the framework of 
subject-object relations, not only does Habermas fail to consider the non-linguistic core 
of reconciliation, but effectively circumvents the very relations critical theory ought to 
tackle. Before addressing the nature of a dialogical moment compatible with the 
framework of subject-object relations, an assessment of Habermas‟s own dialogical 
procedure and rationality of reconciliation will be provided. Such an exercise will 
indeed serve to identify the conditions under which the dialogical moment can both fail 
or succeed in yielding the reconciliation of humanity with both internal and external 
nature.  
 
 
On the Limitations of the Habermasian Communicative Framework 
 
 Habermas located the process whereby “all participants harmonize their 
individual plans of action with one another and […] pursue their illocutionary aims 
without reservation” at the core of his project of emancipation.22 The success of 
humanity‟s reconciliation with itself, in this sense, is presupposed by the participants‟ 
capacity to engage in unconstrained linguistic communicative practices whereby they 
must all seek both to make the particularity of their own position explicit, and 
coordinate their actions in such a way as to reach a consensus of the various 
“illocutionary aims” or interests entering dialogue. At some point in the process, then, 
each individual will seek to accommodate the interests of others with their own. Before 
doing so, however, each participant must be in a position to establish, on an 
intersubjective basis, the validity of the claims uttered by others. It is here that 
Habermas turns to a central feature of communicative action, namely argumentation. 
Through the so-called “force of the better argument” participants are not only capable of 
making their own position and the reasons for such a position explicit, but also find the 
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conditions whereby the particularity of their own interests contributes to the constitution 
of a general consensus. The harmonisation of individual plans of action through 
communicative action, then, is understood as an intersubjective reconciliation between 
the individual level of action and its general counterpart. As Habermas himself put it:  
 
As a mechanism of socialization, the first act of reaching understanding itself sets a dialectic of 
universalization, particularization and individualization into motion, a dialectic which leaves 
only the differentiated particular in the position of an individual totality. General structures of 
the lifeworld, collective forms of life, and individual life histories arise within the structures of 
the diffracted intersubjectivity of possible understanding and are at the same time differentiated. 
The ego is formed equiprimordially as a subject in general, as a typical member of a social 
collective, and as a unique individual. The universal, particular and individual constitute 
themselves radially, as it were – and no longer as moments bound within a totality.23 
  
According to Habermas, therefore, the communicative procedure whereby 
individuals are socialised and understanding is universalised, does not stifle the 
development of the individuality of the speakers but, in actual fact, stimulates it. Since 
the intelligibility of the process of argumentation depends on the participant‟s capacity 
to locate his/her interests within a pre-existing normative framework (the “general 
structures of the lifeworld”), the participant is said to be socialised. Only this way can 
understanding between the various participants in discourse be universalised. In 
interaction, however, the individual confronts the general character of the “collective 
forms of life” with the uniqueness of his/her “individual life history,” and can begin to 
affirm the particularity of the latter (particularisation) as soon as the argumentative 
procedure is set in motion. For this reason, and because the participant “augments 
his[/her] individuality in the course of this effort,” the participant is also said to be 
individualised.
24
 Thus, Habermas argued, by maintaining each process in motion, 
communicative action prevents the exhaustion of the multifaceted ego formation in 
intersubjective communication, and can apparently serve to realise what Horkheimer 
and Adorno had attempted to achieve before him, namely the reconciliation of 
particularity and universality.  
As the above observations seem to suggest, the reconciliation of particularity 
and universality can be realised only once the dialogical procedure is set in motion. 
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Consequently, it is thought to be inapplicable to the economy, i.e. the framework of 
subject-object relations. The emancipation of internal nature through communicative 
reason presupposes that the participant in discourse must be in a position to 
communicate (rationally) his or her interests in a such a way as to achieve mutual 
understanding, which means that he/she must only “interpret[…] the nature of his 
desires and feelings [Bedürfnisnatur]” but to do so “in the light of culturally established 
standards of value” as well.25 Whilst such a process aims to both secure the conversion 
of private interests into public ones and form the basis upon which a consensus can be 
achieved, this “democratic generalisation of interest” would limit the dialogical 
procedure to the mere interpretation of the desires and feelings of the participant 
without requiring an engagement with the validity of the value standards in the light of 
which they ought to be interpreted, and would therefore fall short of equipping 
participants with the full range of communicative practices required for moral 
autonomy. For this reason, Habermas suggested that the dialogical procedure ought to 
include a process of evaluation, whereby  participants “adopt a reflective attitude to the 
very value standards through which desires and feelings are interpreted.”26 The 
“democratic generalisation of interests” must therefore be complemented by a 
“universalistic justification of norms.” The normative validity of the illocutionary aims 
of the various participants and the value standards according to which they are 
interpreted is, in this sense, established procedurally. In other words, any individual 
failing to explain and render plausible his/her attitudes and evaluations is thought to 
behave irrationally, and is consequently incapable of engaging in emancipation.
27
 This 
is in fact why the tastes and feelings, or the possibility of other sensuous manifestations, 
falling within the scope of what Habermas called the “aesthetic-expressive” realm are, 
for the most part, considered a non-public affair. However, by emphasising the 
discursive distinction between the moral-universalist and the aesthetic-expressive 
realms in the process of interpretation, Habermas effectively turned his back on an 
entire dimension of reconciliation which the first generation of critical theorists had 
sought to realise:  
 
Habermas labels the forms of discourse in which our need interpretations are thematized, and 
whose semantic content defines happiness and the good life, “aesthetic-expressive.” This, of 
                                                 
25
 Habermas, J. The Theory of Communicative Action, p 20 
26
 Ibid, p 20 
27
 Ibid, p 17 
  
112 
 
course, coheres with the idea that the good life is a (semi-) private affair, that is non-
universalizable and culturally specific, and hence outside the bounds of either truth or morality.
28
  
 
Thus, by displacing reconciliation onto the dialogical level, Habermas turned the 
relationship between the individual and his/her internal nature into a strictly moral-
universalist matter. According to Habermas‟s approach to emancipation, only those 
courses of action all participants in discourse are likely to reach an agreement on, can be 
considered legitimate. Consequently, what each participant regards as the good courses 
of action, namely those courses of action oriented towards the happiness of each 
participant, can be expected to play a role in emancipation only if other participants 
recognise them as legitimate in discourse. The substance of emancipation, then, is 
composed of elements concerning the “right life” or common good rather than those 
concerning the “good life” of each participant, a state of affairs which ultimately implies 
that “reaching agreement about what is universally good for humanity as a whole has 
„absolute priority‟ over the particularistic good.”29 In response to such an observation, 
Habermas would suggest that although the outcome of discourse would not consist in a 
“consensus of hearts” it would remain a “consensus of arguments,” and therefore one 
serving each participant in their rational self-reflective emancipation.
30
 In other words, 
the fact that, through discourse, a “legitimate decision […] is one that results from the 
deliberation of all,” led Habermas to argue that, as the product of a so-called 
harmonisation of individual plans of action, the common good is effectively in line with 
the conception of the good life of each participant.
31
 It could nevertheless be suggested 
that by turning the differentiation between the “aesthetic-expressive” and the “moral-
universalist” spheres into a differentiation between private and public concerns 
respectively, and “defin[ing] emancipation in strictly procedural terms,” Habermas 
eventually excludes the sensuous dimension of reconciliation from dialogue.
32
 Whereas 
the first generation of critical theorists were particularly concerned with issues 
regarding the relationship between individuals and their sensuous selves whilst under-
conceptualising the relationship between individuals themselves, Habermas‟s own 
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conceptualisation of the dialogical moment runs of the risk of mistaking the rational 
self-reflective reconciliation between subjects for an all-round reconciliation of 
humanity with itself.
33
  
The latter confusion was picked up by Seyla Benhabib in her work entitled 
Critique, Norm and Utopia. As Bernstein himself put it, she argued that Habermas‟s 
“standpoint of rights and entitlements,” which was developed under the acknowledged 
influence of George Herbert Mead‟s “generalised other,”34 meant that “the moral 
dignity of individuals derives not from what differentiates them from all others, but 
from what, as speaking and acting agents, they have in common with all others.”35 
Since, in order to play a role in emancipation, the interpretation of needs required for 
the reconciliation of individuals with their internal nature must be recognised as 
legitimate by all participants in discourse, this key process of interpretation is primarily 
the result of a process of universalisation. The non-identical, here, is effectively being 
“dialogised” and, one could even argue, disciplined by language. Thus, by approaching 
the interpretation of needs from the moral-universalist standpoint of intersubjectively 
recognised rights and obligations, Habermas is forced to subsume the process of 
particularisation under the process of universalisation. As a corrective to such a state of 
affairs, Benhabib proposed 
 
to view each other and every rational being as an individual with a concrete history, identity, and 
affective-emotional constitution. Our relation to the other is governed by the norm of 
complementary reciprocity: each is entitled to expect and to assume from the other forms of 
behaviour through which the other feels recognized and confirmed as a concrete, individual 
being with specific needs, talents, and capacities. The norms of our interaction are… the norms 
of solidarity, friendship, love and care.
36
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In her attempt to overcome the subsumption of particularity under universality, 
Benhabib sought to combine elements of Adorno‟s philosophy of non-identity with 
elements of Habermas‟s theory of communicative action. The substitution of the  
“generalised other” with a “concrete other,” allows participants in discourse to address 
each other‟s interests from the standpoint of “needs and solidarity.”37 No longer treating 
each other as rational beings abstracted from their “specific needs, talents, and 
capacities” and prioritising the normative generalisation of their interests, the various 
participants can begin to engage in a dialogue whereby the realisation of their concrete 
selves is made the priority of their interpretation of needs. Actions oriented towards 
mutual understanding cease to manifest themselves as ones primarily directed at the 
compliance with normative standards, and can begin to allow each participant in 
discourse to “expect and entitle” others to “feel confirmed and recognised” as particular 
beings. On this account, discourse could more effectively give the plurality of interests 
constituting social life their due, and turn the attainment of the common good into the 
outcome of a process of particularisation unstifled by the process of universalisation. By 
re-positioning the communicative framework of action in such a way as to 
accommodate the sensuous experiences constitutive of each individual‟s plan of action 
and, consequently, turning discourse into a process potentially capable of assigning a 
central role to the good life in emancipation, Benhabib made it possible to begin to 
envisage how the reconciliation between individuals could simultaneously serve the 
reconciliation between humanity and internal nature.
38
 
 So far, it has been suggested that Habermas attributes, at best, a secondary 
significance to mimetic knowledge in emancipation. It has been shown that, as a result 
of treating sensuous experience as a primarily private affair and conceptualising 
intersubjective reconciliation as a process involving rational subjects unreconciled with 
their sensuous selves, Habermas had ultimately failed to elaborate a dialogical moment 
capable of combining moral autonomy and self-realisation. The reasons leading 
Habermas to both adopt such a stance regarding the place of sensuous experience in 
emancipation and maintain that a process of particularisation can exist alongside a 
process of universalisation do nevertheless remain to be both clarified and further 
assessed. Indeed, whilst one can understand why a consensus of arguments can be 
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expected to reflect the rational interests of the various participants in discourse, the 
claim according to which this consensus is expected to reflect the good life of each 
participant stands in need of justification. Habermas‟s exploration of the relationship 
between reason and the senses undertaken in Knowledge and Human Interests should 
provide an explanation. Drawing his inspiration from Kant‟s “pure interest of reason,” 
Habermas argued the following: 
 
The (pathological) interest of the senses in what is pleasant or useful arises from need; the 
(practical) interest of reason in the good awakens a need. In the former case the faculty of desire 
is stimulated by inclination; in the latter it is determined by principles of reason. By analogy with 
sensual inclination as habitualized desire, we may speak of an intellectual inclination free of the 
senses if it is formed from a pure interest as a permanent attitude […]39  
 
The practical interest of reason, or interest deriving from practical reason, is 
thought to “awaken a need” since, as Habermas further suggested, it is an interest that 
“aims at existence, because it expresses a relation of the object of interest to our faculty 
of desire.”40 Habermas was able to draw such conclusions following his assessment of 
Kant‟s own attempt to find out “how a mere thought, which contained nothing of the 
senses, could produce a sensation of pleasure and pain.” 41 Whereas Kant sought to 
solve the latter riddle by exploring the path of causality between theoretical reason and 
sensation, Habermas questioned the capacity of a form of reason abstracted from 
actions to produce sensations of pleasure and pain. The latter argued that in order to be 
able to yield such results, reason must in fact be oriented towards action. This is 
precisely what led him to turn to practical reason which, he argued, could effectively 
serve as a framework within which conceptions of a pleasurable or good life can be 
formulated. Thus, although understood as a form of “intellectual inclination free of the 
senses,” practical reason is thought to be capable of stimulating the needs making up the 
conception of the good life of each participant in discourse. However, within the 
communicative framework of Habermas‟s practical discourse, practical reason orients 
itself towards a particular set of actions, namely those aimed at reaching a mutual 
understanding. Within this framework of action, the interpretation of needs of each 
participant develops in relation to the interpretation of needs of other participants in 
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discourse, thus leaving no room for a conception of the good life formulated 
independently of the intersubjective recognition of norms. Thus, as Deborah Cook 
pointed out, “in Habermas‟ work, the particular refers, not primarily to individuals, but 
to collective forms of life in which individuals take shape by developing their own 
personalities through identification with social groups and collectively shared values 
and goals.”42 As the discursively produced interpretation of needs turns the particularity 
of pleasure into a product of reason – as “pleasure in the fulfilment of duty” – the 
sensuous particularity of the good life itself becomes effectively dissolved in the moral 
universality of the “collective forms of life.”43  It could therefore be suggested that 
Habermas‟s definition of both emancipation and the interpretation of needs in strictly 
moral-procedural terms, turns his attempt to harmonise individual plans of action into a 
subsumption of the latter under the universality of the common good.  
 The origins of such a state of affairs can be traced back to Habermas‟s own point 
of departure. As was shown above, part of his conceptualisation of the conditions for 
human emancipation involved an attempt to provide an answer to the riddle Kant 
himself had tried to resolve, namely how a thought could produce a sensation of 
pleasure and pain. Thus, instead of seeking to identify the conditions under which 
thought could assist the realisation of our sensuous nature in emancipation, Habermas 
“demot[ed] human desires to the status of subjective expressions that lack any natural, 
material, or even social referents,” thereby submitting internal nature to thought itself, 
i.e. to reason.
44
 Here, a clear departure from the first generation of the Frankfurt 
School‟s own project of emancipation can be observed:  
 
Against the Freudian project of bringing our rational powers into harmony with the instincts – 
the project that Adorno embraced – Habermas suggests that reason and desire have already been 
reconciled: desire is just the subjective expression of disembodied needs that are rational, at least 
in principle, because they cannot be divorced from their articulation in speech.
45
  
 
According to Habermas, then, the critical theorist is not required to seek the 
reconciliation of sensuous experience and reason in emancipation, for as merely 
“subjective expressions,” desires bear no relation to the objective world – the very 
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world which the senses belong to. Language, he thought, is oriented towards the 
“[e]mancipation from the compulsion of internal nature [italics added].”46 However, by 
“linguistif[ying] desire in order to domesticate it”47 Habermas subordinates internal 
nature to reason, thereby revealing, in a somewhat Kantian vein, his antagonism to 
natural inclinations and reproducing the conditions of existence which Adorno had 
associated with the repression of internal nature. In sum, therefore, Habermas‟s attempt 
to harmonise the individual plans of action in his theory of communicative action led 
him to abandon the project of self-realisation in favour of a conceptual framework both 
reproducing the subsumption of particularity under universality characterising the 
repression of nature by humanity, and stripping the latter of its sensuous dimension.  
With the subject ridden of its somatic self, the issue of the motivation bringing 
individuals into a dialogue governed by communicative reason and aimed at the 
emancipation of internal nature arises. Habermas summarised the distinctive nature of 
communicative action as follows: 
 
I shall speak of communicative action whenever the actions of the agents involved are 
coordinated not through egocentric calculations of success but through acts of reaching 
understanding. In communicative action participants are not primarily oriented to their own 
individual successes; they pursue their individual goals under the condition that they can 
harmonize their plans of action on the basis of common situation definitions. In this respect the 
negotiation of definitions of the situation is an essential element of the interpretive 
accomplishments required for communicative action.
48
  
 
The pursuit of individual goals in practical discourse, then, cannot assume the 
form of an orientation towards individual success, for it is dependent on the successful 
coordination of the participants‟ actions. However, one is here justified in asking why 
individuals come to believe in the necessity to depend on a rational consensus achieved 
through dialogue in order to emancipate individual from their natural inclinations. If it 
is indeed the case that, as was shown above, Habermas views internal nature as a 
phenomenon “entirely generated by communicative practices,”49 then it must follow 
that the “discursively produced and intersubjectively shared beliefs” themselves are 
endowed with the “motivating force” behind actions oriented towards the emancipation 
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of internal nature.
50
 From this perspective, the mere capacity to exercise “the public use 
of communicative freedom” in order express “good reasons” for performing particular 
speech acts appears, as Habermas himself put it, as a “weak” but sufficient motivating 
force behind procedural emancipation.
51
 According to such line of thought, then, the 
fact that internal nature is mediated by language is, in itself, a sufficient reason for 
supposing that, under conditions of unrestrained communication, individuals will seek 
to “pursue their individual goals under the condition that they can harmonize their plans 
of action,” i.e. to engage in communicative action.  
However, as soon as the competitive and insecure environment characteristic of 
the capitalist mode of production is taken into consideration, the weakness of such a 
motivating force suddenly surfaces as an all-to-evident problem. Whereas Habermas 
would maintain that the linguistic mediation of nature necessarily brings individuals 
into a dialogue with each other, his analytical distinction between the system and the 
lifeworld means that he fell short of assessing the extent to which the pressure induced 
by economic scarcity could undermine the motivations leading them to attempt to reach 
an agreement in discourse. Furthermore, if, according to Habermas, non-discursive 
factors such as systemic imperatives have the capacity to enter into and affect 
communicative practices why, then, does he exclude such a typology of factors from the 
set of motivations lying behind actions oriented towards mutual understanding? One 
may indeed be required to step outside language in order to understand not only what 
prevents individuals from engaging in actions oriented towards mutual understanding, 
but also what motivates them, for in order to decide to engage in a discourse seeking to 
achieve a consensus they must first be in a position to realise that they indeed need to do 
so. As it currently stands, Habermas‟s communicative framework fails to account for 
such motivations. As Cook put it: 
 
He […] makes it difficult to understand what motivates human behaviour, including 
communicative action. Reaching agreement may be the telos of communicative action, but it is 
not at all clear that this goal is the sole motivation for communicative action. For one can always 
ask a further question: Agreement for what purpose? Understanding to what end? The goal of 
reaching agreement on validity claims is always pursued within particular contexts that define 
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the aims such agreement will serve. What motivates individuals to pursue these further aims is 
moot.
52
  
 
Whilst Habermas‟s theory of communicative action clearly, albeit 
problematically, seeks to explain the centrality of dialogue in human emancipation, it 
fails to demonstrate why the various participants would seek to do so by attempting to 
achieve a consensus rather than pursuing their individual interests. One may indeed 
seriously question the capacity of individuals forced to compete in the satisfaction of 
their needs to bracket their orientations towards success in  favour of actions oriented 
towards mutual understanding. Habermas‟s failure to tackle this issue in a sufficiently 
extensive manner could be attributed to the fact that “[b]y linguistifying needs, 
Habermas confuses the linguistic articulation of needs with needs themselves,” thereby 
dissolving the motivations behind discursive interaction within the discursive procedure 
itself, and turning his critical theory into one incapable of giving recognition to the 
factors stimulating individuals‟ decisions to emancipate themselves through actions 
oriented towards mutual understanding.
53
  As a result, Habermas falls short of 
completing the task he had set himself, and ultimately causes his critical theory to 
operate in the shadow of liberal thought.  
In sum, therefore, a critical theory realistically seeking to turn the reconciliation 
of humanity and nature into a process applicable to society at large must attempt both to 
safeguard the dialogical process against the repressive tendencies of the subsumption of 
particularity under universality and, in order to identify the conditions under which 
individuals choose to reach an agreement, distinguish the motivations leading 
individuals to engage in discourse from the discursive procedure itself. For such 
reasons, as it currently stands, the dialogical procedure suggested by Habermas cannot 
be expected to yield the rationality of reconciliation required for human emancipation. 
The realisation of the latter is in fact dependent upon the recognition of the role played 
by mimetic knowledge
54
 in emancipation, for it would not only ensure the maintenance 
of the good life in the face of a universalising force such as the common good, but also 
enable critical theory to trace the decisions to engage in dialogue back to the 
spontaneous particularity of human existence, i.e. the natural inclinations. The next 
section of the present chapter, as well as the next two chapters shall attempt to show 
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how dialogue can be expected to give the reconciliation of reason and the senses in 
emancipation its due.  
 
 
Towards a Communicative Basis for the Reconciliation of Subject and Object 
 
 As the preceding section partly attempted to demonstrate, Habermas‟s attempt to 
harmonise the individual plans of action fails to counter the universalising tendencies of 
reason identified by the members of the earlier generation of Frankfurt School theorists 
– especially Adorno – as key factors causing the repression of internal nature. In 
response to such a problem, Seyla Benhabib suggested a revision
55
 of the dialogical 
procedure in such a way as to allow the participants to develop an intersubjective 
interpretation of needs whereby they recognise and confirm each other as “concrete 
others,” thus defending an approach to dialogue from the standpoint of “needs and 
solidarity” against one approached, as Habermas himself did, from the standpoint of 
“rights and entitlements.” The advantage of adopting such a standpoint, she argued, lies 
in the possibility for each participant in discourse to achieve a “complementary 
reciprocity” between individuals treating each other as beings with “specific needs, 
talents, and capacities.” Here, the discursive manifestation of reason would no longer 
give absolute priority to the common good, often manifesting itself as economic 
stability, growth and full employment in advanced capitalist societies. Instead, each 
participant is thought to be reconciled with their internal nature whilst seeking to 
experience the satisfaction of another‟s needs as an integral part of his/her satisfaction 
of needs. As such, it could be suggested that Benhabib elaborated a conceptual 
framework potentially capable of circumventing the problems found in Habermas‟s 
own. 
 The fact of introducing the concrete particularity of individuals‟ existence into 
the communicative framework of action does nevertheless raise several issues regarding 
the role of communicative reason in emancipation. If one accepts, as Benhabib did, that 
the concrete particularity of existence can indeed be introduced into the communicative 
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framework of action, one faces the task of establishing the origins of the needs 
interpreted in the discursive realm. Whilst her emphasis on the concrete particularity of 
individuals‟ existence implies that one can trace such origins by turning to the non-
discursive realm, the view that the reconciliation of humanity and nature depends on a 
“complementary reciprocity” realised through discourse also seems to suggest that each 
participant‟s conception of the good life cannot be formulated outside the framework of 
communicative action. The sociological deficit found in Habermas‟s own theory of 
communicative action therefore remains. One does indeed remain unsure as to where 
the various conceptions of the good life are said to unfold – work, the family, the public 
sphere? Casting such a doubt on Benhabib‟s own revision is the fact that a tension 
between needs originating from the non-discursive realm and those originating from the 
discursive one can be observed. This is problematic as it means that her framework 
cannot be safeguarded against a confusion between the needs themselves and their 
linguistic articulation. At the roots of such a problem lies her rejection, shared with 
Habermas, of subject-object relations from the communicative framework of action. 
Here is how Bernstein summarised her reasons for rejecting such a model: 
 
[S]he argues that, firstly, the category of “objectification,” as employed within the labour model 
of activity, is inadequate to characterize communicative activities; secondly, that this model of 
activity is fundamentally monological, moving from ideas in the head to actions in the world, 
and hence abstracts from the linguistic mediation of desires, intentions and purposes; thirdly, in 
so doing it illegitimately suppresses the interpretive indeterminacy of human action; fourthly, it 
is only as a consequence of the suppression of the interpretive indeterminacy of human action 
that the model of a trans-subjective subject comes into being, but such a subject involves a denial 
of the inescapable fact of human plurality; finally, the model of self-actualization operative in 
the philosophy of the subject assumes “an epistemologically transparent self, who seems to 
possess unequivocal knowledge for determining what would „actualize‟ him/her”[…]; as such, it 
suppresses the very situatedness that characterizes interpersonal existence.
56
 
 
According to Benhabib, the framework of subject-object relations, as Habermas 
himself had pointed out, restricts the scope of human action. The subject is here 
understood as a manipulative and conscious being with determinate needs interpreted 
and satisfied monologically through the efficient mastery of external nature. For these 
reasons, not only is the subject-object framework of action thought to reduce 
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interpersonal existence to actions oriented towards success and relations of power, it is 
also believed to be incapable of accommodating the dialogical basis upon which the 
“interpretive indeterminacy of human action” is thought to rest. According to Benhabib, 
then, the plurality of needs interpretations must be understood in terms of the 
situatedness of interpersonal existence, whose actualisation requires an intersubjective 
framework of action. As such, the various needs, talents and capacities of the 
participants in discourse bear no relevance to human emancipation until they are 
intersubjectively interpreted through the discursive process or, as Benhabib herself 
would put it, until their complementary reciprocity with the needs, talents and capacities 
of others is established. However, by reducing the plurality of need interpretations to the 
situatedness of interpersonal relations achieved through linguistic communication, 
Benhabib, like Habermas before her, effectively dissolved the concrete particularity of 
individual existence in the indeterminacy of linguistically mediated interpersonal 
existence. It could therefore be suggested that she proposed to substitute a framework of 
subject-object relations “denying the inescapable fact of human plurality” with an 
intersubjective model which, by dissolving internal nature in language and consequently 
confusing the needs themselves and their linguistic articulation, fails to secure the non-
identity of subject and object, thereby effectively cancelling the possibility of pluralist 
politics. The search for a single framework of action capable of giving both the 
situatedness of interpersonal existence and the concrete particularity of human 
existence their due continues. 
  Both Habermas and Benhabib sought to harmonise the individual plans of 
action oriented towards the emancipation of internal nature by stepping outside the 
framework of subject-object relations. Whilst the former‟s somewhat evident neglect of 
the sensuous particularity of human existence in emancipation led him to achieve the 
very opposite of his intentions, i.e. to reproduce repressive conditions of existence, the 
latter‟s insistence on the need for all participants in discourse to treat each other as 
“concrete others” fell short of overcoming the problems associated with the theory of 
communicative action. Benhabib‟s unsuccessful attempt could in fact be attributed to a 
lack of consideration of the full epistemological implications to be drawn out of the 
recognition of others in their concrete particularity. As Bernstein put it: 
 
The meaning of universality in the context of need interpretations will have to shift away from 
the paradigm of communication altogether since it will have an epistemic component equivalent 
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to whatever is involved in recognizing others in their concrete particularity, which, again, is what 
Adorno employs art in order to interrogate; and hence an alternative conception of what 
universality means for ethical theory if need interpretation is nonetheless going to be an element 
of a universalistic moral theory.
57
  
 
 What form, then, would “an epistemic component equivalent to whatever is 
involved in recognizing others in their concrete particularity” assume? In order to 
provide an answer, one must first seek to explain what the concrete particularity in 
question consists of. According to Benhabib, it refers to the specific needs, talents and 
capacities of a rational being with a “concrete history, identity, and affective-emotional 
constitution.” The dialogical formation of the interpretation of needs she proposed 
therefore requires each participant to recognise the (partly) sensuous origins of the other 
participants‟ desires. Contra Habermas, then, Benhabib opens up the possibility for 
participants to both address their internal nature as an objective – and not merely 
subjective – reality, and to turn the object as the substance of their needs. The epistemic 
component corresponding to such a schema would thus presuppose a form of 
universality capable of yielding expressive potential to the spontaneity of natural 
inclinations,
58
 so that the rapidly changing character of the emotional impulses can be 
accommodated in the interpretation of needs. The role of subject-object relations in 
framing the interpretation of needs must, in this sense, be given recognition. However, 
her failure to proceed with a “presentation of the misrepresentations of subject and 
substance, of subjects as substance [emphasis added]” in the framework elaborated by 
Habermas, compounded with the view according to which no subject-object relations 
can successfully accommodate the plurality of existence, prevented her from accepting 
the necessity to re-evaluate the role of such relations in framing the interpretation of 
needs.
59
 Indeed, although Benhabib emphasised the need for participants to treat each 
other as “concrete others,” her failure to safeguard her theoretical framework against the 
dissolution of internal nature in language led her to accept blindly the grounding of 
objectivity in the subject accomplished by Habermas in his theory of communicative 
action. Furthermore, since she maintained, again like Habermas, that the scope of 
human action yielded by the framework of subject-object relations remains, whatever its 
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form, too narrow to be capable of accommodating the reconciliation of humanity and 
internal nature, she was ultimately forced to discipline the “concrete other” with the 
universalising tendencies of the situatedness of interpersonal existence in her 
understanding of the plurality of human action. As a result, instead of drawing on the 
full epistemological implications of her inclusion of the concrete other in dialogue and 
treating the “purely particular activity and business of the individual” in relation to the 
“needs which he has as a part of nature,” 60  Benhabib reproduced the divorce of the 
logic of emancipation between humanity and external nature from the logic of 
emancipation between humanity and internal nature found in Habermas‟s theory of 
communciation, thereby separating the “epistemic component” of the latter from 
“whatever is involved in recognizing others in their concrete particularity.” For this 
reason, the socio-epistemological dualism restricting the emancipation of internal nature 
to actions governed by communicative rationality must be overcome in favour of an 
emancipatory logic of action whereby the actualisation of the plurality of human action, 
referring to both the situatedness of interpersonal existence and the concrete 
particularity of individual existence, can be framed by the reconciliation of every 
rational being (subject) with their existence as beings belonging to nature (object). 
Under what conditions, then, can such an emancipatory framework be expected to fulfil 
its promises? 
 Firstly, a confusion between the needs themselves and their linguistic 
articulation must be prevented. As such, the linguistification of internal nature must be 
abandoned in favour of a form of reconciliation whereby knowledge becomes 
mimetically mediated. At the epistemological level, such a task involves a departure 
from the subjectivist tendencies of communicative rationality, towards a form of 
knowledge capable of reconciling the universal and the particular.
61
 At the level of the 
needs themselves, such a task involves turning both internal and external nature, i.e. 
sensory experience in general, into the fabric of knowledge one has of his/her needs, 
thereby treating the emancipation of internal nature as a phenomenon inextricably 
linked to the relationship between humanity and external nature. Finally, at the level of 
social actions, it involves anchoring communicative practices in the sphere of labour, 
where dialogue could simultaneously serve the reconciliation of subject and object, and 
the actualisation of this same reconciliation on a societal scale.  
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Secondly, and as a general precondition for the aforementioned task, the critical 
theorist must accept the possibility of a subject-object framework of action stripped of 
the manipulative tendencies of a sovereign subject oriented towards the preservation of 
the self. In order to do so, one must step outside the bourgeois-productivist model of 
labour – preserved by Habermas in his theoretical framework – in which humanity 
seeks to dominate external nature
62
 and alongside which this same subject treats internal 
nature as an entity to be disciplined by language. One therefore ought to move away 
from a conception of emancipatory practice denying a role to sensory experience. 
Whilst such a task involves re-positioning of reconciliation within the framework of 
subject-object relations, it also corresponds to a transformation of the relationship 
between humanity and nature into one mediated by labour as a process of self-
realisation, i.e. a process whereby, as Marx himself put it,  “human activity itself” is 
conceived as “objective activity”63  and “man is affirmed […] not only in thought but 
through all his senses [italics added].”64 Under such a state of affairs, the possibility of 
maintaining the non-identity of subject and object defended by the first generation of 
critical theorists
65
 is secured by stripping labour of its imperatives of efficiency and 
productivity, and turning it into an activity oriented towards the release of creative 
impulses. As such, labour would effectively perform the role of mimetic mediation 
between humanity and nature, and serve as a basis upon which it becomes “possible to 
transform individual need into an aesthetic value with cognitive content.”66 The 
reconciliation of reason and the senses in knowledge mimetically mediated by labour is, 
here, synonymous with the reconciliation of humanity with both internal and external 
nature.  
Thirdly, the project of human emancipation approached from the reconciliation 
of subject and object involves envisaging a radically different way of experiencing 
social life which, as Adorno suggested, can immediately be appreciated only though 
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autonomous art. This new set of experiences correspond to what Adorno called the 
“aesthetic feeling,” which he interpreted as follows: 
 
Aesthetic feeling is not what is being aroused in us. It is more like a sense of wonderment in the 
presence of what we behold; a sense of being overwhelmed in the presence of a phenomenon 
that is nonconceptual while at the same time being determinate. The arousal of subjective effect 
by art is the last thing we should want to dignify with the name of aesthetic feeling. True 
aesthetic feeling is oriented to the object; it is the feeling of the object, not some reflex in the 
viewer.
67
  
 
Understood as neither a compulsive nor a conceptual phenomenon, the aesthetic 
feeling lies between the sensuous and cognitive realms. It arises from the mimetic 
mediation of individuals‟ instinctual energies (sensuous experience) and their capacity 
to choose the best course of action (cognitive faculties) in, say, the production of object 
or the mere interpretation of needs. As the product of the reconciliation of reason and 
the senses, then, its content arises from the object, whilst its determinacy is “brought 
about by the universal sustaining medium,” i.e. the concept.68 As such, the aesthetic 
feeling expresses a non-identical, yet relational, moment between the subject and the 
object. It is a reflexive moment experienced as a “feeling for the object,” made possible 
by the unifying, yet non-subsumptive, force of a universal flexible enough to “accept 
what is other to it as other,” and therefore capable of giving the particularity of human 
existence, suppressed by existing rationality and non-discoverable by its communicative 
form, its due.
69
 In other words, “aesthetic behaviour is the ability to see more in things 
than they are [in accordance with conceptual frameworks].”70 A form of human 
emancipation approached from the standpoint of the reconciliation of subject and object 
therefore requires one to overcome the subsumption of the good life under the right life 
and turn the former into the substance of morality by substituting communicative 
rationality with a form of rationality capable of turning the aesthetic feeling into a 
reflexive force, i.e. an aesthetic rationality. It requires one to look beyond the principle 
of self-preservation as a result of which existing rationality came to treat the aesthetic 
feeling as a foe of reason. Thus, whilst the major social, political, economic and 
intellectual transformations of the modern age all serve to indicate that the subject is 
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now equipped with the capacity to engage with the object in reflexive terms, they have 
demonstrated that at both the epistemological (Cartesian dualism) and sociological 
(division of labour) levels, such a reflexivity has tended to subsume the particularising 
tendencies of objectivity under the universalising ones of subjectivity. The task of 
critical theory, therefore, is to ensure that what Adorno believes autonomous art to be 
the sole outlet for, namely an aesthetic feeling that “keeps alive the memory of a kind of 
objectivity which lies beyond conceptual frameworks,”71 is diffused within social life as 
whole. Critical theory must therefore seek, as Marcuse put it, the “abolition of art” by 
stripping subject-object relations of the division of labour, which prevents humanity‟s 
recognition of itself as a part of, albeit irreducible to, external nature. 
72
 Whereas this 
may lead to a new form of rationality to which correspond new forms of social 
experiences, its being an act whereby the memory of a phenomenon is “kept alive” 
means that it does not correspond to the realisation of a utopia, but to the mere 
actualisation “of what reason is like,”73 or the realisation of a latent potentiality which 
only an age characterised by a reflexive relation between subject and object can be 
expected to bring about. This is in fact why one speaks here of “reconciliation,” i.e. of a 
mediated non-identity of humanity and nature, whose historical possibility was both 
opened up and denied by modernity, can finally be realised.  
The final condition regards the manner in which dialogue can be expected to 
accommodate the form of rationality corresponding to the reconciliation of humanity 
and nature. As Habermas and Benhabib have themselves already demonstrated, the 
possibility of giving the situatedness of interpersonal existence in the process of 
harmonisation of individual plans of action its due depends on the introduction of a 
dialogue as its fundamental communicative medium. However, as has also been shown, 
human emancipation, if approached from the standpoint of the reconciliation of 
humanity and nature, can only be expected both to give the particularity of human 
existence its due and to assume a socially cohesive form if this dialogue can 
successfully turn the free gratification of one into the precondition for the free 
gratification of all. Since the latter depends on the possibility for each individual‟s 
satisfaction of needs to be consciously and simultaneously experienced as the 
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satisfaction of the needs of others,
74
 the role played by dialogue would become one of a 
medium through which the needs of individuals engaged in a self-realising 
transformation of nature can be communicated to each other. Dialogue would not, in 
this sense, directly serve as the communicative medium between humanity and external 
nature, but would rather take place between individuals conscious of their needs as 
beings belonging to nature, but not reducible to it.
75
 
Furthermore, since, as Marx himself pointed out, a process of self-realisation 
involves actions oriented towards both production and consumption,
76
 individuals will 
tend to seek the satisfaction of their needs from the perspective of the producer as well 
as the consumer. Although the needs of individuals producing objects or providing a 
service effectively differ from the needs of individuals consuming these goods and 
services, the task at hand, here, is to anticipate the possibility for both dimensions to 
yield pleasure. Indeed, whilst under the principle of self-preservation, workers are 
denied the possibility of experiencing pleasure in labour through the repressive force 
stemming from the imperatives of efficiency and productivity, a similar form of 
repression identified by Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse in their critique of the 
culture industry is in fact also experienced by consumers of mass culture. For in both 
cases, individuals‟ incapacity to engage in both production and consumption in such a 
way as to experience pleasure can be traced back to the asymmetry between sensuous 
experience and cognitive faculties in their interpretation of needs: the repression of 
natural inclinations by instrumental reason for the worker turning their activity into toil, 
and the unrestrained (and non-reflexive) release of instinctual energies for the consumer 
both limiting pleasure to mere entertainment, and subjecting individuals‟ reflexive 
capacity to the psycho-mechanisms upon which consumerist culture of advanced 
capitalism relies.
77
 It follows that a self-realising satisfaction of needs rests on a 
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successful coordination of the needs of individuals as both producers and consumers, 
and is, in this sense, dependent upon a communicative framework of action.
78
 Thus, 
whilst the mimetic interpretation of needs would allow the aesthetic feeling to manifest 
itself as an orientation towards the object from the standpoint of the producer and the 
consumer, and turn such a feeling into the basis for emancipation as the reconciliation 
of reason and the senses in reflexivity, dialogue would not only make it possible to turn 
the free gratification of one into the precondition for the free gratification of all by 
situating such an interpretation interpersonally, i.e. as a morally oriented process 
complementing self-realisation, but also by turning the conscious communication of the 
needs of individuals as both producers and consumers into a form of coordination 
directly contributing to self-realisation. Here, however, dialogue would not effectively 
serve as the chief basis upon which needs come to be interpreted – as is the case with 
Habermas and Benhabib – but would instead make its contribution to emancipation by 
coordinating the two dimensions of internal nature (production and consumption) 
serving the mimetic interpretation of needs.  
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
 Habermas‟s call for a departure from the critique of instrumental reason in 
favour of a theory of communicative action has been motivated by a firm belief in the 
need to introduce a framework of action suitable for the actualisation of a form of 
emancipation approached from the standpoint of reconciliation. In virtue of their 
necessarily manipulative character, he argued, subject-object relations cannot provide a 
basis for actions seeking to accommodate the point of view of others. Instead, one must 
seek to raise humanity higher and above external nature, and turn to language. However, 
by doing so, he effectively paved the way for those conditions of existence which the 
earlier generation of Frankfurt School theorists (Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse) had 
identified as the seeds of a repressive social order. Indeed, his understanding of the 
emancipation of internal nature as a process exclusively confined to actions governed by 
communicative reason not only led him to subsume individual conceptions of the good 
life under the common good, thereby reproducing the subsumption of particularity and 
                                                 
78
 The next chapter shall provide a more detailed analysis of this approach to the self-realising satisfaction 
of needs, but that time, in the more specific context of institutionalisation 
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universality, but also caused him to liquidate the somatic dimension of human 
existence. In response to such pernicious orientations, it was suggested that humanity be 
re-positioned within external nature. Such a conceptual turn, however, necessitates one 
to elaborate a framework of action whereby the prospects of human emancipation on a 
societal scale rest on a subject capable of recognising its dependence on the object, on a 
form of reflexivity arising from the mimetically mediated reconciliation of reason and 
senses, and on a communicative medium whereby the free gratification of one can be 
turned into the precondition for the free gratification of all and become the basis for the 
growth of an organic form of morality.
79
 For these reasons, it was finally suggested a 
dialogue be organised among individuals conscious of their needs as both producers 
and consumers belonging to nature. In the following two chapters, I shall proceed with 
a detailed exploration of the socio-political institutions capable of accommodating such 
demands.  
 
 
                                                 
79
 In the next chapter I shall provide a more detailed analysis of this form of morality and of the 
institutional framework required for its development. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Drawing the Contours of Institutionalised Emancipatory Practice 
 
 
In the last chapter I sought to show that one ought to elaborate a practical 
content aimed at turning the realisation of the sensuous particularity of individuals into 
a key element of emancipatory practice. Frankfurt school critical theorists, with the 
possible exception of Habermas, have nevertheless refrained from adopting a 
prescriptive practical stance.
1
 The reason for this is their conceptualisation of critical 
theory‟s task as a merely diagnostic one. Critical theory, they argue, can only be 
expected to negate the existing world. However, as chapter three demonstrated, the 
principle of negativity itself, in virtue of its opposition to the status quo, necessarily 
entails considerations and anticipations regarding what the status quo is not. It was 
suggested that critical theory should indeed fulfil its own, at times unacknowledged, 
promises and harness the positive content of negativity in such a way as to provide an 
insight into alternative objective conditions of existence.
2
 In this chapter I shall attempt 
to employ critical theory in the aforementioned manner, and seek to reveal the affinity 
between the earlier generation of the Frankfurt School and the libertarian socialism of 
G.D.H. Cole.  
 
 
Democracy and the Reconciliation of Humanity and Nature 
 
 Habermas was the first member of the Frankfurt School to engage in a 
theoretical exercise partly aimed at drawing the contours of the democratic processes 
through which individuals can find the practical means for the emancipation of their 
internal nature from the repressive mechanisms of advanced capitalism. One could 
indeed find a significant concern with the institutional arrangement making such a form 
                                                 
1
 With the possible exceptions of Marcuse and Fromm, whose works did somehow anticipate alternative 
conditions of existence : the aesthetic form for the former, and a system where the individual actively 
“participates in the social process” in such a way as to make the “active and spontaneous realization of 
the self”  possible, for the other. Fromm, E. (2002) The Fear of Freedom, London : Routledge, p 237. 
These insights have nevertheless been limited to somewhat vague theoretical considerations. For a more 
detailed discussion of Marcuse‟s aesthetic form see chapter three.  
2
 See chapter three.  
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of emancipation possible as early as The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere.
3
 It could in fact be suggested that Habermas was the first member of the 
Frankfurt School to formulate a critical theory with a prescriptive content providing an 
insight into the broad institutional framework capable of actualising emancipation 
Critical theory, he thought, should not only seek to identify the emancipatory 
potentialities inherent in modernity (communicative action), but must also seek to 
conceptualise the basic institutional framework and the various democratic processes 
through which they can be realised (the public sphere).  
Guiding Habermas‟s project can be found the notion of control which, as a 
notion necessarily deriving from his concerns with moral autonomy, has significantly 
shaped the practical content of his critical theory. Key to such a content, in fact, is the 
view that human emancipation is only possible under democratic control. Here is how 
he briefly defined his conception of democracy: 
 
We shall understand democracy to mean the institutionally secured forms of general and public 
communication that deal with the practical question of how men can and want to live under the 
objective conditions of their ever-expanding power of control.
4
 
 
Whilst the development of the productive forces increases humanity‟s capacity 
for technical control, Habermas contends that it remains an insufficient condition for the 
emancipation of humanity from repression. Indeed as a sphere involving actions 
oriented towards the efficient mastery of external nature, it is thought to fall short of 
satisfying all human needs. Individuals must also be in a position to make decisions 
regarding the best course of action to follow in order to realise the common good or, as 
Habermas would put it, to answer questions of a practical nature. Alongside such a 
development, therefore, must be secured the institutionalisation of communicative 
channels through which the normative concerns related to matters regarding “how men 
can and want to live” are addressed. Furthermore, since the very idea of emancipation 
implies that individuals must be in a position to have control over decisions on matters 
regarding the common good, decision-making processes ought to assume a democratic 
                                                 
3
 His qualified critique of the Bourgeois public sphere does indeed contain clear indications of a concern 
with the type of institution capable of serving the satisfaction of individuals‟ needs by providing them 
with an outlet for the generalisation of their interests through the public use of their reason. A more 
detailed analysis of his critique can be found in chapter four. 
4
 Habermas, J. “Technical Progress and the Social Life-World” in Habermas, J. (1971) Towards a 
Rational Society, London: Heinemann, p 57 
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form. How, then, does Habermas expect the democratic decision-making processes to 
perform their emancipatory function alongside the sphere of material reproduction? 
According to Habermas‟s own theoretical framework, the task facing humanity 
once it has reached a particular stage in the development of the productive forces, 
consists in reaching a consensus on “how men can and want to live.”5 This, in turn, 
entails that individuals must be in a position to make decisions regarding the fate of the 
technological advances achieved through the technical mastery of the forces of external 
nature. As such, the problem facing modern societies in their quest for complete human 
emancipation “can […] be stated as one of the relation between technology and 
democracy: how can the power of technical control be brought within the range of the 
consensus of acting and transacting citizens.”6 The mastery of nature in the “system” 
therefore means that command can be replaced by consensus in the “lifeworld,” but in 
order to prevent the repression of internal nature, the latter process ought to assume a 
democratic form. A society composed of individuals engaging in successful 
emancipatory practices, is one in which the democratic decision-making processes have 
brought technological achievements under the rational control of individuals engaging 
in communicative practices aimed at reaching a consensus, whose content consists in 
defining, intersubjectively, the “right” role for technology  in the realisation of the 
common good. Thus, whilst new forms of technologies, such as contraceptive and 
transportation technologies, constantly develop, it is not until individuals voicing their 
interests through the various communicative channels available to them have 
established the moral significance of the role of such technologies, that one can begin to 
speak of human emancipation.
7
 Practical matters such as the moral implications of the 
diffusion of, for example, abortive technologies and petrol-guzzling vehicles hold, 
according to Habermas, no place in a sphere where actions are governed by imperatives 
of efficiency and power. The epistemological content of practical questions instead 
corresponds to actions oriented towards the accomplishment of a rational consensus on 
the definition of the common good and, as such, strictly regard matters concerning 
social integration or, to put it differently, the emancipation of humanity‟s own nature. A 
society failing to accumulate enough socially integrative resources for the development 
                                                 
5
 Here, one could suggest, lies both the link and break of Habermas‟s own critical theory with historical 
materialism. 
6
 Ibid, p 57. This view is also expressed in other works such as Knowledge and Human Interests and 
Legitimation Crisis.  
7
 Habermas‟s approach to emancipation may in this regard be defined in terms of moral autonomy.  
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of the communicative channels required for democratic decision-making processes 
would, consequently, fail to equip individuals with the means for human emancipation. 
A critical theory that can, however, does demand positive changes.  
As a social form marking the “colonisation”8 of the sphere of social integration – 
also known as the “lifeworld” – by systemic imperatives, the advanced stage of 
capitalist development effectively brought about a highly significant democratic deficit. 
Indeed, once manipulative relations governed by the principle of efficiency begin to 
interfere with matters of a practical nature, the latter lose their normative character, 
thereby causing a distortion in communication. As a “solution” to the problem of the 
spread of instrumental reason, Habermas proposes to harness the reflexive power of 
communicative reason by mobilising the already existing socially integrative resources 
and turning them into a buffer against the systemic imperatives. Individuals are 
expected to do so by seizing the various communicative channels at their disposal. A 
free form of communication, i.e. communication undistorted by the systemic 
imperatives, itself the precondition for truly democratic decisions, is therefore thought 
to be possible without altering the sphere of material reproduction, also known as the 
“system.” In contrast to Marcuse, then, Habermas believes autonomy to be realisable 
through democratic decision-making processes standing alongside a “technological 
rationality” yielded by the capitalist model of production. According to him it is “a 
question of setting in motion a politically effective discussion that rationally brings the 
social potential constituted by technical knowledge and ability into a defined and 
controlled relation to our practical knowledge and will.”9 Habermas is in fact in a 
position to argue that human emancipation can coexist with “technological domination” 
as a result of his epistemological distinction between a technical-scientific and practical-
normative sphere. However, as was shown in chapter four, this distinction rests on the 
fallacious assumption according to which the sphere of material reproduction is thought 
to exclude orientations of a normative nature. Whilst Habermas‟s claim that one can 
either have the existing form of technology or no technology at all implied an entirely 
value-neutral status for the imperatives of efficiency and productivity, a revised 
interpretation of Marx‟s historical materialist approach revealed the contrary. Once the 
role of the relations of production in the development of the productive forces and 
                                                 
8
 See chapter four for a more detailed account of this phenomenon 
9
 Ibid, p 61 
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individual human nature has been acknowledged,
10
 and the true origins of efficiency 
and productivity have been uncovered – as orientations traced back to a particular 
manner of organising social life, i.e. as matters concerning “how men can and want to 
live”– the distinction between the two spheres becomes untenable, for the so-called 
systemic imperatives immediately acquire a political and cultural form.  
Having established the necessary political and cultural character of technology, 
the task of anticipating decision-making processes that can effectively lead to human 
emancipation becomes one directed at the nature of those practices located within the 
confines of material reproduction. The solution to the democratic deficit facing modern 
societies may consist in bringing technical control under the direct democratic control 
of a “political public,” such as the form found in Marx‟s own communist vision. 
However, here is how Habermas responded to such a proposal: 
 
[T]he reproduction of social life can be rationally planned as a process of producing use-values; 
society places this process under its technical control. The latter is exercised democratically in 
accordance with the will and insight of the associated individuals. Here Marx equates the 
practical insight of a political public with successful technical control. Meanwhile we have 
learned that even a well-functioning planning bureaucracy with scientific control of the 
production of goods and services is not a sufficient condition for realizing the associated material 
and intellectual productive forces in the interest of the enjoyment and freedom of an emancipated 
society. For Marx did not reckon with the possible emergence at every level of a discrepancy 
between scientific control of the material conditions of life and a democratic decision-making.
11
  
 
Habermas‟s objections are clear. Any attempt, such as Marx‟s, to bring material 
reproduction under the rational control of a political public will inevitably lead to a 
significant democratic deficit. His reasons for thinking so are also clear. Since material 
reproduction and democratic decision-making are two spheres of activity corresponding 
to two distinct epistemological orientations, the direct control of production by a 
political public would necessarily entail the confusion of practical matters with those of 
a technical form, “as though appropriate means were being organized for the realization 
of goals that are either presupposed without discussion or clarified through 
                                                 
10
 Habermas‟s somewhat narrow emphasis on the productive forces in his interpretation of Marx‟s 
materialism led him to ignore such a role. See the last section of chapter four for a more detailed critique 
of Habermas‟s stance.  
11
 Ibid, p 58 
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communication.”12 In other words, the nature of production is such that any attempt to 
bring it under the direct rational control of “associated individuals” will necessarily lead 
to the formation of a society entirely governed by the imperatives of efficiency and 
productivity and, consequently, failing to provide the conditions required for human 
emancipation. According to Habermas, then, the democratic control of industry cannot 
but produce a society in which the communicative energies required for democratic 
decision-making are stifled by the heavily administered, and therefore repressive, 
character of its bureaucratic apparatus.
13
  
Habermas‟s objections do nevertheless rest once again on his problematic 
distinction between a logic of emancipation corresponding to the relationship between 
humanity and external nature (labour) and another corresponding to the relationship 
between humanity and internal nature (interaction). Habermas‟s conception of a 
democratic control of industry fails to anticipate the possibility of a relationship 
between humanity and external nature governed by principles of a form different from 
those currently steering the sphere of labour. Such a conceptual blindness, it was 
argued, caused him to adopt a reductionist approach to labour.
14
 Whether such a 
conceptual blindness was either a cause or an effect of his interpretation of Marx‟s own 
concept of labour in strictly rational-instrumental terms falls outside the scope of the 
present task. What is nevertheless of notable interest here is the fact that Marx himself 
had envisaged a concept of labour reaching beyond the confines of instrumental reason 
by predicating it upon humanity‟s recognition of itself as a part of nature,15 whilst 
heavily criticising “centralized State power, with its ubiquitous organs of standing army, 
police, bureaucracy, clergy, and judicature,”16 and praising instead “the emancipation of 
labour”17 through the “self-government of the producers”18 exemplified by the Paris 
Commune. It could therefore be suggested that the prospects of a non-instrumental 
rational control by producers depend upon the recognition of labour as a process 
                                                 
12
 Ibid 
13
 The weaknesses in the Soviet system, or the communist regimes of Mao‟s China, North Korea, Cuba 
and Vietnam made such a view entirely plausible.  
14
 See chapter four for a more detailed critique of Habermas‟s account of the sphere of labour.  
15
 As was shown in chapter one, such a concept of labour corresponds to the “implicit thesis” identified in 
Marx‟s works. Since it referred to the emancipation of all faculties (cognitive and sensuous), it came to be 
called “labour as self-realisation.”  
16
 Marx, K. The Civil War in France in McLellan, D. (2000) Karl Marx: Selected Writings, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp 584-5 
17
 Ibid, p 589 
18
 Ibid, p 587. A planned economy, such as the form found under the Soviet system, would, in virtue of 
their heavily centralised nature, stifle the possibility for the creative and cooperative practices required for 
the actualisation of labour as self-realisation, thereby reducing labour to a merely instrumental form. 
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mediating both the transformation of humanity and nature, and upon the corresponding 
conceptual departure from the productivist model of labour characterising the capitalist 
and Soviet mode of production, for which Marx provided theoretical guidance. Thus, 
whilst it is true that he failed to “reckon” with the epistemological implications of his 
concept of labour as self-realisation and the institutional framework corresponding to it, 
segments of his works provided the conceptual tools with which the relationship 
between humanity and nature and, consequently, the direct control of industry by 
producers themselves, could be prevented from assuming a rational-instrumental form.  
It was not until the publication of the works of Horkheimer and Adorno that 
epistemological considerations
19
 of a non-instrumental relationship between humanity 
and nature potentially reconcilable with the concept of labour as self-realisation found 
in Marx‟s works began to gain ground. Both members of the Frankfurt School, 
however, have made conscious efforts not to venture into the conceptual elaboration of 
the institutional framework corresponding to such a relationship, claiming that any such 
attempts would either be counterproductive or have pernicious effects.
20
 They were 
nevertheless in agreement with the view according to which matters regarding the 
transformation of external nature bear a direct relevance to the emancipation of 
humanity‟s own nature, and for this reason elaborated their critical theory on the more 
or less implicit assumption that an approach to human emancipation from the standpoint 
of the reconciliation of humanity and nature, in virtue of its requiring a creative form of 
activity mediating the former‟s relationship with both the internal and external form of 
the latter, entails an autonomous control of those directly involved in such an activity. 
Horkheimer even went as far as suggesting that the “system of workers‟ councils” 
corresponds to “the theoretical conception which […] will show the new society its 
way.”21 Thus, although they never made any thorough attempts to explore the 
alternative institutional framework, their conception of human emancipation – 
reconciliation of humanity and nature – along with their exploration of the 
                                                 
19
 Both critical theorists‟ critiques of instrumental reason were complemented by a defence of an aesthetic 
form of rationality thought to correspond to the reconciliation of humanity and nature.  
20
 In his essay entitled “Traditional and Critical Theory” Horkheimer claimed that “any specific 
theoretical content must be constantly and „radically questioned,‟ and the thinker must be constantly 
beginning anew.” Horkheimer, M. “Traditional and Critical Theory,” p 234. For this reason, the 
conceptual elaboration of an alternative institutional framework would constitute a meaningless exercise. 
The present thesis clearly contends otherwise. See the second section of chapter three for a presentation of 
Adorno‟s own stance and my reasons for defending the inclusion of a theoretical exploration of an 
alternative institutional framework within critical theory. 
21
 Horkheimer, M. “The Authoritarian State” in Arato, A. and Gebhardt, E. (1982) The Essential 
Frankfurt School Reader, New York: Continuum, p 104 
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epistemological implications of such a conception – aesthetic rationality – point towards 
the introduction of a “politically effective discussion” in and about labour.   
If one combines both the view according to which the “revolutionary movement 
negatively reflects the situation which it is attacking,”22 with an attempt to realise the 
promises of the principle of negativity,
23
 one can begin to appreciate the compatibility 
of a conceptual elaboration of an alternative institutional framework with the general 
orientations of critical theory. Thus, if the aforementioned members of the Frankfurt 
School all agreed on the repressive character of the advanced capitalist bureaucratic 
apparatus, they must also share the view that any negative reflection on the situation 
they are attacking would seek to avoid reproducing the conditions leading to such a 
state of affairs. However, whilst they have all traced the origins of instrumental reason 
back to the presence of the principle of self-preservation, they shared different views 
regarding the place such a principle ought to hold in relation to human emancipation.
24
 
It has nevertheless been argued throughout the present work that, in agreement with the 
first generation of critical theorists, any attempt to rid society of its repressive character 
must presuppose the transcendence of “self-preservation,” even from the labour process. 
The autonomous control of industry, which their conception of human emancipation 
implicitly calls forth, must, in this sense, be stripped of all orientations towards forms of 
efficiency driven by private profit and systematic exploitation. As such, the negative 
reflection of the situation attacked by critical theorists, even by Habermas himself in his 
critique of Marx‟s alleged communist vision, closely corresponds to the vision 
contained in the works of the guild socialist G.D.H. Cole: 
 
The driving force behind the Guild Socialist movement is a profound belief that man was born 
for freedom – freedom that shall be full and complete. The bureaucrat, on the other hand, looks 
at life from the point of view of “efficiency.” What he desires is that the State shall arrange and 
manage the affairs of its citizens, whether industrial or political, with an eye to extracting the 
most that machine production can achieve. For him life must be organised by those above for the 
benefit of those below. His ideal is a bureaucracy masquerading as a democracy.
25
 
 
                                                 
22
 Ibid, p 99 
23
 In chapter three the principle of negativity was shown to be endowed with a positive force which only 
Marcuse wished to release, albeit in an incomplete form. 
24
 Whereas Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse advocated the transcendence of self-preservation from 
society, Habermas insisted that all actions involved in the transformation of nature were necessarily 
governed by it, thereby defending its existence alongside human emancipation. 
25
 Cole, G.D.H. and Mellor, W. (1918) The Meaning of Industrial Freedom, The Herald: London, p 25 
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Like the various members of the Frankfurt School – including Habermas – Cole 
opposed the principles underlying the bureaucratic machine to those upon which 
democracy is thought to flourish.
26
 Although he is here referring to the heavily 
bureaucratised state-socialist alternative to capitalism, i.e. to a specific institutional 
model whereby economic affairs are directly managed by the state, a general opposition 
between orientations towards success and those towards “full and complete freedom” 
can be identified. As such, it could be suggested that his stance at least partly follows 
Habermas‟s own, for both clearly attacked, and for somewhat similar reasons, the 
management of economic affairs by the state. However, instead of dismissing all forms 
of direct control in industry as necessarily repressive, and locating autonomy outside the 
sphere of material reproduction, Cole envisaged an institutional model whereby the 
“democratic principle” applies “not only or mainly to some special sphere of social 
action known as „politics,‟ but to any and every form of social action, and, in especial, 
to industrial and economic fully as much as to political affairs.”27  
Contra Habermas, then, and in accordance with the first generation of Frankfurt 
School theorists, Cole believed human emancipation to be predicated upon autonomy in 
labour. Indeed, since the “crowning indictment of capitalism,” he argued,  “is that it 
destroys freedom and individuality in the worker, that it reduces man to a machine, and 
that it treats human beings as means to production instead of subordinating production 
to the well-being of the producer,” one can expect such problems to be solved “only by 
the workers asserting their freedom and proving their individuality, by their refusing to 
be regarded as machines, and by their determining to assume the control of their own 
life and work. [Italics added]”28 In other words, as long as “industrial autocracy remains 
unchallenged,” society will fall short of meeting the conditions required for human 
emancipation.
29
 By advocating a democratic control of industry, however, Cole is not 
merely defending a change in the nature of the decision-making processes found in the 
sphere of material reproduction, but is also calling forth a radical transformation of the 
relationship between humanity and nature. For the introduction of democracy in 
industry necessarily entails bidding farewell to instrumental efficiency and productivity. 
                                                 
26
 Such an opposition could indeed be viewed as the politico-institutional equivalent to the opposition 
found in their critique of instrumental reason, and according to which the organisational principle of 
social life under self-preservation (instrumental efficiency) are thought to be opposed to those 
corresponding to actual human emancipation (freedom as autonomy). A clear affinity with Weber‟s own 
critique of bureaucracy can also be observed here.  
27
 Cole, G.D.H. (1980) Guild Socialism Restated, London: Transaction Books, p 12 
28
 Cole, G.D.H. (1917) Self-government in Industry, London: G. Bell & Sons, p 23 
29
 Ibid, p 3 
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In sum, therefore, whereas Habermas called for a “mastery” of the “irrationality of 
domination,”30 Cole – as well as the first generation of the Frankfurt School – advocated 
the latter‟s suppression. The next section shall explore how Cole envisages the 
institutionalisation of democratic decision-making processes suitable for the realisation 
of the good life implied by the transformation he advocated.   
 
 
The Associative Model and the “Good Life” 
 
 Whilst Cole was keen to expose and overcome the autocratic nature of the 
economic system of capitalist societies, he also made frequent and sustained attacks 
against the form of political organisation such forms of societies entail, namely the 
capitalist State. Indeed, like Marx
31
 and the members of the Frankfurt School, Cole 
viewed the “present political machine [as] an organ of class domination,” and therefore 
sought to expose the illusory democratic character of the decision-making processes 
composing it.
32
 Such a democratic deficit, he also argued, was compounded by the 
incapacity of the existing political machine to deal with the growing complexity of 
modern societies: 
 
Men found themselves called upon to master the art not of governing the State as it was, but of 
prescribing for the government of a vast society which changed its basic structure so fast that the 
magnitude and growing complication of its problems outran hopelessly their capacity to learn the 
difficult art of collective control. Under the leadership of science things ran away with men, and 
the social mind was left groping further and further behind.
33
 
 
The inadequacy of the modern state machinery, therefore, cannot be explained 
merely in terms of interests and class domination. One must indeed turn to the 
institutional structure of the political system supporting capitalist societies in order to 
                                                 
30
 Habermas, J. “Technical Progress and the Social Life-World,” p 61 
31
 It must be noted here that the affinity between Marx‟s and Cole‟s attacks on the capitalist state is not 
my own discovery. Such a case has already been made by Chris Wyatt in his doctoral thesis entitled 
“G.D.H. Cole: Emancipatory Politics and Organisational Democracy.” The general lines of such an 
argument can also be found in Darrow Schecter‟s Beyond Hegemony. My own contribution to the debate, 
could therefore be said to consist in an attempt to reveal the triangular affinity between the early works of 
Marx, the Frankfurt School, and Cole‟s libertarian socialism. 
32
 Cole, G.D.H. Guild Socialism Restated, p 122 
33
 Cole, G.D.H. “Democracy Face to Face with Hugeness” in Cole, G.D.H. (1950) Essays in Social 
Theory, London: Macmillan, p 91 
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grasp fully the causes of their democratic deficit. Cole, then, sought to warn us against 
the growing incapacity of the modern state to provide an outlet for “collective control.” 
The mode of representation at the basis of the state, namely “representative democracy,” 
has failed, he argued, to realise its emancipatory promises. Instead, and in virtue of the 
limited control it has been capable of yielding,
34
 “representative democracy” has created 
a state of affairs where individuals “feel lonely in a great crowd unless there is someone 
to hustle them into herd activity,” thereby making them vulnerable to the influence or 
control of “the man with the loudest voice, or […] the loudest loud-speaker and the 
most efficient propagandist technique.”35 With an institutional structure and mode of 
representation incapable of accommodating the direct control required for “a society in 
which everyone has a chance to count as an individual, and to do something that is 
distinctively his own,”36 Cole is eventually forced to dismiss the “omnicompetent State, 
with its omnicompetent Parliament, [as] utterly unsuitable to any really democratic 
community.”37 For this reason, they “must be destroyed or painlessly extinguished.”38 
What form, then, would an institutional structure and mode of representation 
suitable for a truly democratic society assume? If, according to Cole, a central problem 
with the existing political machine is, in virtue of its “hugeness” and distance from the 
day-to-day affairs of individuals, its incapacity to give adequate recognition to the 
particular and ever-changing needs of these same individuals, it must follow that the 
latter “can control great affairs only by acting together in the control of small affairs, 
and finding, through the experience of neighbourhood, men whom they can entrust with 
larger decisions than they can take rationally for themselves.”39 For this reason, the 
institutional structure of the political sphere must be re-organised into “groups small 
enough to express the spirit of neighbourhood and personal acquaintance.”40 In other 
                                                 
34
 The two main problems Cole identified with the existing form of political representation are as follows: 
“The first is that the elector retains practically no control over his representative, has only the power to 
change him at very infrequent intervals, and has in fact only a very limited range of choice […] The 
second is that the elector is called upon to choose one man to represent him in relation to every 
conceivable question that may come before Parliament, whereas, if he is a rational being, he always 
certainly agrees with one man about one thing and with another about another […]” Cole, G.D.H. Guild 
Socialism Restated, pp 31-2 
35
 Cole, G.D.H. “The Essentials of Democracy” in Cole, G.D.H. Essays in Social Theory, London: 
Macmillan, p 99 
36
 Ibid, p 99 
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 Cole, G.D.H. Guild Socialism Restated, p 32 
38
 Ibid, p 32 
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 Cole, G.D.H. “Democracy Face to Face with Hugeness,” pp 94-5 
40
 Ibid, pp 94-5. Cole, therefore, defended a concept of need radically different from needs developing 
under a capitalist market based on private property. Indeed, whilst the capitalistic conception of need 
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words, according to Cole, the problems identified with the existing political life would 
best be overcome by re-organising it into various associations, whose local character 
would serve to maximise each member‟s control over the “larger decisions” requiring 
representation. 
Above and beyond the local nature of associations, it is their very raison d’être 
that is instrumental to a key criterion when discussing democracy, namely the 
maximisation of communication. Since, as Cole further pointed out, the “consciousness 
of a want requiring co-operative action for its satisfaction is the basis of association,”41 
the latter effectively serves the direct purpose of giving its members “a chance to count 
as an individual, and to do something that is distinctively his own” in cooperation with 
others.
42
 Members of each association are, in this sense, united by a common purpose 
originating from the “translat[ion] of their consciousness of wants into will.”43 Any 
political representation expected to maximise direct control over decision-making 
processes must, accordingly, be organised around the purpose of each association. 
However, whilst a re-organisation of the political machine‟s institutional structure and 
mode of representation constitutes a necessary step towards the formation of a truly 
democratic society, it remains, as has already been demonstrated, an insufficient one. As 
Cole argued: 
 
[…] Society ought to be so organised as to afford the greatest possible opportunity for individual 
and collective self-expression to all its members, and […] this involves and implies the extension 
of positive self-government through all its parts [Emphasis added].
44
  
 
 Cole, then, effectively sought to give life to liberal ideas on autonomy (the 
possible) without reproducing conditions of existence causing “individual self-
expression” to develop into self-preservation (the actual). In order to achieve such a 
task, he argued, the sphere of material reproduction itself cannot be excluded from a re-
organisation of its institutional structure into associations. The task, here, as Cole 
suggested, is to “reintroduce into industry the communal spirit” required for the creation 
                                                                                                                                               
causes the conflation of private property and liberty, Cole sought to undo such a conflation by 
emphasising the communal character of needs satisfaction.  
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of conditions favourable for “self-expression,” and therefore direct control.45 With the 
market forces under the control of individuals organised into associations, and a mode 
of political representation aimed at defending the interests of the various members in 
each association, one can begin to catch a glimpse of the contours of an institutional 
framework capable of giving human emancipation in all the relevant aspects of social 
life its due. It could therefore be argued that Cole‟s institutional framework provides a 
basis upon which the fossé between the actual and the possible, which the critical theory 
of the Frankfurt School insisted on analysing, can be overcome. 
One is nevertheless justified in asking, here, how Cole expected the political 
sphere to relate to its economic counterpart? Or, to put it differently, how did Cole 
envisage the various associations to interact with one another in such a way as to form a 
coherent whole? In order to provide an answer, one ought to turn to the purpose of 
associations. As was discovered above, the members of each association are united by a 
common purpose which constitutes the purpose of the association itself. According to 
Cole, “[e]very such purpose or groups of purposes is the basis of the function of the 
association which has been called into being for its fulfilment.”46 Thus, in virtue of its 
seeking to realise a specific purpose, every association is said to perform a particular 
function. The latter, which Cole also described as “the underlying principle of social 
organisation,”47 shall therefore serve as a basis for the political representation of the 
interests of the various individuals organised into economic and civic
48
 associations. 
Cole summed up the advantages of the principle of function as follows: 
 
Due performance by each association of its social function […] not only leads to smooth 
working and coherence in social organisation, but also removes the removable social hindrances 
to the “good life” of the individual. In short, function is the key not only to “social,” but also to 
communal and personal well-being.
49
  
 
 With an institutional framework composed of political, economic and civic 
associations, the principle of efficiency underpinning the various institutions composing 
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advanced capitalist societies and causing the spread of the “social hindrances” to the 
good life,
50
 would be substituted with the principle of function whose general impact on 
the various domains of social life shall consist in providing a cohesive basis upon which 
“the creative, scientific and artistic impulses which capitalism suppresses or perverts” 
can flourish, “and to enable the now stifled civic spirit to work wonders in the 
regeneration of human taste and appreciation of the good things in life.”51 Above all, 
then, and in virtue of their localised, cooperative and functional character, associations 
provide individuals with the organisational means to gain control over the various 
political, economic and civic processes currently in the hands of the state and the 
market, whilst ensuring that the self-realisation ensuing therefrom assumes a socially 
cohesive character. It could therefore be argued at this stage that Cole‟s functional 
associative democracy could succeed where Habermas‟s theory of communicative 
action had failed, namely by aligning the common good with the good life of each 
individual, and circumventing the conditions leading to the subsumption of the latter 
under the former.
52
  
 In order to grasp the full range of mechanisms making the aforementioned 
alignment possible, one ought to turn to one of Cole‟s main inspirations, namely 
Rousseau‟s social and political thought. What attracted Cole to Rousseau53 was above 
all the latter‟s concern with the riddle of the relationship between individual interests 
and the common good, which the French thinker claimed to have solved in his concept 
of the “general will.” Despite the now well-known problems associated with this 
famous concept,
54
 it was the fact that “it put right at the heart of social thought the 
notion of will, rather than so passive a notion of „consent‟ or so objectionable a notion 
as obedience of the subject to the commands of a superior” that led Cole to develop 
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such an admiration for Rousseau.
55
 It was, as Cole himself put it, a “special kind of 
will” for the following reasons: 
 
He [Rousseau] was insisting that men, whenever they form or connect themselves with any form 
of association for any active purpose, develop in relation to the association an attitude which 
looks to the general benefit of the association rather than their own individual benefit. This is not 
to say that they cease to think of their own individual advantage – only that there is, in their 
associative actions, an element, which may be stronger or weaker, of seeking the advantage of 
the whole association, or of all its members, as distinct from the element which seeks only 
personal advantage.
56
  
 
Cole, therefore, was not effectively seeking to establish whether Rousseau has 
successfully solved the aforementioned riddle but was merely interested in the manner 
in which the latter sought to solve it. He discovered that by placing his emphasis on the 
notion of will in associative actions, Rousseau had been able to expose the mechanisms 
whereby one actively seeks to realise the purpose of the association (or common good). 
The development of this “attitude which looks to the general benefit of the association 
rather than their own individual benefit” could only be possible wherever individuals 
become conscious of the fact that the satisfaction of a want requires involvement in 
cooperative action for, under such conditions the association, although effectively 
embodying a will of a different kind to the will of each individual, turns the common 
good into an extension of the good life of each individual. An institutional framework 
making it possible for individuals to act in accordance with their will would, in this 
sense, create the conditions for the development of social solidarity into a sentiment 
and, ultimately, turn the common good (or purpose of each association) into a project 
which the members of associations could all actively and personally commit to. As 
such, social solidarity is experienced as a “strong impulsion”57 or “primitive social 
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impulse that has been overlaid by bad institutions, but not destroyed,”58 and whose 
release would be made possible by the associative model elaborated by Cole. 
59
  
It should now become clearer how and why the associative model elaborated by 
Cole could provide solutions to the problems identified with Habermas‟s critical theory. 
The conceptual opposition between “reason ordering and will acting” which Habermas 
sought to solve in his theory of communicative action assumed the form of a translation 
of the latter into the former.
60
 However, as has already been demonstrated,
61
 because 
Habermas sought to do so by turning the common good into an absolute priority, the 
conversion inevitably turned into a subsumption of “will acting” under “„reason 
ordering,” for it forced individuals to accept a project that fails to grow organically from 
their will, thereby forcing the sensuous dimension of social solidarity into retreat.
62
 In 
sum, therefore, it could be argued that in order to create the conditions favourable for 
human emancipation, the institutional framework must be engineered in such a way as 
to allow “sentiment” to become “a force in the shaping of human affairs,” or, to use 
Habermas‟s own terms, a force shaping decisions regarding “how men can and want to 
live.”63 It is with this particular concern in mind that Cole sought to realise the good life 
in his associative model, a realisation that, according to him, cannot be limited to a re-
organisation of the sphere of production, but should also be extended to consumption as 
well. The next section shall present his reasons for arguing so and further demonstrate 
why the practical content of critical theory ought to be revised in such a way as to give 
associations a central role to play in the realisation of human emancipation.  
 
 
Production, Consumption and Dialogue 
 
 Conceptualisations of alternative societal models aimed at overcoming the 
problems associated with the capitalist mode of production have, as a result of the 
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predominance of orthodox Marxist perspectives, favoured and even prioritised the 
democratic control of production by workers. As Marx himself had discovered, private 
property and the wage-system that ensued therefrom have turned the act of labour, and 
therefore the labourer himself, into a means for the accumulation of capital, thereby 
causing the subservience of the vast majority of individuals composing society to the 
economic system.
64
 Human emancipation, it was thought, could only be expected to 
flourish on a societal scale once the sphere of material reproduction has been re-
organised in such a way as to rid the system of production of its alienating, exploitative, 
and generally oppressive character.
65
 This is precisely why, in The Civil War in France, 
one can find Marx defending the “self-government of the producers” exemplified by the 
Paris Commune, but also the reason why conceptualisations of alternative societal 
models inspired by Marx‟s works have placed such a strong emphasis on the radical re-
organisation of the system of production.  
 However, whilst such visions of a truly emancipated society include detailed 
analyses of the relation between individuals and labour, they have tended to neglect the 
role of consumption in self-realisation, and to theorise it as a dimension of internal 
nature. Indeed, whereas, for example, Marx himself was conscious of the inhuman 
character of the process of satisfaction of needs,
66
 he did not seek to present the sphere 
of consumption as one capable of developing its own repressive mechanisms, and 
therefore as one necessitating a distinct analytical emphasis. He therefore did not ask 
himself whether the individual would indeed succeed in finding the means for 
emancipation in consumption, for he believed it was sufficient to demonstrate that a 
failure to achieve self-realisation through labour would necessarily prevent society at 
large from acquiring the means to attain human emancipation. It could nevertheless be 
argued that by locating the crux of his critique of political economy in production, Marx 
effectively failed to anticipate the key role consumption would eventually come to play 
in the advanced stage of capitalist development. Indeed, not only has the latter sphere, 
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as Habermas argued, become central to the production of value,
67
 it has also, as the first 
generation of critical theorists demonstrated, come to perform a key function in 
repression. 
When one engages with the works of Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, one 
cannot but appreciate the significance and complexity of the repressive mechanisms a 
system like the “culture industry” relies on.68 Under an age of “mass culture,” they 
argued, one ought to expose the conditions under which individuals “as producers and 
consumers” experience the principle of self-preservation brought about by the capitalist 
mode of production.
69
 Under the pressure of a hostile and competitive environment 
yielding conditions of existence under which they can only be expected to “cope[…] 
most proficiently with the facts,”70 individuals as producers are forced to abandon any 
hope for self-realisation in labour, and ultimately seek refuge in a sphere where they 
expect to find the “pleasure” and “comfort” denied in production by the principle of 
self-preservation. The latter, therefore, is said to engender a “longing for a „feeling on 
safe grounds‟” which, combined with the search for pleasure, turns individuals as 
consumers into agents immediately responsive even to the most superficial and 
incomplete of instinctual releases.
71
 They are, for this reason, most responsive to a 
system – such as the culture industry – relying precisely on those “psycho-dynamic” 
mechanisms making possible the effortless and non-reflexive experience of pleasure, i.e. 
a form of pleasure that is not experienced as a process of self-realisation involving both 
sensuous and cognitive faculties or a satisfaction that does not really satisfy. However, 
since such a system, by professing the attainment of pleasure whilst thriving on the 
feeling of insecurity generated by self-preservation and complying with the logic of 
efficient capital accumulation, effectively limits the experience of the consumers of 
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culture to one of “adjustment and unreflecting obedience,” it ultimately falls short of 
fulfilling its very own promises:
72
 
 
The culture industry perpetually cheats its consumers of what it perpetually promises. The 
promissory note which, with its plots and staging, it draws on pleasure is endlessly prolonged; 
the promise, which is actually all the spectacle consists of, is illusory: all it actually confirms is 
that the real point will never be reached, that the diner must be satisfied with the menu.
73
  
 
By restricting the consumers‟ experience to the domains of “fun” and 
“entertainment,” the films, music and other cultural artefacts supplied by the culture 
industry become incapable of supplying the cultural forms making it possible for 
individuals to engage in sustained self-gratification, also known as the sublimation of 
instincts. Instead the culture industry tends “to ensnare the consumer as completely as 
possible and in order to engage him psycho-dynamically in the service of pre-meditated 
effects.”74 Consequently: 
 
The man with leisure has to accept what the culture manufacturers offer him. Kant‟s formalism 
still expected a contribution from the individual, who was thought to relate the varied 
experiences of the senses to fundamental concepts; but industry robs the individual of this 
function. Its prime service to the customer is to do the schematizing for him. Kant said that there 
was a secret mechanism in the soul which prepared directly intuitions in such a way that they 
could be fitted into the system of pure reason. But today that secret has been deciphered. While 
the mechanism is to all appearances planned by those who serve up the data of experience, that 
is, by the culture industry, it is in fact forced upon the latter by the power of society, which 
remains irrational, however we may try to rationalize it; and this inescapable force is processed 
by commercial agencies so that they give an artificial impression of being in command. There is 
nothing left for the consumer to command. Producers have done it for him.
75
 
 
Under the control of psycho-dynamic mechanisms aimed at attracting as wide an 
audience as possible,
76
 drawing their manipulative force from the divorce between 
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reason and the senses,
77
 and addressing themselves mainly to the latter, individuals 
effectively lose control over the release of their instinctual energies. However, since the 
“desublimation” of instinctual energies resulting therefrom means that individuals 
remain in a position to experience instant forms of gratification, they fail to call into 
question the hostile and manipulative environment surrounding them. In sum, therefore, 
whilst the pleasure the culture industry constantly promises in advertising campaigns 
and marketing strategies must under such circumstances remain an illusion, the control 
sought by individuals over the choices made in the sphere of consumption becomes no 
less illusory. Under the advanced stage of capitalist development, then, individuals fail 
to emancipate themselves not only as producers but also as consumers.  
Once the central function played in repression by the psycho-dynamic 
mechanisms
78
 found in the sphere of consumption has been exposed, it becomes the 
task of the critical theorist to explore the conditions under which such a sphere, along 
with material reproduction, can serve the realisation of the good life where each person 
develops their own vision that is no longer interpreted in terms of functional 
competence or success in capital accumulation. As such, any attempt to conceptualise 
an alternative institutional model aimed at creating the conditions favourable for 
emancipation must be directed at the two spheres. It is with such concerns in mind that 
Cole elaborated his associative model: 
 
[T]he only way in which industry can be organised in the interests of the whole community is by 
a system in which the right of the producer to control production and that of the consumer to 
control consumption are recognised and established [Emphasis added].
79
  
 
Whilst Cole was conscious of the fact that because the worker “does not find his 
job interesting or pleasurable [he] seeks his pleasure outside it, in his hours of leisure,”80 
he was clearly aware of the fact that “the decision of the character and use of the 
product is clearly a matter primarily for the user” and cannot therefore “remain in the 
hands of outsiders” such as the markets forces or, more concretely, the “commercial 
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agencies.”81 Thus, democratic control must be exercised in both production and 
consumption.  
Cole‟s concern with consumption could, at this point, be said to reveal a 
significant affinity and complementarity between his libertarian socialist institutional 
framework and the critical theory of the earlier generation of the Frankfurt School. 
Indeed, whilst Adorno and Horkheimer merely sought to reveal the mechanisms at work 
in the repression of individuals qua consumers, Cole provided the theoretical 
foundations upon which the emancipation of these individuals from repression could be 
conceptualised and translated into practice.
82
 As such it could be suggested that, to put it 
in terms echoing the views of Frankfurt School thinkers, Cole effectively treated 
consumption as a central dimension to the emancipation of internal nature from the 
psycho-dynamic mechanisms causing individuals to experience repressive forms of 
desublimation. Such a concern for consumption, then, marks a significant departure 
from previous attempts to institutionalise emancipatory practice. By restricting the 
scope of its concerns to the conditions of existence experienced by individuals qua 
workers, the Marxist orthodoxy had locked itself into a somewhat narrowly defined and 
pernicious vision of a society where the invisible hand of the free market would be 
substituted with the all-too-visible and autocratic rule of planners, whose role would 
consist in the highly challenging task of satisfying the needs of society at large. Under 
such an institutional framework, individuals qua consumers would lose all control over 
the definition of their needs, thereby failing to find the conditions of existence required 
for autonomous self-realisation. The conceptual elaboration of an alternative vision 
aimed at turning human emancipation into a reality must, therefore, also give 
recognition to the role played by consumption in the realisation of the good life. Indeed, 
as Cole put it, “[i]f the good life is a blend of satisfactions achieved from consumption 
and satisfactions achieved from successful creation, the only answer […] is that men 
themselves must decide collectively what blending of these elements they like best.”83 
One can further appreciate the relevance of such a sphere in self-realisation once the 
changing nature of the capitalist mode of production is accounted for. Indeed, as has 
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been demonstrated above, individuals have, as a result of the alienating nature of the 
wage-system and the division of labour, turned to the sphere of consumption for self-
realisation. Thus, a reorganisation of consumption into democratic associations would 
not only give the role of consumption in self-realisation its due, it would also serve to 
overcome the more recent and increasingly complex forms of repression
84
 found at the 
advanced stage of capitalist development, thereby allowing individuals qua consumers 
to exert control over the definition of their needs and opening up an horizon of 
possibilities for the sensuous objectivity of nature to be expressed in the definition of 
those needs. 
One is nevertheless justified in asking, at this point, how individuals organised 
into such associations would come to harmonise their individual plans of action. In 
other words, whilst it may seem immediately clear why one individual can best be 
emancipated in an association, it remains difficult to grasp how human emancipation 
could be achieved cohesively on a societal scale. In order to answer such a question, one 
must first turn to the very raison d’etre of an association. If, as Cole suggested, one 
enters into an association following the consciousness of a “want requiring co-operative 
action for its satisfaction,” one can immediately appreciate the continuity between the 
good life of the individual members and the good of the association as a whole. The 
purpose of each association, therefore, is pursued by its members as their own. 
However, in order to ensure the completion of the process of satisfaction of needs, the 
producers must be in a position to know the quantity and quality of goods and services 
to be supplied, and the consumers in a position to communicate their needs. With such a 
concern in mind, Cole envisaged the introduction of a dialogue between the various 
associations. Once associations of producers enter into a dialogue with the associations 
of consumers, the members of the respective associations would be in a position to 
defend the interest of the association as their own and “negotiate on equal terms.”85 
Dialogue would, as a result, turn the satisfaction of needs into a process capable of 
maximising “the freedom of the producer as well as the consumer.”86 With the invisible 
hand of the free market replaced by a dialogical relationship between a supply side and 
a demand side organised into democratic associations of producers and consumers 
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respectively, one gains an insight into the institutional framework in which the process 
of satisfaction of needs is directly shaped by decisions regarding “how men can and 
want to live.” 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
 The various members of the first generation of critical theorists, on the whole, 
agreed with each other regarding the dependence of the emancipation of internal nature 
upon the process whereby external nature is transformed. They have nevertheless fallen 
short of providing an insight into the institutional structure within which the new set of 
subject-object relations required for human emancipation could develop. As such, 
Habermas‟s attempt to address the institutionalisation of the reconciliation of humanity 
and nature and to treat it as a matter strictly regarding the relationship between 
humanity and itself marks a significant departure from the earlier generation. What I 
have sought to achieve in this chapter is to reconcile the prescriptive character of 
Habermas‟s critical theory with the approach to human emancipation defended by the 
first generation of critical theorists.  In order to do so, I have attempted to expose the 
elective affinity between the associative model of democracy elaborated by G.D.H. Cole 
and the form of emancipatory practice defended by Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, 
whilst revealing that the self-government of individuals consists in, as Marx himself put 
it, “the political form […] under which to work out the economic emancipation of 
labour.”87 In the following chapter, I shall further explore such an elective affinity by 
presenting Cole‟s institutional framework as the most suitable one for the task of 
reconciliation.  
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Chapter 7 
 
 
The New Practical Content of Critical Social Theory  
 
 
There are three levels on which the repressive character of advanced capitalism 
has been identified throughout the present work: the economic (labour), epistemic 
(knowledge) and political (communication).
1
 All of these levels are, as it has already 
been shown, inter-connected. This chapter seeks to show how Cole‟s institutional 
framework can reconcile humanity and nature at each of these levels, and serve the 
development of a legitimate legal order.
2
  
 
 
Reconciliation at the Level of Associative Action 
 
 The first generation of Frankfurt School critical theorists are well known today 
for the strong emphasis they placed on culture and, more specifically art, in both their 
critique of the advanced stage of capitalist development and their approach to 
emancipation. It has been the contention of the present work to demonstrate the equally 
strong emphasis placed by the same generation upon the role played by humanity‟s 
transformation of external nature in repression. However, whereas Horkheimer 
identified the economy as the “first cause of wretchedness”3  and, along with Adorno, 
presented work as “the active, practical basis, and thus the historically and logically 
prior form of domination,”4 both tended to view culture and, more specifically, works of 
art as the potential loci of reconciliation of humanity and internal nature. At first glance, 
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then, the critical theories of Adorno and Horkheimer appear to dismiss work as a 
potential sphere of emancipatory practice. It has nevertheless been suggested in the 
previous chapters that since emancipatory practice cannot be located outside the 
framework of subject-object relations, the practical content of critical theory ought to be 
revised in such a way as to include explicit and direct concerns with the possible form 
of mediation for the reconciliation of humanity and external nature. Thus, whilst 
Adorno and Horkheimer sought to present reconciliation and the process thought to 
mediate it as matters primarily concerning culture, or the relationship between humanity 
and internal nature, it was argued that the inextricable tie between reconciliation and the 
transformation of external nature which they have consistently sought to uncover 
throughout their works
5
 effectively exposed the process of satisfaction of needs itself to 
mimesis. As a result, any attempt to strip social relations of their repressive character 
ought to involve the transformation of labour into a mimetic process of mediation 
between subject and object or, in Marcuse‟s own words, aim for a “convergence of 
technology and art.”6 
 How, then, can the institutional framework broadly outlined in the preceding 
chapter be expected to accommodate mimetic labour? If mimesis, as Adorno himself 
understood it, involves cultivating the aesthetic moment in reflection,
7
 then its 
introduction into labour would turn the latter into the activity giving the aesthetic feeling 
its due. As such, production would become an activity whereby the spontaneity of the 
senses can be channelled into the process of satisfaction of needs and finally become 
one of the key contributory forces to the knowledge individuals have of their needs. 
Labour, here, would in fact consist in a creative process of self-sublimation inasmuch as 
its products would serve to confirm the essence – cognitive and sensuous – of the 
producers, whilst satisfying the needs of other individuals, i.e. other producers and the 
consumers themselves. However, before labour can be expected to assume such a form, 
the producers must be given enough scope for the release of their creative impulses. In 
other words, they must cease to produce under the pressures of efficiency and 
productivity, which have served to justify the most significant hindrances to creativity 
                                                 
5
 Here is in fact the point of convergence between the earlier generation of Frankfurt School theorists and 
Marx, for despite approaching human emancipation from two contrasting standpoints – a critique of 
knowledge, i.e. the epistemological standpoint, for the former and a critique of political economy, i.e. the 
materialist standpoint, for the latter – both viewed the relationship between humanity and external nature 
as a determining factor for the relationship between humanity and itself.  
6
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7
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under capitalism, namely the introduction and intensification of the division of labour as 
well as the autocratic and repressive character of production. Drawing his inspiration 
from the works of William Morris, Cole undertook the task of elaborating an 
institutional framework that would protect labour against such hindrances. In a lecture 
entitled “William Morris as a Socialist,” in which Cole expressed the full extent of his 
admiration for the English artist, he expressed his agreement with the view according to 
which modern production 
 
had divorced the routine executant from the artist-designer, and had thus destroyed the 
opportunity for the craftsman to employ his creative impulses, converting what should have been 
joyous creative effort into mechanical toil and, in the process, depriving the detailed work of all 
real meaning.
8
  
 
 The separation of cognitive and sensuous faculties brought about by the 
capitalist division of labour, followed by the elevation of (instrumental) reason caused 
by a system of satisfaction of needs forcing individuals to “cope with the facts” have 
divided production into specialised designers and manual workers, depriving the latter 
of a creative engagement with the act of production and the former of an engagement 
with the manual dimension of production. As a result, most productive activities are 
turned into highly specialised and restrictive activities falling short of realising the 
essence of each individual. Under such conditions, the producer fails to identify with the 
product of labour, the labour process itself and fellow workers and, as a result, takes 
part in an activity deprived of “all real meaning.” As an alternative to this alienating 
model of production, Cole proposes to re-organise labour in such a way as to create 
conditions favourable for its conversion into a “joyous creative effort,” for he refuses  
“to contemplate working for any kind of society that does not put high among its 
objectives the restoration to man […] of a chance to engage in friendly co-operation 
with others, in satisfying forms of creative work.”9 Economic institutions must therefore 
allow the producers to enjoy sufficient freedom in, and control over, the productive 
process in order to be able to turn the reconciliation of sensuous experience and 
cognitive faculties into the basis for the interpretation and satisfaction of needs. One can 
therefore begin to appreciate more clearly why the cooperative and democratic 
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character
10
 of associations of producers such as those proposed by Cole would succeed 
in accommodating mimetic labour. Indeed, if the possibility for a widespread release of 
the aesthetic feeling in production depends on overcoming the division of labour and the 
autocratic form of management imposing it, then an environment in which the various 
agents involved in production can be given the chance to understand, through 
deliberative processes, the tasks undertaken by the functionally different parties and, in 
turn, exert control over the wide range of operations composing the labour process, 
would create conditions favourable for its realisation. Thus, although following Morris, 
Cole did not “mean to deny the existence of functional differences between architect 
and craftsman or between manager or technologist and manual worker,” the deliberative 
character of his associative model would enable “the former […] to understand the 
practice of the operations they directed, and the latter [to] be given the largest 
practicable freedom in carrying out their work under the general directives imposed by 
the master plan.”‟11 Associations would, in other words, provide enough scope for the 
diffusion of information required for the various producers to exert control over both the 
design and execution of the products of labour, thereby opening up a space for the 
creative self-sublimation implied by the reconciliation of reason and the senses.  
Once in a position to confirm their essence on a cooperative basis, individuals 
qua producers can become conscious of the social utility of the products of labour. The 
latter, which are no less than the material form of the producer‟s individuality, become 
“examples of the kind”12 as each producer “practically and theoretically” makes “both 
his own and other species into his objects.”13 As such, mimetic labour and its products 
would not only serve to confirm the particularity of each producer but the essence of the 
whole species as well. It follows that by engaging in labour on both a creative and 
cooperative basis and, consequently, interpreting in common the “implications of the 
technical demands placed upon [them],”14 producers can begin to reflect on matters 
regarding “how men can and want to live.” Products would, in virtue of their being 
“examples of the kind,” acquire a moral significance.15 After all, by becoming 
conscious of the fact that the objects created will not only meet their needs but the needs 
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 See chapter six for a more detailed account of the nature of associations.  
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 Ibid, p 9 
12
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of other members of the same species too, producers are directly confronted with these 
individuals‟ interpretations of the good life.16 In other words, by consciously producing 
an object that will directly satisfy the needs of other individuals, each producer 
consciously produces the object that will serve the confirmation of the essence of other 
beings, and can therefore orient his/her action towards matters regarding how other 
individuals can and want to live. Elements of the social utility of new technologies, such 
as contraceptive and transportation technologies, would here be directly interpreted by 
the producers themselves, who become conscious of the place they hold in the 
conception of the good life of other producers. Attributing a key role to the process of 
satisfaction of needs in orientations towards the life in common is not to say, however, 
that economic factors ought to dominate political power. As Cole put it, since it “is 
undeniably true that, under the capitalist system, „economic power precedes political 
power,‟” it must be the goal of “the Guild Socialists to destroy this predominance of 
economic factors.”17 The idea of a life in common is, under Cole‟s framework, no 
longer abstracted from the sphere of activity, i.e. labour, which makes each individual a 
“species-being,” nor does it fall prey to the repressive tendencies of money and power.18 
Instead, one witnesses the recovery, by the labour process itself, of its socially 
integrative functions, and the formation of a space in which the individual qua producer 
can “take the abstract citizen back into himself” and “recognize his own forces as social 
forces.”19 One can also appreciate, here, the inextricable tie between matters regarding 
the transformation of external nature and those regarding the life in common.  
The relevance of Cole‟s institutional framework for a critical theory aimed at 
turning the satisfaction of needs into a means for the reconciliation of humanity with 
itself and external nature does not, however, merely rest on its capacity to turn labour 
into a process of creative self-sublimation. Fully conscious that under capitalism, the 
worker “does not find his job interesting or pleasurable and seeks his pleasure outside it, 
in his hours of leisure,” Cole sought to tackle the new role played by the sphere of 
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 The significance of such a model of production – which Marx called “human production” –  and of the 
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consumption in self-realisation.
20
 Drawing his inspiration, once again, from the works 
of Morris, he observed that the productivist and consumerist nature of the capitalist 
mode of production meant that “things […] could give no pleasure to use any more than 
to make.”21 With the constant drive towards consumption for its own sake and a 
repressive form of desublimation relying upon the endless manufacture of “false 
needs”22 forced upon the consumers by the various commercial agencies, the former not 
only fail to experience the act of consumption as a sustained form of self-gratification, 
but effectively lose the capacity, as atomised agents vulnerable even to the most 
superficial of instinctual releases,
23
 to exert control over the definition of such needs. As 
a result, the act of consumption deprives individuals of any meaningful engagement  
with the definition of their needs, and the objects thought to satisfy the latter. The 
prospects of emancipation consequently rest on a re-organisation of consumption in 
such a way to enable individuals qua consumers to turn the release of instinctual 
energies into both a gratifying and collective exercise. The transformation of 
consumption into a component of self-realisation here depends on the consumers‟ 
capacity to define, in cooperation with one another, their needs in accordance with both 
their cognitive and sensuous faculties.
24
 Sustained gratification, then, would be secured 
by their capacity to formulate their demand in accordance with the mimetically 
mediated interpretation of their individual needs. In this sense, they would find 
themselves in a position to identify directly with the products they have directly chosen 
to consume. It follows that since the “main function of the consumers‟ organisation is to 
make articulate and definite the consumers‟ needs and desires” their interests would best 
be served in associations.
25
 Indeed, their democratic and cooperative character would 
not only provide the scope for its members to exert control over the definition of their 
needs, but also to bring the release of their instinctual energies under their own control. 
With an act of consumption assuming the form of a collective process of self-
gratification, one therefore witnesses the development of a new relationship between 
individuals qua consumers and the products, where the latter finally enter the process of 
satisfaction of needs as objects directly serving the sustained gratification of its 
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participants. The re-organisation of consumption into associations would also encourage 
the emergence of a new relationship between the consumers themselves, for rather than 
seeking to both define and meet their needs in isolation from each other, the goal they 
share as members of the same association means that they would collectively make 
“articulate and definite their needs and desires” by directly engaging with the 
conception of good life of others. Since the goal of an association can only be realised 
on the basis of the communicatively shared interpretation of needs of its members, the 
effective demand for, for example, new contraceptive and transportation technologies, is 
the result of collectively articulated views on the necessity and desirability for such 
products. Thus the act of consumption, like production, would encompass decisions 
regarding “how men can and want to live.” 
Given the inseparability of the reconciliation of reason and the senses, and 
humanity‟s relationship with external nature, one is now justified in asking exactly how 
associations could prevent the former from dominating the latter. Since the prospects of 
self-realisation rest on the re-organisation of production and consumption into 
associations of producers and consumers in which the imperatives of efficiency and 
productivity and, more generally, the elimination of the principle of self-preservation, 
are substituted with the imperatives of creative service and self-gratifying use – both 
corresponding to the principle of self-realisation – the reconciliation of humanity with 
itself depends on identical conditions to those favourable for the reconciliation of the 
former with external nature. For with both a process of satisfaction of needs stripped of 
the imperatives causing humanity to dominate nature, and their substitution with 
imperatives allowing the former to become conscious of itself as a part of nature, a 
space for the treatment of external nature as a partner in emancipation opens up. 
Associations of producers and consumers, therefore, play a key role in preventing the 
domination of the object by the subject at the level of both internal and external nature. 
The next section shall further explore the contribution of this institutional model to the 
project of reconciliation, but this time by assessing its role in the constitution of 
knowledge.  
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Associations, Dialogue and the Constitution of Emancipatory Knowledge 
 
With the possibility of experiencing the satisfaction of needs as a process of self-
sublimation and self-gratification, the separation of “art” and “„technology” 
characterising the capitalist mode of production becomes obsolete. As the “material” 
division of labour is overcome and the cognitive faculties are reconciled with the 
sensuous ones, artistic creation finally acquires the status of social utility. Such a 
“convergence of technology and art,”‟ therefore, reaches beyond the confines of the 
material realm of social life to become a source for change in the nature of thought 
itself. Indeed, as individuals no longer come to experience production and consumption 
as processes through which both reason seeks to bring natural inclinations under its 
control (production) and the instincts are repressively desublimated (consumption), but 
as processes whereby the labour of both reason and the senses are combined, the 
cartesian dualism of “understanding” and “reason”‟ vanishes. In turn, a space for the 
reconciliation of subject and object in thought opens up.  
As a phenomenon mediated by mimetic labour, the convergence of art and 
technology relies upon reason‟s capacity to “assist and support nature.”26 Accordingly, 
the conversion of the labour of the imagination into a socially useful force must depend 
upon the recovery, by reason itself, of its “spirit of humility.”27 By ceasing to master, 
and now effectively channelling the plurality of sensuous experience into knowledge, 
reason equips the latter with the capacity to preserve the moment of the non-identity of 
subject and object in thought and, in turn, capture the rapidly changing character of 
aesthetic impulses. With the aforementioned convergence, then, one witnesses the 
substitution of a rationality of domination, also known as “technological rationality,” 
with a rationality of reconciliation, i.e. one capable of preserving the non-identical and 
situated symmetry between the particularity of the object and the conceptual 
universality of subjective forces. Here the spontaneity of human existence is said to be 
channelled into a productive force through its mimetically mediated relation with 
cognitive faculties, thereby turning the interpretation of needs into a constellation of 
reflexively determined thoughts that remains open to the fluctuations of sensuous 
experience. What, then, are the implications of this form of rationality – also known as 
aesthetic rationality in Adorno‟s work – for the relationship between individuals and the 
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social reality encompassing them, and how can Cole‟s institutional model be expected 
to create the conditions for its development?  
With the emergence of an institution such as the modern state, individuals have 
been “placed  in a position in which they are called upon to take part in decisions which 
involve reasoning in generalizations which far transcend the limits of their practical 
knowledge and personal experience,” thereby falling short of finding the means for the 
confirmation of their own essence in decision-making processes.
28
 The heavily 
bureaucratised nature of political life and the resulting treatment of individuals‟ own 
affairs in terms of efficiency and productivity characterising advanced capitalism, have 
effectively led to the prioritisation of institutional management and cost-effectiveness 
schemes over the satisfaction of both the particular needs of individuals and the good of 
society at large. Unable to treat decision-making processes as outlets directly capable of 
accommodating their conceptions of the good life, individuals have been reduced to the 
status of abstract citizens. In contrast, and because of its capacity to preserve the 
moment of non-identity between subject and object, aesthetic rationality equips 
individuals with the reflexive means to affirm themselves in the world as beings with a 
unique cognitive and sensuous make-up. An institutional framework enabling each 
individual to “take the abstract citizen back into himself[/herself]” must therefore be 
organised in such a way as to channel aesthetic rationality into the various decision-
making processes he/she participates in. As such, institutions must be sufficiently 
democratic and small to be able to both connect the “individual man[/woman] in 
his[/her] empirical life” to the decision-making processes affecting the conditions under 
which individuals seek to confirm their essence, and maximise their control over such 
processes.
29
 Thus, since individuals “can control great affairs only by acting together in 
the control of small affairs”30 and finding the means “to count as an individual, and to 
do something that is distinctively [their] own,”31 the introduction of aesthetic rationality 
into decision-making processes depends on a re-organisation of the economic and 
political realms into institutions  small enough to be able to give cooperative action and 
the spontaneity of natural inclinations their due in social relations. As producers 
collectively interpret the technical demands placed upon them under the imperative of 
creative service (Cole‟s “guilds”), and consumers cooperate in the definition of their 
                                                 
28
 Cole, G.D.H. “Democracy Face to Face with Hugeness,” p 90 
29
 Marx, K. “On the Jewish Question,” p 64 
30
 Cole, G.D.H. “Democracy Face to Face with Hugeness,” pp 94-5  
31
 Cole, G.D.H. “The Essentials of Democracy,” p 99  
  
163 
 
needs under the guise of self-gratifying use (Cole‟s “consumer councils”), they end up 
in a position to communicate their individual conception of the good life, drawn from 
the mimetically mediated non-identical reconciliation of their cognitive and sensuous 
energies, to one another. They therefore also become capable of reflecting upon their 
own conditions of existence on the basis of such a reconciliation. However, in order to 
be capable of giving such a reflexivity its due, orientations towards matters regarding 
the life in common, i.e. practical orientations, must serve as an extension of each 
individual‟s will. This is precisely where the principle of function comes to play a part:  
 
Each of us has in mind, whether we rationalise it or not, some conception of the sort of social life 
which is ultimately desirable. Our conceptions of the functions of particular associations are 
inevitably formed in the light of our ultimate conception of social value.
32
  
 
With the purpose of each association forming the basis of its function, and each 
purpose consisting in an extension of the individual members‟ will, the functional re-
organisation of political life endows the representatives of the various associations with 
the responsibility to accommodate the conception of the good life of others in their 
decisions, and generally act in accordance with the aesthetic-rational reflexive activity 
of individuals qua free producers and consumers. The “social value” of an association, 
or its function in social life, would, in this sense, stem from the aesthetic-rational 
definition of the good life of the members of the various associations, and underpin the 
dialogue between the representatives directly involved in political decision-making 
processes. In other words, the interpretation of the social utility (by producers) of, say, 
new contraceptive and transportation technologies, along with the articulation and 
definition of the demand for such technologies (by consumers) enter the dialogue as the 
content of negotiation, as public opinion. The successful re-organisation of decision-
making processes into outlets through which the rationality of reconciliation 
underpinning the conception of the good life of each individual can be channelled, 
therefore, depends on the re-organisation of the institutional structure into associations 
of producers and consumers represented by functionally organised political associations. 
Such a re-organisation entails, in more concrete terms, the introduction of notions of 
creativity, self-gratification and personal commitment into decision-making processes. 
The Mondragon experience has shown that: 
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in times of stringency when an orthodox firm would lay off workers or shut down, the members 
of a self-governing enterprise can decide to reduce wages, curtail their share of the surplus, if 
any, or even contribute additional capital funds, as at Mondragon, self-governing enterprises are 
likely to tap the creativity, energies, and loyalties of workers to an extent that stockholder-owned 
corporations probably never can, with profit-sharing schemes.
33  
 
Self-governing associations make it possible for individual producers (and 
consumers) to regard the interest of the community as an extension of their own, 
thereby opening up a space for decisions (cognition) made on the basis of instinctual 
impulses (aesthetics). As such, they are the most suitable institutional form for the 
transformation of “individual need into an aesthetic value with cognitive content.”34 
Whilst channelling aesthetic rationality into decision-making processes is a 
fundamental prerequisite for the adequate representation of individuals‟ interests in the 
political sphere and the control by these individuals of the conditions under which they 
seek to confirm the essence, the prospects of their emancipation do nevertheless also 
rest on yet another condition. Indeed, as beings with both cognitive and sensuous 
energies, individuals continuously develop new needs and desires, thereby constantly 
altering their conception of the good life. Once such new developments take place, a 
discrepancy between the existing state of affairs and the new interests they wish to fulfil 
unfolds, prompting a will to alter the status quo itself. For this reason, the individuals 
must be in a position to turn their newly defined conception of the good life into 
politically effective decisions. The demand for new contraceptive technologies, along 
with the interpretation of their social utility may indeed change at any time. Thus, the 
institutional framework must not only enable individuals to cultivate the aesthetic 
moment in reflection, but also create the conditions whereby it can be turned into the 
very fabric of public opinion. Since it has already been demonstrated above how Cole‟s 
associative model can frame the development of aesthetic rationality, the present 
discussion shall focus on the manner in which this same model can serve the translation 
of sensuous and cognitive energies into a subversive form of public opinion.   
If, as Adorno himself argued in relation to the artist‟s reflexive engagement with 
autonomous works of art, a truly emancipatory form of reflexive activity consists in a 
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form of thought capable of giving a constitutive role to the object in knowledge,
35
 then 
it follows that the institutional structure must be organised in such a way as to allow 
decision-making processes to capture the rapidly changing character of aesthetic 
impulses. What I take this to mean is that the institutional framework itself ought to 
become sufficiently flexible to give sensuous experience its due in decision-making 
processes. As such, political life ought to become immediately responsive to a public 
opinion composed of the reflexive orientations stemming from the affinity between 
subject and object characterising the new  needs and desires individuals seek to satisfy. 
How then, can such a state of affairs be achieved? 
As individuals organised into associations of producers mimetically and 
cooperatively interpret the demands placed upon them, and consumers collectively 
articulate and define the needs to be satisfied (the demand) in order to realise self-
gratification, they are in a position to turn their conception of the good life into a matter 
of public significance. For, insofar as the needs are defined and satisfied on a 
cooperative basis, and become the purpose of the associations themselves, they are 
endowed with a public quality. Furthermore, since the completion of the process of the 
satisfaction of needs requires the two categories of associations to enter into a dialogue 
with each other, the needs of individuals acquire a public significance beyond 
associative action. Any change in the conception of the good life of each member of the 
association therefore directly enters the dialogue between producers and consumers, and 
as such, immediately becomes part of the public realm.  
To become the fabric of public opinion, however, the new conceptions of the 
good life must have an impact on the decision-making processes determining the nature 
of the life in common. They must be unified in such a way as to become a subversive 
force. The dialogue confirms the public character of the needs and desires of individuals 
organised into associations, and provides both the institutional flexibility and reflexive 
unity required for the satiation of the rapidly changing character of aesthetic impulses, 
and their conversion into a coherent subversive force respectively. Whilst such a unity 
arises, in nucleo, from the newly emerging affinity between the particularity of 
sensuous objectivity and the conceptual universality unfolding in creative production 
and self-gratifying consumption, it can become a subversive force only once the 
members of the various associations are in a position to communicate it at the more 
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general level of dialogue. Each member of the association shall, at this level, defend the 
good of the association as a whole. However, they shall do so without what Habermas 
himself problematically accomplished, namely the subsumption of the good life of each 
individual under the common good.
36
 Indeed, since the purpose and function of each 
association consists in an extension of the good life of their members, the degree of 
generality attained by the subject-object affinity stemming from the associative level, 
and its representation at the dialogical level remain sufficiently particularised to give 
individual conceptions of the good life their due in dialogue. Any change in the 
individual conception of the good life taking place at the associative level, therefore, 
becomes a force capable of challenging the established order once it enters the dialogue 
composed of the representatives of each association.  
One does not witness, here, a “conflation of bourgeois and homme” in the 
citizen, and the ensuing colonisation of public opinion by the imperatives of efficiency 
and productivity but, rather, a conversion of individuals‟ wills, as consumers seeking 
self-gratification and producers seeking creative self expression, into differentiated 
public wills defended by representatives functionally organised into political 
associations in dialogue with one another. Studies on the self-governing enterprises of 
Mondragon have revealed that the alignment of the common good with individual 
conceptions of the good life could indeed succeed in turning decision-making processes 
into outlets whereby “economic plurality/difference has been celebrated.”‟37 Political 
and economic decisions are neither conflated nor separated but differentiated and 
complementary. Furthermore, one cannot define the nature of such a political life in 
terms of “generalised particularism,” for, as the consequence of self-interested 
orientations and cause of temporary compromises this form of political resolution falls 
short of giving the cooperative character of associations their due and is in turn unable 
to strip the tension between the various conflicting interests from political decision-
making. Nor can it be defined in terms of “democratic universalism,” for the constantly 
changing character of the aforementioned public opinion excludes any possibility for 
universalistic tendencies to gain the upper hand. One could, instead, speak of a public 
opinion assuming the form of a pluralistic general will, inasmuch as the will of the 
representatives, functionally organised into political associations, consists in a reflexive 
extension of the will of the various members of the associations of producers and 
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consumers and is, therefore, directly aligned with the changing – and, in this sense 
plural – character of aesthetic impulses of the represented parties.38 The phenomenon 
identified by Adorno as negative thinking is effectively made possible by what Marx 
understood as the process whereby individuals take “the abstract citizen back into 
himself,” where the latter effectively consists in accomplishing an affinity between the 
particularity of sensuous experience (the empirical individual) and reason (the cognitive 
self) as a moment of non-identity between object and subject in thought which, in virtue 
of its capacity to accommodate the rapidly changing character of aesthetic impulses, can 
both serve to reliquify a reality previously congealed by reifying, totalising and 
absolutising tendencies of a sovereign subject, and be expected to turn the cooperatively 
defined conceptions of the good life into a subversive public opinion.  In sum, Cole‟s 
associative model does not turn will into ratio, but effectively reconciles both in 
political decision-making processes, thereby creating the conditions for the permanent 
“reliquification” of social reality.  
Whilst the dialogical nature of the decision-making processes composing Cole‟s 
associative model serves to convert the individual conceptions of the good life into a 
pluralistic form of public opinion and underpins the institutional flexibility required in 
order to accommodate the rapidly changing character of aesthetic impulses, such 
phenomena are significantly facilitated by the power of the represented to recall their 
representatives. Under existing forms of parliamentary democracies,  decision-making 
processes take place on the assumption “that one man can „represent‟ another or a 
number of others, and that his will can be treated as the democratic expression of their 
wills.”39 However, as Cole pointed out, decision-making processes whereby the will of 
the represented only directly plays a part whenever the representatives themselves are 
elected remain insufficiently democratic. Representation, here, fails to give a voice to 
the immediate needs and desires of the represented. This is precisely what led Cole to 
conclude that “[n]o man can represent another man, and no man‟s will can be treated as 
a substitute for, or representative of, the wills of others.”40 Representation, therefore, 
ought to be re-organised in such a way as to align the decisions made by the 
representative with the cooperatively defined needs and desires of the represented. 
                                                 
38 The phrase “general will” is here being used to refer to Rousseau‟s own political theory, according to 
which the will of an association “is, in Rousseau‟s sense, „general‟ in relation to the members of the 
association, but „particular‟ in relation to the community as a whole.” Cole. G.D.H. “Rousseau‟s Political 
Theory,” pp 51-2 
39
 Cole, G.D.H. Social Theory, p 103 
40
 Ibid, p 103 
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Whilst the functional representation of the various associations makes it possible for the 
representative to act “in relation to a quite narrow and clearly defined purpose or group 
of purposes which the association exists to fulfil,” it is the power of the represented to 
recall whenever they see fit those representing them that will safeguard decision-making 
processes against the elected person‟s “pretension […] of substituting his personality for 
those of his constituents.”41 With such a proximity between the elected and their 
constituents, political decision-making processes effectively become directly aligned 
with the conscious needs and desires of the represented, i.e. with public opinion itself. 
Whilst the mimetically mediated affinity between subject and object turns the aesthetic 
moment of reflection into the very fabric of emancipatory criticism (subversive public 
opinion), the latter is turned into a politically effective mode of thought by the re-
organisation of political life into associations in dialogue with one another and 
functionally represented by representatives whose own decisions, in virtue of their 
direct alignment with the constituents‟ wills, can finally be treated as the democratic 
expression of these wills. Political life thus becomes a realm of reconciliation sui 
generis. In the next section, it shall be shown how subject-object relations can serve as a 
basis for the formation of a legitimate legal order.  
  
 
On the Role of Subject-Object Relations in the Formation of a Legitimate Legal order 
 
 Habermas and Benhabib have addressed the issue of reconciliation as a matter 
regarding intersubjective relations, “outside,” so to speak, of the structures of 
instrumental reason, such as the economic and political-administrative power. 
Accordingly, they have sought to expose the limitations of subject-object relations in 
framing the normative basis of the legal order required for the complete realisation of 
human emancipation. However, as has already been demonstrated in chapter five, 
several problems associated with their normative approach render their defence of the 
intersubjective framework unsustainable. Indeed, not only have they failed to account 
for the value-laden character of the imperatives of efficiency and productivity and 
underestimated their encroaching power upon the relationship between humanity and its 
inner nature, they have also dissolved the particularity of human existence in the 
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linguistic articulation of needs whilst failing to anticipate the possibility for non-
manipulative subject-object relations. As such, it could be suggested that by failing to 
address the latter relations in normative terms and neglecting the objectivity of internal 
nature in subject-subject relations, they have ultimately failed to safeguard the 
normative dimension of social relations against the repressive tendencies of the 
instrumental form of rationality spreading under the advanced stage of capitalist 
development.
42
 As an alternative approach, it was suggested that critical theory‟s 
normative axis ought to be grounded within the framework of subject-object relations, 
for it is precisely here that the resources required for the pursuit of matters regarding 
how individuals can and want to live – the good life – originally stem from. How, then, 
can the practical content of critical theory be revised in such a way as to give subject-
object relations their due in the constitution of a legal order giving recognition to the 
plurality of conceptions of the good life, i.e. of a legitimate – and in the present context, 
emancipatory – legal order? 
 Firstly, participants in political decision-making processes must be in a position 
to orient themselves towards matters regarding how other individuals can and want to 
live. In order to do so, communication between the relevant agents must first be freed 
from all distortions – actual or potential – causing these same agents to engage in 
conflictual practices. Whilst Habermas and Benhabib restricted the possibility for such 
forms of undistorted communication to a framework of subject-subject relations lying 
outside subject-object relations, it has been argued that denying such a possibility to the 
latter framework poses a real problem for critical theory. Indeed, by rejecting the 
philosophy of consciousness as a suitable theoretical frame of reference for 
reconciliation, both social theorists problematically take for granted what is but a 
historically specific condition, namely the principle of self-preservation. As a result, 
they fail to grasp the communicative, and therefore normative, potential of work, and the 
specifically distorting nature of its capitalist form.
43
 Once the distorting tendencies in 
the sphere of work have been traced back to the principle of self-preservation, it 
becomes possible to identify the social hindrances rendering such a sphere incapable of 
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 See chapter five for a detailed critique of their approaches. One could in fact conclude that the social 
relations entailed by their theoretical framework effectively serve as an apology for the form social 
democracy emerging in the 70‟s and 80‟s.  
43
 See Honneth, A. and Ash, M.G. “Work and Instrumental Action.”  
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providing the communicative means for reconciliation.
44
 The conception of individual 
need as an aesthetic value with cognitive content that such a reconciliation entails does 
not, therefore, imply a return to organic communities, for it seeks to give both reason 
and sensuous faculties their due in reflexivity. With the substitution of self-preservation 
by the principle of self-realisation, furthermore, one begins to discern the contours of a 
normative framework of action anchored in the sphere of work, and serving as a basis 
for the development of legitimate laws. 
 As argued above and in previous chapters, the transformation of subject-object 
relations into a non-manipulative framework of action rests on the conversion of the 
activities central to the satisfaction of needs into processes of self-realisation.
45
 It was 
shown that whilst such conditions would be partly met by transforming the supply side 
into a process of creative production mediated by mimetic labour, a concern for non-
repressive forms of consumption was also required. The latter, it was suggested, ought 
to be transformed in such a way as to allow individuals to experience self-gratifying use, 
which the control over their definition of needs presupposes.  Thus, by re-organising the 
satisfaction of needs into associations whose actions are underpinned by the principles 
of creative production and self-gratifying use – the two principles corresponding to self-
realisation in production and consumption respectively – one not only becomes capable 
of anticipating the treatment of nature (both internal and external) as a partner in 
emancipation, but also gains an insight into the institutional model capable of yielding 
the necessary control, by individuals, over the satisfaction of their needs, which self-
realisation itself presupposes. Where, though, do normative orientations likely to form 
the basis of a legitimate legal order fit into such a model? In order to provide an answer, 
one ought to turn to the nature of the social relations yielded by associative action and 
dialogical coordination.  
With the dissolution of the imperatives of efficiency and productivity in 
associative action, a change in the orientations of those taking part in the process of 
satisfaction of needs occurs. In a free market economy, milk producers, for example, are 
forced to seek the maximisation of surplus value. As such, the purpose of production is 
immediately governed by the need to turn their efforts into a profitable enterprise, 
thereby subsuming their own needs and those of the consumers under the search for 
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 As mentioned in chapter six, the social hindrances include: competition, alienation, the division of 
labour, class inequalities, bureaucracy, the wage-system etc… 
45
 Chapters four, five and six all more or less explicitly address this issue 
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capital accumulation. In a democratically organised association of milk producers in 
dialogue with a democratically organised association of milk consumers, however, the 
actions and decisions of the members of the former type of association are effectively 
oriented towards the cooperative satisfaction of a need which motivated them to 
combine with other milk producers, and towards the satisfaction of the collectively 
articulated demand of consumers communicated through dialogue. The re-organisation 
of the economy into associations of producers and consumers in dialogue with one 
another therefore entails a change in the purpose assigned to the satisfaction of needs 
itself or, more specifically, a change in the motivations of the various actors involved in 
the process. Now in a position to treat the satisfaction of needs of other members of the 
association as their own, whilst seeking to coordinate their actions qua producers and 
consumers in dialogue, individuals no longer seek to pursue their self-interest but, 
rather, begin to treat matters regarding how other individuals can and want to live as 
central to the transformation of external nature.
46
 In order to fulfil the purpose of each 
association and successfully coordinate their needs at the level of dialogue, individuals 
must indeed become conscious of the conceptions of the good life of others, and 
consciously treat their realisation as an integral part of the satisfaction of their own 
needs. The raison d’être of associative action, namely the “consciousness of a want 
requiring co-operative action for its satisfaction,” coupled with the dialogue‟s 
coordinating function, therefore, secure the alignment of the common good with the 
individual conceptions of the good life, and effectively turn the realisation of the latter 
into the precondition for the realisation of the former:  
 
“[T]o give freedom by freedom is the universal law”‟ of the “aesthetic state”; in a truly free 
civilization, “the will of the whole” fulfils itself only “through the nature of the individual.” 
Order is freedom only if it is founded on and sustained by the free gratification of the 
individuals.
47
 
 
Under the guise of “technological rationality,” validity claims are assessed 
according to the normative yardstick
48
 framed by the imperatives of efficiency and 
                                                 
46
 Gibson-Graham‟s depiction of the Mondragon self-governing enterprises as forming an “intentional 
community economy” giving life to an “economic being-in-common” provides a practical illustration of 
the form of communicative practices defended here.  Gibson-Graham, J.K. Postcapitalist Politics, p 84 
47
 Marcuse, H. Eros and Civilization, p 191 
48
 In chapter four I sought to demonstrate, against Habermas‟s own stance, the normative character of 
such imperatives. 
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productivity. Individuals, here, compete, to succeed in an environment rendered hostile 
by the pressure to preserve the self. As such, they come to treat other individuals and, 
more generally, their environment as means for, or impediments to,  the satisfaction of 
their needs. However, as soon as supply and demand are brought under the control of 
individuals organised into associations of producers and consumers, and the 
aforementioned imperatives replaced by those of creative service and self-gratifying 
use, one gains an insight into an altogether different normative yardstick. No longer 
oriented towards the preservation of the self, and equipping individuals with the 
reflexive means to a) affirm themselves as social beings with a unique cognitive and 
sensuous make-up, b) view themselves as beings belonging to nature, and c) regard the 
realisation of the good life of others as an integral part to the realisation of their own, 
the “motives of greed […] and fear” vanish to give way to those of self-gratification and 
cooperation. Under such a state of affairs, the validity of a claim is no longer judged 
according to the morally pernicious yardstick of success, but, instead, acquires 
legitimacy in virtue of its capacity to yield communicative practices capable of aligning 
the needs and desires of each individual with the common good. Since the “position of 
the individual [acts] as the source and sustaining spirit of every association,” and each 
member of the association comes to treat its purpose as their own, anyone seeking to 
satisfy one‟s needs through associative action necessarily develops a strong concern 
with the well-being of the members they cooperate with in achieving their goals.
49
 As 
the competitive-individualist ethos framing social relations under the principle of self-
preservation vanishes, and individuals begin to experience, consciously, their 
satisfaction of needs as a process immediately contributing to the satisfaction of needs 
of others, a new set of social relations, this time framed by the ethos of cooperative self-
realisation, emerges.
50
 Under such circumstances, a reflexive space within which 
                                                 
49 Cole, G.D.H. Social Theory, p 191. In the elaboration of his institutional model Cole, in fact, drew a 
significant proportion of his inspiration from the guild system of the medieval age for precisely its 
capacity to induce the moral orientations causing individuals seeking to satisfy their needs to regard the 
well-being of others as central to their own: “a fundamental difference between mediaeval industry and 
industry to-day is that the former was imbued through and through with the spirit of free communal 
service, whereas this motive is almost wholly lacking in modern industrialism, and the attempt to replace 
it by the motives of greed on one side and fear on he other is manifestly breaking down. It is undoubtedly 
the case that, though there were sharp practices and profiteering in the Middle Ages, the Gildsman or the 
Gild that committed or sanctioned them did so in flat violation of moral principles which he or it had 
explicitly accepted as the basis of the industrial order, whereas to-day moral principles are regarded 
almost as intruders in the industrial sphere, and many forms of sharp practice and profiteering rank as the 
highest manifestations of commercial sagacity.” Cole, G.D.H. Guild Socialism Restated, pp 44-5 
50
 Such an approach to the satisfaction of needs can, once again, be related to the idea of an “economic 
being-in-common” spelled out in Gibson-Graham‟s chapter on the Mondragon self-governing enterprises. 
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individuals can begin to seek the primacy of the object previously denied by the 
repressive tendencies of a sovereign subject striving to preserve the self against other 
individuals and the forces of both internal and external nature, opens up. The new social 
relations do, in this sense, correspond to a state of affairs whereby the conscious 
knowledge of themselves as beings part of, but not reducible to, nature, safeguards their 
actions against orientations towards mastery and exploitation, and the corresponding 
development of a legal framework founded upon power and inequality. 
So far, it has been possible to catch a glimpse of the form assumed by a system 
of satisfaction of needs comprising communicative practices serving as a basis for the 
formation of a legitimate legal order. In other words, a case was made for a framework 
of action mediated by labour and capable of attributing socially integrative functions to 
associative action. The task of establishing exactly how social norms can be expected to 
emerge from this new set of subject-object relations, and become the foundation of a 
legitimate legal order does nevertheless remain. I propose to undertake it by looking 
more closely at the form of freedom enjoyed by individuals organised into associations 
of producers and consumers. The “personal liberty” which Cole believes associations to 
be capable of yielding was summarised as follows: 
 
It is simply the freedom of the individual to express without external hindrance his “personality” 
– his likes and dislikes, desires and aversions, hopes and fears, his sense of right and wrong, 
beauty and ugliness, and so on.
51
 
 
In associations underpinned by the principle of creative service (production) and 
self-gratifying use (consumption) individuals do not merely seek to satisfy basic needs 
such as shelter and food, but are also in a position to affirm themselves as beings with a 
unique cognitive and sensuous make-up and express desires of both moral and affective 
quality. The reflexive power of reason is here being combined with the subversive 
power of the senses to yield conditions of existence whereby individuals express and 
seek to realise desires of both moral and affective quality as both producers and 
consumers. By assuming such a form, then, the satisfaction of needs also serves as an 
outlet for these individuals‟ identity formation. What is meant here is that in their effort 
                                                                                                                                               
Other historical examples, such as the cooperative movement in central Italy or the self-government of 
Yugoslav workers, could also serve to illustrate it.  The latter example was analysed by Loucks in his 
interesting article entitled “Workers‟ Self-government in Yugoslav Industry.” 
51
 Cole, G.D.H. Social Theory, p 184 
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to express and affirm a wide range of already existing tastes and preferences, they 
acquire the capacity to reflect on their own conditions of existence, thereby opening up 
an horizon of new possibilities for the further development of their identity.
52
 How, 
then, can the reconciliation of humanity and nature at the individual level become the 
basis upon which the legal fabric of society can unfold, i.e. lead to a reconciliation on a 
societal scale?  
Since the overall communicative character of the associative model has already 
been exposed above, the present discussion shall concentrate on  the specific 
communicative practices involved in the translation of norms into laws.  A set of 
practices of such kind can be observed on two levels: the associative and the dialogical. 
At the associative level, individuals democratically organised into associations of 
producers and consumers engage in deliberative processes aimed at securing the 
cooperative pursuit of the purpose of the association as a whole or, put differently, at 
maintaining the alignment of their individual needs and desires with the needs and 
desires of other members of the associations. As such they are already in a position to 
orient their own actions in such a way as to accommodate the conception of the good 
life of others in the satisfaction of their needs. As producers, they shall indeed seek to 
harmonise the various individual plans of action aimed at the creative deployment of 
their cognitive and sensuous energies in the interpretation of the technical demands 
placed upon them. As consumers, on the other hand, each member of the association 
shall seek to interpret the needs and desires that will secure self-gratifying use in 
cooperation with others, thereby harmonising the various conceptions of the good life 
comprised in the association. It is worth reiterating here, however, that the 
harmonisation of individual plans of action at the associative level is such that it does 
not effectively subsume the individual conceptions of the good life under the good of 
the association. Indeed, since, as it has already been shown, the “position of the 
individuals acts as the source and sustaining spirit of every association,” the pursuit of 
the purpose of each association directly serves the realisation of the good life of each 
member. For this reason, the purpose of the association is endowed with both a 
particular and universal quality. It is, as Cole himself put it in an essay on Rousseau‟s 
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 The dynamics of this “learning mechanism” have been explored by Piaget, who Habermas cites in the 
first volume of The Theory of Communicative Action : “If reciprocal actions between subject and object 
modify both, it is a fortiori evident that every reciprocal action between individual subjects mutually 
modifies them. Every social relation is thus a totality in itself which creates new properties while 
transforming the individual in his mental structure.” Habermas, J. The Theory of Communicative Action, 
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political theory, “clearly a special kind of will, present to some extent in every citizen, 
but distinguished from the rest of the individual will of each citizen by a quality of 
generality.”53 Thus, the purpose of each association encompasses both a sufficiently 
particular character to give the individual conceptions of the good life their due in 
political representation, and a sufficiently general one to underpin the constitution of 
laws.  
The completion of the process of constitution of laws as reconciliation does 
nevertheless rest on the successful recognition of the plurality of needs in the 
harmonisation of individual plans of action on a societal scale. Under a process of 
satisfaction of needs underpinned by the principle of self-preservation and regulated by 
free market forces, individuals compete with one another in the pursuit of their self-
interest. As such they seek to maximise their competitive advantage with, at best, a 
complete disregard for the life chances of other individuals. Orientations towards the 
life in common
54
 assume, under such circumstances, a conflictual form, thereby 
becoming incapable of yielding the normative basis required for a harmonisation of 
individual plans of action at the legal level. Any successful attempt to realise the 
common good, here, would have to take place in an abstracted political sphere, where 
the tension between the general character of the former and the particularism of self-
interested actions would ultimately be exposed and force each atomised individual to 
prioritise the common good over their individual conceptions of the good life. What is 
therefore required is a system of satisfaction of needs whereby individuals can treat the 
needs and desires of other individuals as an extension of their own. Whilst Benhabib 
clearly sought to conceptualise the conditions under which a complementary reciprocity 
between the needs, talents and capacities of individuals can be achieved, the framework 
of action used failed to safeguard critical theory against the dissolution of the concrete 
particularity of human existence. Her failure to distinguish the interpretation of needs 
from their linguistic articulation in orientations towards matters regarding how 
individuals can and want to live, caused by her efforts to locate complementary 
reciprocity outside subject-object relations, has led her to dissolve the concrete 
particularity of human existence in her search for the “situatedness of interpersonal 
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 Cole, G.D.H. “Rousseau‟s Political Theory,” pp 113-4 
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 One can here still speak of orientations towards in common, for ,as was demonstrated in chapter four, 
competition and other forms of action arising from the imperatives of efficiency and productivity do 
embody normative elements. Their normative content, however, is insufficiently cooperative to be able to 
lead to a harmonisation of individual plans of action. 
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existence,” thereby falling short of creating the conditions required for the reconciliation 
of humanity with itself.
55
 Under Cole‟s institutional model, however, the representatives 
of associations of producers perform their actions in relation to the function of the 
association and orient them towards the provision of a creative service. As such, they 
must seek to coordinate their actions with the representatives of associations of 
consumers, whose role is to ensure that the represented experience self-gratifying use. 
In the case of a demand for, for example, additional bus routes by consumer councils, 
the representatives of associations responsible for public transportation services will 
inform consumer representatives of the limitations placed upon them by the technical 
demands such a request entails. The latter may offer alternative options (such as 
additional buses on, or the extension of, already existing routes) formulated in 
accordance with their current resources (labour power, machinery etc.) which would not 
directly match the original demand, but could serve to satisfy the needs of consumers 
nonetheless. Here, a complementary reciprocity between the needs of individuals qua 
producers and consumers stripped of the pressures of a free market would have 
ultimately been sought. As producers seeking to perform a creative service, then, 
individuals develop conceptions of how they can and want to live distinguishable from 
those of individuals seeking self-gratification in consumption. However, they are not 
irreconcilable, for the organisation of social life into activities oriented towards service, 
and others oriented towards use, opens up a space for complementary reciprocity. 
Furthermore, whilst the complementary reciprocity between the various conceptions of 
the good life is completed at the level of dialogue, between the various representatives, 
it effectively encompasses the concrete needs and desires of individuals as producers 
and consumers embodied in the function of the associations. One can therefore 
anticipate, here, the emergence of a framework of action capable of giving the concrete 
particularity of human existence its due in the actualisation of the situatedness of 
interpersonal existence required for a process of constitution of laws capable of giving 
the plurality of needs its due. One is nevertheless justified in asking, at this stage, what 
form a dialogical coordination capable of accomplishing the aforementioned state of 
affairs would assume. Such a concern is in fact central to a comprehensive 
understanding of the process of law formation developing within the proposed 
institutional model.  
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Under the pressure exercised by public opinion, political decision-making 
processes which, under the institutional model defended here, assume the form of 
dialogical coordination, ought to be sufficiently flexible to give the plural and rapidly 
changing character of the needs and desires of individuals its due. Dialogical 
coordination cannot, in this sense, assume the form of rational consensus. For, on the 
one hand, in virtue of their emphasis on similitude, consensual orientations lead to a 
form of action too passive for an adequate recognition of individuals‟ wills in dialogical 
coordination. It also involves too high a degree of universality to give the spontaneity of 
natural inclinations its due in dialogue, for it implies too fixed and absolute a character 
to remain open to changes in individual conceptions of the good life.  The various 
participants in the form of dialogical coordination defended here do not effectively set 
themselves the task of realising the common good, for which the generalised 
particularism attained through consensus would constitute the most appropriate form.
56
 
Instead their efforts are concentrated on the achievement of a complementary 
reciprocity between the different needs and desires of producers and consumers 
expressed as a “special kind of will” in the function of each association. Dialogical 
coordination, therefore, unfolds on the basis of individuals‟ points of difference rather 
than in relation to their identity. This is not to say that a unity between the various 
interests expressed in dialogue cannot be found, for without it, the legal foundation of 
the social order would not be possible. What is being suggested, instead, is that such a 
unity assumes the form of a temporary affinity between the various conceptions of the 
good life; a non-identical moment manifesting itself as a constellation of wills. This 
constellation is, more concretely, made up of orientations establishing the moral role 
and significance of, say, contraceptive and transportation technologies stemming from a 
temporary affinity between the demand articulated and defined by associations of 
consumers and the interpretation of this demand by producers. Thus, in a constellation 
one finds, in contrast with a rational consensus, a temporary affinity between the 
various moral orientations comprised in dialogue, and manifesting itself as a situated 
complementary reciprocity. The laws thereby constituted, in virtue of their immediate 
relation with the knowledge of empirical individuals, do not effectively mediate social 
relations in abstraction from the context of action in which these same individuals are 
engaged by, for example, sanctioning one conception of the good life and prohibiting 
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another independently of the given situation, but rather draw their legitimacy from their 
capacity to give recognition to the singularity of each situation in mediation. As such, 
approaching the legal order from the standpoint of constellation, involves attributing an 
ad’hoc character to the laws themselves, for the affinity underlying them permanently 
remains open to the possibility of a configurational change triggered by the subversive 
force of what it is not, stemming from the aesthetic impulses. In a libertarian legal order 
such as this one, the common good is no longer said to comprise interests shared by 
individuals, which connects these same individuals in virtue of what they have in 
common, but rather refers to a singular configuration of wills, which are connected to 
one another in virtue of their reciprocal complementarity. The legitimacy of laws 
related to, for example, contraceptive or transportation technologies is here determined 
by the complementary reciprocity, i.e. affinity, between the demand articulated and 
defined by consumers and the interpretation of this demand by producers at a particular 
time and place.
57
 As a constellation of wills, then, the system of rules mediating social 
relations, i.e. the laws, is stripped of the absolutising tendencies ensuing from a subject 
made sovereign by the imperatives of efficiency and productivity, thereby safeguarding 
the achievements of dialogical coordination against the dissolution of the particular. As 
a moment of pluralist generalism yielded by the dialogical coordination of functions, 
the legal framework becomes flexible enough to accommodate new individual plans of 
action manifesting themselves as a subversive force in public opinion. Norms, under 
such circumstances, can finally be expected to serve the constitution of laws capable of 
accommodating the spontaneity of natural inclinations, thus giving maximum scope to 
individuals for the control of their own conditions of existence.  
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 In this chapter I have sought to defend a revision of the practical content of 
critical theory by exposing the affinity between critical theory‟s approach to 
                                                 
57
 In their study of the Mondragon community of self-governing enterprises, Bradley and Gelb observed 
that : “Workers may benefit from the absence of a formal framework for several reasons. By their nature,  
legalistic codes at national levels are insensitive to the needs of local groups. […] Workers can press for 
more in unofficial, sequential, disputes than as an institutionalized component of the political system with 
broader responsibilities.” Mondragon therefore serves to confirm both the possibility of, and desirability 
for, a form of pluralist generalism of the kind defended here. Bradley, K. and Gleb, A. (1983) 
Cooperation at Work: The Mondragon Experience, London: Heinemann, p 43 
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emancipation as reconciliation and the institutional framework elaborated by G.D.H. 
Cole. In order to shed light on the relevance of his libertarian socialism to critical 
theory, however, I had to proceed with a demonstration of the capacity of his 
institutional framework to actualise the reconciliation of humanity and nature (internal 
and external) at the economic, epistemological and political levels. It was therefore 
argued, firstly, that the re-organisation of economic life into associations of producers 
and consumers seeking to engage in creative service and self-gratifying use 
respectively, would effectively turn the satisfaction of needs into a process of self-
realisation capable of performing socially integrative functions. Then, it was shown how 
functional representation of individuals’ wills at the dialogical level could serve the 
translation of the aforementioned reconciliation into the fabric of emancipatory 
knowledge in the form of a subversive pluralistic public opinion. Finally, it was argued 
that the dialogically coordinated complementary reciprocity between creative service 
and self-gratifying use would, as decision-making processes ensuing in a constellation 
of wills, locate the process of identity formation at the centre of deliberative decision-
making processes and assume a sufficiently flexible and democratic form to 
accommodate the rapidly and constantly changing character of the norms comprised in 
the pluralistic public opinion and turn them into the basis of a legitimate legal order. As 
an institutional model capable of turning the reflexive capacity of individuals affirming 
themselves as beings with a unique cognitive and sensuous make-up, Cole‟s libertarian 
socialism provides a framework of action whereby individuals could be in a position to 
maximise their participation in the constitution of the rules regulating their life in 
common. It is, therefore, an institutional model entirely suitable for a critical theory 
seeking to actualise human emancipation as the reconciliation of humanity and nature.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
Socio-historicising the New Practical Content of Critical Theory  
 
 
From Kant to Cole 
 
Building on the critique of political economy of Karl Marx, the critical theory of 
the Frankfurt School and the libertarian socialism of G.D.H. Cole, the task of the 
present work has revolved around the formulation of a social critique aimed at the 
institutionalisation of the reconciliation of humanity with both internal and external 
nature. To begin with, it was suggested that the first attempt to conceptualise autonomy 
as a matter regarding the relationship between humanity and nature could be traced back 
to the works of “modern”‟ philosopher, Immanuel Kant. In the first chapter, the author 
did indeed seek to show that from Kant onwards, any attempt to conceptualise the form 
of knowledge capable of yielding autonomy became a problem of mediation between 
subjective faculties and the forces of nature (both internal and external). With Kant, 
then, such a relationship came to assume the form of a mediated unity of subject and 
object, manifesting itself as an asymmetry between cognitive and sensuous energies, 
with the former dominating the latter. As such, the modern age marked the advent of a 
form of autonomy understood as mastery. The problem with such a conception was 
exposed by the earlier generation of the Frankfurt School
1
 – especially Adorno and 
Horkheimer – who argued that by approaching objective forces (instinctual impulses 
and the forces of external nature) as dangerous and requiring mastery, it effectively led 
to the repression of internal nature at both the epistemological and institutional levels. 
Autonomy, they thought, could not limit itself to a mere preservation of the self against 
external forces, for this would create conditions of existence restricting social practice 
to the hostility of actions oriented towards survival. Instead, it ought to be understood as 
the realisation of both cognitive and sensuous faculties. From Kant to Marx, Adorno 
argued, approaches to autonomy had failed to strip themselves of the reifying tendencies 
                                                 
1
 It must be noted, however, that the problems associated with the instrumental mastery of nature had also 
been explored by thinkers such as Heidegger in The Question Concerning Technology and Arendt in The 
Human Condition.  
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of the sovereign subject. What is therefore required is an approach to autonomy 
presupposing the reconciliation of cognitive faculties with the sensuous ones.  
Whilst the Marxian critique of political economy contained clear limitations, it 
was suggested that the earlier generation of critical theorists, especially Adorno, had 
failed to identify the emancipatory potential of Marx‟s concept of free labour.2 A case 
was indeed made for the latter‟s capacity to grasp autonomy as the “open revelation of 
human faculties”3 through labour, and where the term “human” encompasses both the 
subjective and objective dimensions of existence. It was therefore argued that such a 
conception of autonomy, although more implicitly stated than the instrumental mastery 
of nature in Marx‟s early works, could provide a conceptual basis for the mediation of 
subject and object required in reconciliation. Thus, by defending labour as self-
realisation as the mediating agent of reconciliation, a first call for the revision of critical 
theory‟s practical content was made.  
A second call for revision was suggested by attempting to defend Habermas‟s 
own task, namely the conceptualisation of the institutional arrangement capable of 
actualising reconciliation. Marcuse‟s reliance on both civic disobedience and a 
providential subject had led him to fall short of fulfilling the promises of the principle of 
negativity, i.e. of turning critical theory into a force capable of informing a form of 
political action oriented towards the institutionalisation of both emancipatory practice 
and the corresponding form of knowledge.
4
 What was therefore suggested is a revision 
of the practical content of critical theory in such a way as to orient its subversive 
inclinations towards the implementation of a clearly identifiable set of institutions 
capable of creating the material and epistemological conditions for emancipation from 
the repressive conditions of existence brought about by the advanced stage of capitalist 
development. This was precisely what Habermas‟s own revision of critical theory partly 
sought to achieve. However, by treating reconciliation as a matter strictly regarding 
intersubjective relations mediated by language, and failing to strip communicative 
rationality of the sovereign subject‟s repressive tendencies, he effectively fell behind not 
only the earlier generation of critical theorists, but even Marx himself.
5
 A third call for 
revision was then suggested, namely the conceptualisation of an alternative institutional 
model based on new subject-object relations, i.e. a form of mediation between humanity 
                                                 
2
 See chapter two 
3
 Marx, K. Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p 102 
4
 See chapter three 
5
 See chapters four and five 
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and external nature accommodating orientations towards a life in common capable of 
actualising the “open revelation of human faculties.” 
I then proceeded with an attempt to demonstrate how the foundations of the 
institutional framework elaborated by G.D.H. Cole could effectively serve to fulfil the 
promises of critical theory.  Whilst the penultimate chapter of the present work sought 
to elucidate the elective affinity between his libertarian socialist model and critical 
theory, the final chapter attempted to show how a re-organisation of social, economic 
and political life into associations of producers and consumers coordinating their 
decisions and actions through dialogue, could serve the institutionalisation of 
emancipatory practice approached from the standpoint as reconciliation.  
The present work can therefore be seen as an attempt to revive the radicalism of 
the earlier generation of Frankfurt School theorists, and reconcile it with the conceptual 
elaboration of an alternative set of socio-political institutions capable of actualising 
human emancipation initiated by Habermas in The Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere. It was further attempted to show that aesthetic negation‟s orientation 
towards the possible and the earlier generation‟s concern with the relationship between 
humanity and nature as a matter regarding subject-object relations could be translated 
into a political form assigning Marx‟s concept of labour as self-realisation the role of 
“transform[ing] individual need into an aesthetic value with cognitive content” and 
emancipating society from the repressive rule of instrumental reason.
6
 Cole‟s libertarian 
socialism, therefore, could be said to share orientations found in both Marx‟s and the 
Frankfurt School‟s work. Firstly, as the loci of production‟s actualisation into a socially 
useful form of creative activity, Cole‟s associations of producers would effectively give 
life to Marx‟s concept of “free labour.” Secondly, Cole‟s treatment of consumption as a 
dimension of internal nature and his call for its re-organisation into associations of 
consumers provides a basis upon which the culture industry, along with the “repressive 
desublimation” it causes, could be superseded by self-gratifying forms of use. Finally, 
whilst the dialogue between representatives of producer and consumer associations 
thought to be required for actual democratic control may, in virtue of its economic 
character, consist in a departure from Habermas‟s stance, it provides a suitable basis for 
the development of communicative practices oriented towards the harmonisation of 
individual plans of action, which the second generation critical theorist has been keen to 
                                                 
6
 Schecter, D. Beyond Hegemony, p 160 
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concretise. The project defended here, in sum, aims to give life to the realm of the 
possible unleashed by Marx‟s critique of political economy and the critical theory of the 
Frankfurt School.  
Where, however, does such a project stand in the recent literature on modernity 
and capitalism, and the contemporary conditions of existence they seek to investigate? 
After all, a defence of the critique of instrumental reason of the earlier generation of 
Frankfurt School theorists against the more recent developments in critical theory raises 
concerns regarding the relevance of the present project to contemporary conditions of 
existence. As Wagner argued,
7
 social theory cannot overlook the manner in which social 
reality is both experienced and interpreted by individuals making up this social reality, 
and as the narratives found in the recent literature on capitalism seem to converge 
towards the view of a new age or phase of social and economic development, the 
relationship between the present work and the so-called “new capitalism” cannot be 
ignored. 
 
 
 “New Capitalism:” Overview of the Mainstream Literature 
 
 The task of establishing the relationship between the present work and the recent 
literature on capitalism shall serve to assess the revised form of critical theory proposed 
here in the light of what are considered to be problems of a contemporary nature. 
Although the fact of providing an overview cannot do justice to both the breadth and 
precision of views and claims provided by the relevant authors, an identification of the 
general lines of argumentation should serve as a fair and sufficient indication of the 
types of issues and phenomena thought to characterise contemporary society in their 
works.  
The recent literature on contemporary capitalism has tended to concentrate its 
attention on the various social, cultural, political implications of a change from an 
“industrial” age, to what is usually referred to as a post-fordist regime of capital 
accumulation thought to characterise contemporary capitalism in a “high,” “late,” or 
“liquid” phase of modernity. Giddens8 and Beck9 have, for example, sought to 
                                                 
7
 See his work entitled Modernity as Experience and Interpretation. 
8
 Giddens, A. (1991) The Consequences of  Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press 
9
 Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, London: Sage Publications  
  
184 
 
emphasise the partly destabilising effects of the decline of traditional forms of social 
integration caused by the increasing prominence of “danger” and “risk” emanating from 
a previously unknown rate of “techno-economic development.”10 Other authors, such as 
Sennett,
11
 Boltanski and Chiapello,
12
 and Harvey,
13
 have concentrated a great deal of 
their attention on the flexible nature of the new regime of capital accumulation 
characterising the post-fordist era, as well as on its effects on both individuals and the 
wider social, political and cultural realms. They have concluded, in a more or less 
similar vein to Beck and Giddens, that such new developments have effectively led to 
the emergence of a world characterised, at least in appearance, by what Harvey himself 
described as “the new, the fleeting, the ephemeral, the fugitive, and the contingent.”14 
From the point of view of the individuals making up the social world, then, one could 
ague, as Bauman
15
 did, that the apparent instability characterising the “liquid” phase of 
modernity has led them to develop a longing for security.
16
   
The various narratives found in the aforementioned mainstream literature on 
contemporary capitalism all tend to share common concerns regarding the human 
condition, now thought to be characterised by an overwhelming sense of insecurity and 
uncertainty, caused by a social world increasingly exposed to remote and unreachable 
systemic structures underpinned by a flexible regime of accumulation and the 
unpredictable development of productive forces. As such, the “new” capitalism is 
contrasted with its predecessor, whose heavily bureaucratised institutions and regulated 
markets are thought to underpin an age of “solidity” causing a longing for freedom, 
                                                 
10
 Ibid, p 20 
11
 Sennett, R. (1998) The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New 
Capitalism, London: W.W. Norton; Sennett, R. (2006) The Culture of the New Capitalism, New Haven: 
Yale University Press 
12
 Boltanski, L. and Chiapello, E. (1999) Le Nouvel Esprit du Capitalisme, Paris: Gallimard  
13
 Harvey, D. (1990) The Condition of Postmodernity : An Inquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change, 
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 
14
 Ibid, p 171 
15
 Bauman, Z. (2000) Liquid Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press  
16
 It must be noted here that whilst the mainstream literature more or less tends to treat the instability and 
uncertainty of the social reality as factual, Mark Neocleous and Kevin Doogan have sought to expose the 
manufactured character of such features. In his Critique of Security, Neocleous described security “as a 
mode of governing, a political technology through which individuals, groups, classes, and, ultimately, 
modern capital is reshaped and reordered.” Neocleous, M. (2008) Critique of Security, Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, p 4. Doogan pursued a similar line of argumentation by defending the view 
according to which “job insecurity might be usefully reconceputalized as a broader social insecurity 
arising out of the representation of globalization and the restructuring of welfare regimes, rather than an 
outcome of technological innovation and job obsolescence.” Doogan, K. (2009) New Capitalism? The 
transformation of work, Cambridge: Polity Press, p 10. The task of establishing whether the instability 
and uncertainty of the contemporary social world is ideological or actual falls outside the scope of the 
present work. What shall remain significant, however, is the predominance of the discourse on security in 
the interpretation that individuals have of their own experiences.  
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autonomy, and creativity in individuals. One is therefore justified in asking, here, what 
exactly the implications of this change from a previously prominent longing for freedom 
to a recently widespread longing for security are for the revision proposed in the present 
work  
 
 
Critical Theory and the “New Capitalism” 
 
The critique of instrumental reason elaborated by the earlier generation of 
Frankfurt School thinkers was, above all, aimed at uncovering the conditions of 
existence which have suspended the emancipatory potential of reason, and turned the 
latter into an instrument of repression. The principle of self-preservation underpinning 
modern societies, they argued, created conditions of existence of such a hostile nature 
that reason rapidly came to be associated with an instrument for the preservation of the 
self against external forces.
17
 In virtue of its manifestation as a form of self-defence, 
then, the modern conception of autonomy has, from its inception, effectively subsumed 
liberty under security. As such, one could argue that it also presupposes the perception 
of the social reality as an insecure realm, and in which the demands for security cause 
those for liberty to recede into the background. Furthermore, by serving the mastery of 
both internal and external nature, perceived as the sources of the aforementioned 
“external forces,” reason effectively turned itself against the spontaneity of human 
existence, thereby turning “relations of men and historical forces” into “relations of 
things and „natural‟ laws.” 18 As structures increasingly appear remote and 
unreachable,
19
 and the aggressive mastery of nature becomes increasingly questioned,
20
 
the need for social critique to rethink the relationship not only between humanity and 
nature, but also between individual and society, becomes a pressing matter. For if 
                                                 
17
 As Neocleous pointed out, the sense of insecurity yielded by modern conditions of existence had 
already been identified by Marx, in The Communist Manifesto: “The bourgeoisie cannot exist without 
constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with 
them the whole relations of society [….] Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted 
disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch 
from all earlier ones.”‟ Marx cited in Neocleous, M. (2008) Critique of Security, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, p 28. 
18
 Marcuse, H. Reason and Revolution, p 112 
19
 Financial crises (such as the one taking place in 2008) play a significant role in revealing how an 
institution created by individuals themselves – such as the financial market – can eventually acquire a life 
of its own. 
20
 See the introduction for a selection of sociological works addressing such issues. 
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critical theory is to be expected to serve as a means to overcome the insecurity yielded 
by the principle of self-preservation, it must be capable of confronting it with a socio-
political model in which the dialectical relationship between humanity and nature is re-
articulated into one whereby individuals can finally be expected to liberate both the 
sensuous and cognitive dimensions of internal nature, whilst treating external nature as 
a partner in emancipation. For it has been shown, throughout the present work, that a 
sociological understanding of human emancipation – as opposed to a merely 
psychological or intersubjective one – effectively depends on recognising the dialectical 
relation between internal and external nature.  
Critique‟s general failure to provide an answer to what Wagner called the 
“political problématique” of modernity partly contributed, he argued, to the rise of 
individualism in the years following the events of 1968.
21
 Its incapacity to anticipate an 
alternative “life in common” in the face of the “de-collectivizing”‟ implied by the 
dismantling of what is usually referred to as “organised modernity” or “organised 
capitalism,” meant that critique “contained individualization as a possible outcome.”22 
As such it could be argued that, in virtue of its “failure to construct a viable political 
form,” critique effectively paved the way for the development of demands for security 
characterising the period following the events of 1968. Although Boltanski and 
Chiapello approached the problems associated with the theoretical orientations guiding 
the latter social uprisings from a different standpoint, they drew similar conclusions. 
According to them, the failure of the events of 1968 ought to be attributed to a failure to 
combine the demands of both “social” and “artistic” critiques. Whilst the demands for 
authenticity, autonomy and creativity characteristic of the latter form of critique had 
been successful in freeing individuals from the bureaucratic constraints of organised 
capitalism, their divorce from the demands for equality and solidarity characteristic of 
social critique has led to the emergence of a “connexionist world” both only capable of 
translating the demands of the artistic critique into flexibility, and inducing a sense of 
precariousness into social life.
23
  
Socio-historical experience in advanced capitalist societies has also shown that 
social critique‟s success depends on exposing the subsumption of liberty under security 
in autonomy, and ensuring that the demands for the former are no longer obscured by 
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 Wagner, P. Modernity as Experience and Interpretation, p 71 
22
 Ibid, p 71 
23
 Boltanski, L. and Chiapello, E. Le Nouvel Esprit du Capitalisme 
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the demands by the latter. Such a task can be achieved by exposing the incompatibility 
of the principle of self-preservation underpinning the conditions of existence under the 
capitalist mode of production with human emancipation. Since capital accumulation 
thrives on insecurity,
24
 economic security becomes a priority; without it, “liberty is 
meaningless.”‟25 Insecurity, therefore ought to be conceptualised in terms of an 
incapacity for individuals to emancipate themselves from the repressive mechanisms 
flourishing under the aggressive mastery of nature caused by the principle of self-
preservation. Social critique must, in this sense, seek to “take[…] us beyond the narrow 
horizon of bourgeois security”26 The task of ensuring that the demands for autonomy 
translate into demands for liberty therefore depends on the formulation a social critique 
presenting capitalism as an hindrance to liberty – or fundamental cause for the 
repression of internal nature – rather than as an hindrance to security, and opposing it 
to an institutional model capable of yielding human emancipation. In sum, critical 
theory ought be revised in such a way as to a) include a viable political form that b) 
succeeds in combining the orientations characterising both social and artistic critiques 
and c) translating the demands for control into demands for human emancipation. How, 
then, can the new practical content of critical theory elaborated in the present work 
accomplish such a task? 
 In order to provide an answer, a slightly more detailed account of the two forms 
of critique identified by Boltanski and Chiapello shall first be provided. On the one 
hand, based on objections of a moral nature inspired by socialists and marxists, the 
social critique seeks to tackle the causes of inequalities, exploitation and social 
fragmentation. On the other, based on objections of an aesthetic nature inspired by the 
“bohemian lifestyle,” the artistic critique attacks the causes of the loss of authenticity, 
meaning, and creative autonomy. Both critiques, therefore, “are  not immediately 
compatible.”27 In order to be able to conceptualise an alternative life in common 
successfully combining the demands of the two critiques, one must therefore seek to 
identify the conditions of existence connecting the sources of the phenomena at which 
their attacks are directed.  
                                                 
24
 See Marx‟s The Communist Manifesto and Neocleous‟s Critique of Security. 
25
 Neocleous, M. The Critique of Security, p 83 
26
 Ibid, p 186 
27
 Ibid, p 84. Please note that this is my own translation of: “ne sont pas immédiatement compatibles” 
found in the original version of the text.  
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Such sources have, in fact, already been identified by the earlier generation of 
the Frankfurt School. Their consistent attack on the instrumental mastery of both 
internal and external nature, although primarily aimed at uncovering the conditions 
suppressing authenticity, meaning and creative autonomy, could indeed provide the 
theoretical foundations upon which demands for equality, solidarity and security can be 
combined with those for emancipation.
28
 By tracing the hostile character of existing 
conditions of existence to a subject made sovereign by the principle of self-preservation, 
seeking to repress the spontaneity of objective existence, and creating conditions 
whereby social reality has come to appear as “„relations of things and „natural‟ laws” – 
also known as the phenomenon of reification – critical theory effectively opened itself 
up to the challenge of anticipating a life in common where reality can finally appear as 
“relations of men and historical forces,” i.e. where humanity can be reconciled with 
both external nature and itself. The earlier generation of Frankfurt School theorists, 
however, did not seek to take on this challenge. It has indeed fallen short of employing 
its theoretical tools for the elaboration of the socio-political form corresponding to a 
world in which individuals could become capable, on a daily basis, to engage 
cooperatively with “the task of mastering reality as self-conscious practice.”29 
It was Habermas who first undertook the task of conceptualising a life in 
common in which some of the demands of both critiques would be met. His “theory of 
communicative action” effectively sought to combine orientations towards both justice 
and autonomy. However, it was shown that by locating issues regarding the life in 
common outside the framework of subject-object relations, he had failed to tackle the 
root source of the phenomenon – reification – underpinning the problems identified by 
the two forms of critique, namely manipulative subject-object relations.
30
 The task of 
anticipating the right life in common thus becomes, at this point, one directed at the 
reconciliation of the subject with the object.  
The present revision, deeply indebted to the work of prominent figures in the 
more or less recent debate on the contemporary relevance of libertarian socialism,
31
 has 
indeed aimed at elaborating the theoretical foundations for the institutionalisation of a 
form of self-conscious practice meeting the demands for authenticity, meaning, 
                                                 
28
 The adoption of Marx‟s concept of “human production,” also known as free labour or labour as self-
realisation, has indeed partly served to give the demands of the social critique their due.  
29
 Marcuse, H. Reason and Revolution, p 110 
30
 See chapters four and five.  
31
 See, for example, the works of Chris Wyatt and Darrow Schecter. 
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autonomy, equality, solidarity, and approached from the standpoint of the socially and 
historically mediated reconciliation of humanity and nature, inspired by Marx and the 
Frankfurt School. More specifically, such a task involved the elaboration of an 
institutional framework capable of a) giving the spontaneity of objective existence its 
due in social practice and political decision-making – meeting the demands for 
authenticity, meaning and creativity, b) giving individuals control over their conditions 
of existence – meeting the demands for autonomy , c) aligning the common good with 
individual conceptions of the good life – meeting the demands for solidarity and 
equality. It was shown that the achievement of such a state of affairs effectively 
presupposes the substitution of the principle of self-preservation with the principle of 
self-realisation, inspired by Marx‟s own concept of free labour. In institutional terms, 
such a substitution would involve a re-organisation of social, economic and political life 
into associations of producers and consumers in dialogue with one  another. Under such 
circumstances, imperatives of efficiency and productivity would effectively vanish to be 
replaced by imperatives of creative service and self-gratifying use, dialogically 
coordinated by representatives of associations of producers and consumers organised 
into political associations. As such, the longing for security experienced by individuals 
as a) alienated, individualised and exploited producers increasingly exposed to market 
fluctuations brought about by the flexibility of post-fordist regimes of accumulation, 
and b) consumers both seeking pleasure in standardised,
32
 mass produced cultural 
goods, and increasingly exposed to the repressive mechanisms of the culture industry, is 
here said to be overcome by the democratic and cooperative re-organisation of subject-
object relations aimed at the institutionalisation of emancipation as the reconciliation of 
humanity and nature. Libertarian socialism not only corresponds to a radically different 
relationship between humanity and nature, it also marks the advent of a new 
relationship between the individual and society, where the former engages with the 
latter as a realm of self-conscious practice.  
The so-called “new” phase of capitalist development, usually defined as the neo-
liberal age, and thought to emerge, at least partly, as a response to the demands of the 
artistic critique, has only been capable of translating creative autonomy into flexibility, 
and diffused new and sophisticated forms of control, thereby contributing to the 
                                                 
32
 This search for pleasure in the consumption of cultural goods, Adorno argued, is motivated by a 
“[l]onging for a „feeling on safe ground‟” and reflects “an infantile need for protection” characteristic of a 
“freely competitive society,” such as one underpinned by the principle of self-preservation. Adorno, T.W. 
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increasing remoteness between individuals and society and the further degradation of 
the bonds between individuals themselves. As such, it marked the advent of the age of 
an apparent “anything goes”‟ and ruthless individualism, both characterising the 
radicalisation of the principle of self-preservation. Whilst the role played by the artistic 
critique embodied in the critical theory of the Frankfurt School in the 1968 uprisings 
was somewhat undeniable, its divorce from the concerns characterising social critique 
and the absence of a clear formulation of its political orientations, made it incapable of 
providing individuals with the theoretical tools required for the development of a 
coherent political alternative both meeting the demands for justice and complementing 
resistance. Now equipped with the political orientations capable of guiding individuals 
towards the practical application of an alternative life in common approached from the 
standpoint of reconciliation, critical theory can finally be expected to play a role in 
shaping political life, and even contribute to the revival of political radicalism in an age 
whereby the discredited legacy of statist forms of socio-political alternatives, combined 
with an incapacity to move beyond the conception of autonomy as security, have led 
major political parties of the Left in Europe
33
 to redefine themselves as allies to 
capitalist forces. The author of this thesis does not expect to solve all the existing 
problems with libertarian socialism, the critique of instrumental reason or the theory of 
communicative action elaborated by Habermas. The task has rather been one aimed at 
demonstrating that as a social and artistic critique oriented towards the practical 
realisation of a libertarian socialist institutional model, critical theory has a fresh and 
valuable role to play in both piercing the veil of, and challenging, the neo-liberal 
ideology permeating contemporary society.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33
 The Parti Socialiste in France, the Labour Party in England, and the Sozialdemocratische Partei of 
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